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Abstract 
This thesis explores the process of controlled affect regulation – the deliberate control 
of feelings and expressions – in terms of its dynamics. The thesis takes the perspective 
that affect is a dynamic and controllable process, regulated towards held goals, which 
themselves are controllable and dynamic. It is argued that affect regulation dynamics 
are underexplored, as are the dynamics of the related concepts of self-regulatory 
capacity and affect goal adjustment. 
A model of affect regulation dynamics (MARDy) is presented, which integrates affect 
regulation, self-regulatory capacity, and affect goal adjustment, within a control theory 
framework. A computational simulation of the MARDy model is constructed and 
known trends in affect are simulated. The model further offers predictions of affect 
dynamics and understanding of underlying mechanisms involved. 
Two studies are conducted to collect data for model representation. In Study 1, affect 
diary data are collected from five university staff and students. Parameter values for the 
model are derived from determining best fitting correlations of model results with the 
diary data across dimensions of felt-affect, self-regulatory capacity, felt-affect goals and 
affect-expression goals. In Study 2, affect diary data are collected from six teaching 
staff at a local primary school. This study extends beyond the first, to also incorporate 
data for affect-expressions. The capacity for the model to represent this second data set 
is assessed, using the protocol from Study 1. 
In a third, simulated, study, the model is extended to represent a network of two 
individuals. Propositions regarding affect dynamics across the dyad are made and tested 
in simulation. Considerations are offered for dyad representation in the affect regulation 
literature. 
The proposed dynamics of affect regulation, arising from model development and the 
three studies described, are discussed in terms of current literature; theoretical and 
practical implications of model results and propositions are discussed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter outlines the general research area, the content, and structure of the thesis. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, this chapter presents a broad 
outline of the developments of affect research and research directions within the field, 
particularly that of understanding affect in terms of being a controllable, social and 
dynamic process. Alongside this, the topic of self-regulation is introduced and the 
process of controlling affect is viewed in the context of the capacity for engaging in 
self-regulation. Second, this chapter presents an overview of the research approach and 
methods used in the thesis and the research aims for the project. Third, this chapter 
presents brief descriptions of the contents of the two parts to the thesis and each chapter 
within. 
1.1 Research Area 
Our everyday lives are shaped and characterised by how we feel. Our emotions and 
moods appear to both influence our actions and decisions in life and to be influenced by 
them. Yet, it is only recently that the cognitive revolution, of examining people as 
rational processing agents, has given way to an affective revolution, of examining 
people in terms of the influence of affective processes (e.g., Panksepp, 2003). Affect, as 
a term, encompasses both emotions and moods, which are differentiated by their 
duration, intensity, and specificity (e.g., Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005; Frijda, 1993; 
Scherer, 1984). Emotions are shorter-lasting, more intense feelings, occurring in 
response to events, while moods are longer-lasting, less intense, background feelings, 
occurring without specific cause. Often though, these distinctions can be muddied and 
many researchers prefer to use the more general term of affect for examining feelings 
(e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007; Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Russell, 2003). 
Formal research in development of theories of affect can be dated back to James (1884), 
in which an argument is made for the existence of affect solely as a property of 
physiological changes. This theory is best characterised in James’s own description, “we 
feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble” (p. 
190). Around the same time, Carl Lange independently devised a similar perspective on 
affect (Lange, 1885/1922) and so the theory that physiological responses define the 
affective experience, with different responses forming different affective states, came to 
be termed the James-Lange theory (e.g., Cannon, 1927).  Elements of this theory can 
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still be seen in more recent developments in affect research, forming an integral part of 
the facial-feedback hypothesis, which argues that affective experiences are, in part, 
influenced by expressions (e.g., Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Laird, 1984). 
The James-Lange theory has faced substantial challenges since its inception. Most 
notably, criticism highlights the relatively slow pace of physiological changes in 
comparison to the more immediate affective response and the wide range of affective 
experiences that are associated with broadly similar physiological responses (Cannon, 
1927). An alternative theory, based on Cannon’s arguments and Bard’s animal lesion 
studies (e.g., Bard, 1939) termed the Cannon-Bard theory, posits that the physiological 
reaction and the affective experience coincide but the emotional experience is an 
independent construct. However, this perspective creates an ambiguity about affect’s 
origin. 
This uncertainty of affect’s origin is resolved with the development of theories of 
appraisal, which specify that there is a cognitive component to the affective experience. 
Schachter and Singer’s (1962) two-factor theory, which describes the process of 
attributing physiological changes to specific affect-relevant events or circumstances as 
the cognitive aspect of affect, supplants the Cannon-Bard theory through its provision of 
an origin for affect. Further emphasis on the cognitive aspect of emotional experience is 
seen in the theory put forward by Lazarus (1968, 1991), which argues that individuals’ 
affective experiences arise from evaluations of events from the environment. In an 
initial appraisal, an individual assesses if an event supports or hinders his or her held 
goals and so determines whether the experience will be pleasant or unpleasant. 
Following this, a second appraisal is made regarding the capabilities for coping with 
this occurrence, which is argued to shape the actual affective state experienced.  
The theory put forward by Lazarus (e.g., 1968) shows a lasting influence on affective 
research and can be seen to have shaped recent approaches to the investigation of affect 
discussed in this thesis. The principle of coping with an affect eliciting event underpins 
theories of affect regulation, although this field has broadened and developed the 
concept (see section 1.1.2). Also, the evaluation of events as affective in terms of their 
influence on goal pursuit is echoed in the modern control theory literature, particularly 
in Power’s (1974, 2005) description of affect as an indicator that behaviour needs 
adjustment to reach goals (see section 1.1.3). A further contribution is the reference to 
affective experiences developing over time, namely that of an initial appraisal and then 
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subsequent appraisal of affect eliciting stimuli, shaping the affective experience. 
However, how an affect experience unfolds in time and the course of affect change with 
time is, until recently, relatively under-examined (e.g., Kuppens, Oravecz, & 
Tuerlinckx, 2010; Scherer 2009). 
1.1.1 Affect as a Dynamic Process 
A fundamental development in modern affect research is the consideration of affect in 
terms of its dynamics (e.g., Eaton & Funder, 2001; Hemenover, 2003). It has been 
argued that although, in past affect research, emotions have been considered as brief, 
momentary responses, they should perhaps be considered as unfolding, longer-term 
processes (Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans, & Van Goozen, 1991). Further to this, it is put 
forward that, even throughout the course of a single affective experience, aspects such 
as intensity may dynamically unfold (Verduyn, Van Mechelen, Tuerlinckx, Meers, & 
Van Coillie, 2009). Similarly, evidence points towards moods not being homogenous, 
background states but feelings that vary with some degrees of regularity over the course 
of a week (e.g., Parkinson, Briner, Totterdell, & Reynolds, 1996) and a day (Murray, 
Allen, & Trinder, 2002; Owens et al., 2000).  
Daily life is characterised by affective changes, which come with the day-to-day ups 
and downs of comforts and hassles. Affective changes are argued to exist so that 
individuals can be informed of an important change in the environment (e.g., Frijda, 
2007) and the dynamic nature of affect is argued to be the very reason people 
experience affect at all (Kuppens et al., 2010). Individual differences in affective 
dynamics are considered an important factor influencing everyday experiences (Eaton & 
Funder, 2001). Moreover, atypical affective dynamics, such as emotional inertia 
(wherein a person’s emotions are slow to change) or heightened affective responses, are 
associated with affective disorders, such as depression (e.g., Rottenberg, 2005), or 
personality disorders, such as Borderline Personality Disorder (e.g., Trull et al., 2008). 
Research into the underlying dynamics of affect is still a developing field, possibly 
because study designs traditionally used in psychological research are structured to 
investigate static variables (Larsen, Augustine, & Prizmic, 2009). Although study 
designs and methods used in affect research are diverse, including but not limited to: 
experiments (e.g., Richards & Gross, 2000), brain lesion studies (Bechara, 2004), 
observational methods (e.g., Locke, 1996), and cross-sectional self-reports (Zapf, 2002), 
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these do not typically offer understanding of affect from a dynamic perspective. Diary 
studies (e.g., Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell & Kellet, 2008) offer insights into how affect 
changes across time and can act as a standpoint for developing simulations of 
underlying affect dynamics (e.g., Oravecz, Tuerlinckx, & Vandekerckhove, 2009, 
2011). 
Recent years have seen what has been termed an ‘explosion of interest’ (Gratch, 
Marsella, & Petta, 2009, p. 1) in examining the dynamic process of affect through the 
use of computer simulation. While there has long been research investigating and 
describing affect change across time (e.g., Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 
1989; Soloman & Corbit, 1974), the availability of computational modelling offers new 
means of representing and offering predictions regarding the dynamic courses of affect. 
These include describing the variability in affect associated with personality traits, 
(Oravecz et al., 2009, 2011), representing decisions made based on affective 
information in virtual agents (e.g., Gratch & Marsella, 2005), and modelling the 
dynamics of affect in individuals attempting to control their affect state (Bosse, Pontier, 
& Treur, 2010). The understanding of affect dynamics has been considered a challenge 
worthy of comprehensive investigation (e.g., Boker, 2002) and is anticipated to be a 
fundamental step in further understanding affect as a process (Scherer, 2000a). 
Computation modelling can offer a substantial contribution to understanding the 
dynamics of the process of affect regulation (Sloman, 2001). 
1.1.2 Affect as a Controllable Process 
As a parallel to the understanding that affect exists as phenomena changing over time, 
an important development in affect research is the recognition that affect can be actively 
changed (Thompson, 1994). Rather than simply being aspects of lives that just happen 
with people as passive recipients, affective experiences are now considered to be 
phenomena that people can seek out, engage with, and, in some ways, control (e.g., 
Parrot, 1993). In many circumstances, it may be important to control what is felt, such 
as trying to keep calm in the face of anger or fear eliciting events or stimuli. 
Affect regulation is now considered to be an integral part of the affect experience; so 
much so, that very few, if any, affect experiences are thought to escape regulation (e.g., 
Frijda, 2007), It is argued that to experience affect is to have undergone affect 
regulation (Scherer, 2000b). Models of affect regulation, such as the widely regarded 
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process theory (Gross, 1998a) pose that all affective situations, before developing as an 
affective experience, are in some way regulated. Gross’s theory draws affect regulation 
into two broad categories: regulation of feelings, termed antecedent focused regulation, 
and regulation of expressions, termed response focused regulation. 
The distinction between the regulation of affect as a felt process and regulation of affect 
as an expressed process is also made in the literature examining affect in more applied 
contexts. Hochschild (1983) poses that many employees in organisations, such as those 
in customer service, are expected in the course of their duties to present specific affect 
displays. This is considered to be achieved through two means: surface acting, which is 
the regulation and presentation of a target expression without influencing the felt state 
(thus, analogous to response focused regulation); and deep acting, which is the 
regulation of one’s felt state so that one’s affect-expression will, in turn, change (thus, 
analogous to antecedent focused regulation). The regulation of affect-expression serves 
as an important aspect of interpersonal communication; in this context, affect regulation 
of one’s own affect state can ultimately influence how others feel. 
One of the underlying assumptions within the process of affect regulation is that affect 
is regulated towards a specific, known goal state (e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007). As 
such, affect regulation exists as a continuous loop: monitoring of affect, comparison 
against preferred, or necessary, affect, and seeking to change affect based on this 
comparison. This goal-directed process serves an adaptive function for affect regulation 
because it enables affect to be influenced so that people may work towards hedonistic or 
instrumental aims (e.g., Tamir, 2009a). This conceptualisation of affect and affect 
regulation places it within the broader field of self-regulation and goal-directed action. 
1.1.3 Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation, as a field of research, considers human action to be goal-driven (e.g., 
Austin & Vancouver, 1996); goals may be major or minor, short-term or long-term, and 
in the forefront of attention or more general background considerations. Actions and 
decisions are considered to be chosen, based on the pursuit of these held goals in life 
(e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; Powers, 1974). This concept of free decision of one 
choice over another and volition of action has arisen from the perspective of the 
existence of free-will. The existence of free-will in persons or a deterministic direction 
of action has long been debated in philosophy and considered in psychology under 
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terms such as will (James, 1892) and ego (Freud, 1927), although is regarded by some 
to be too nebulous a debate to be resolved (e.g., Baumeister, 2008). Self-regulation, and 
particularly the sub-study of self-control, stems from the view that at least some action 
or cognition can at times arise from volition. 
In recent years, the subject of self-control has seen a dramatic increase in interest and 
there exists an abundance of studies examining the influence of persistence in self-
control engagement (for recent reviews see Gailliot, 2008; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2010; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). A prominent assumption in research 
into self-control is that its use draws from a limited capacity to actively engage in the 
suppression of one predisposed action in favour of another (e.g., Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000). This can lead to a temporary diminishment in the capacity to 
regulate actions, thoughts, or feelings, termed ego-depletion, echoing Freud’s (1927) 
concept of the conscious self as an ego, rationalising and tempering the id, while 
striving to adhere to the super-ego’s standards. Lapses in self-control are considered to 
occur when individuals know what action they ought to take, in order to work towards 
their goals, and yet choose alternative actions, such as eating unhealthy foods while 
dieting or overspending money while wanting to save for the future (e.g., Baumeister & 
Heatherton, 1996).  
In terms of affect regulation, self-regulatory capacity and ego-depletion are seen to 
influence the capacity to manage feelings and expressions (e.g., Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998), further emphasising that affect regulation is a goal-directed process. 
Moreover, affect regulation is considered to exist as part of an integrated framework of 
multiple tiered goals (e.g., Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003) in which regulation of affect 
and affect-expression serve to advance progress towards more distal goals. As part of a 
broader framework, known as control theory (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; Powers, 
1974), the goals themselves for affect experience or affect display may change over 
time (Kirshenbaum, Humphrey, & Malett, 1981) or with situations (e.g., Tamir, 2009a). 
Self-regulation as a means for describing and explaining behaviour presupposes three 
key aspects: that current state of the system (such as affective state) is known, the 
difference between the current state and goal-state can be determined, and action is 
taken to change the current state based on this information. This process forms a 
feedback-loop, where information about the state of a system serves to influence the 
system’s state.  Control theory, has traditionally been a means of understanding physical 
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systems of regulation that use feedback-loops (e.g., maintaining controlled, level flights,  
Ashby, 1961) and has since been adapted to become a primary means of representing 
psychological processes of self-regulation, including affect regulation (e.g., Carver, 
2004; Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Powers, 2005). Representing psychological 
processes as physical or mathematical systems requires specification of concepts, 
processes, and underlying assumptions made, which can then be investigated (e.g., 
Epstein 2008). Moreover, aspects of the psychological processes involved in affect 
regulation can be represented as parameters, of which variation in these could lead to 
predictions regarding their influence on affect dynamics. 
1.2 Research Aims and Approach 
This thesis has three main aims: i) to design and construct a computational model of 
affect regulation dynamics that can successfully represent known findings in the affect 
regulation literature, ii) to validate this model against two separate diary studies of 
affect change in individuals, and iii) to offer novel predictions of affect regulation 
dynamics in individuals and couples.  
To meet the first aim, affect regulation is first examined and presented in terms of its 
dynamics, particularly the regulatory changes to affect made over time towards held 
affect goals. Based on this representation of affect regulation, a control theory 
framework for investigating affect dynamics is developed and a model of affect 
regulation is outlined. This model outline is then constructed as a computational model, 
which enables proposed dynamics of affect in the outlined model to be demonstrable in 
simulation. Relationships between phenomena represented in the model outline are 
specified as parameter values in the computational model and so can be subject to 
testing. At this stage the model can be tested against known findings in affect regulation 
literature.  
To meet the second research aim, first, affect data is collected from a student sample 
using an intensive diary study conducted over a period of 6 days. The computational 
model built to meet the first aim is then fitted to the study data, using parameter 
adjustment, to capture the changes in affect recorded in the study, and quality of final fit 
is assessed. This process is repeated with a second study of affect change in teachers 
from a local school, again, using an intensive diary study over a period of 6 days. The 
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computational model with parameters specified from the first study is fitted against the 
second data set and the model’s validation is assessed in terms of quality of fit. 
To meet the third research aim, the model’s underlying dynamics are examined in terms 
of current theories and models of affect regulation; predictions are made relating to 
affect regulation dynamics in individuals. In addition to this, the computational model is 
copied to form a second model and connected to form a network of two agents, which 
can influence each other’s affective states. Examples from the literature of affective 
interaction between two individuals (a dyadic network) are simulated in this new 
arrangement of the model and further predictions are made based on the simulation’s 
operation.  
Computational models offer new means to explore the hypothesised mechanisms and 
processes involved in dynamic systems such as affect regulation. Moreover, they 
require the specification of assumptions made in theories (e.g., Epstein, 2008) and offer 
a means for these assumptions to be explored and tested. By taking control theory as a 
framework for investigation, this computational model offers the potential to explore 
affect regulation in terms of its dynamics, alongside changes in affect goals, an aspect of 
affect dynamics under-explored in the literature. This model further offers an integration 
of the dynamics of felt-affect regulation, affect-expression regulation and self-
regulatory capacity; the recurrent influence of these on each other over an extended 
period has not yet been investigated. Lastly, this model forms a foundation for further 
enquiry into affect regulation in networks and models of affect dynamics in groups. 
Practical applications may extend to the use of the model in affective forecasting and as 
a tool for affect and affect goal monitoring to determine typical and atypical changes in 
affect regulation dynamics in individuals. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This section details the division of chapters across the two parts and briefly outlines 
their structure and contents. The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part 
comprises of a review of the literature, the construction of the model of affect regulation 
dynamics, and initial testing of the model against findings established in the literature. 
The second part comprises of the fitting of the model to two data sets collected from 
diary studies, and the development of the model in a simulation of dyadic interaction. 
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The final chapter integrates the findings, predictions and outcomes of the model and 
examines these in terms of current literature.  
Part 1 
The first part of this thesis details the theoretical background for the design of a model 
of affect regulation dynamics. The method of investigation through use of computer 
simulation is introduced and justified in terms of examining the dynamic nature of the 
phenomena described. The computer simulation is developed and its simulation of 
affect dynamics tested against known outcomes in the affect and affect regulation 
literature.  
Chapter 2 outlines the issue of affect regulation in terms of its effortful and dynamic 
natures. In this chapter, affect regulation is divided into four interrelated areas: (i) felt-
affect, (ii) affect-expression, (iii) limited capacity for affect regulation, and (iv) affect 
regulation goals. This approach builds upon established theories of affect regulation, in 
which specific held goals are regulated towards (e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007), and 
self-control, in which individuals have a limited capacity for engaging in affect 
regulation (e.g., Baumeister 2002; Hagger et al., 2010). 
Chapter 3 reports the approach taken for examining the questions raised and model of 
affect regulation dynamics outlined in Chapter 2. This chapter is divided into two parts: 
the first describes the perspective chosen for examining affect regulation dynamics, 
control theory; and the second describes the methodological approach taken, 
computational modelling. This framework and approach affords a means for 
developing, specifying, and testing models of affect regulation that incorporate 
dynamics in ways that other methods cannot achieve (e.g., Bosse et al., 2010; Carver, 
2004).  
Chapter 4 describes the design and structure of the model and the process of the model’s 
construction as a computer simulation. The model is constructed in five component 
parts, in the order that each of the aspects of affect regulation dynamics are presented in 
Chapter 2, building up from the more concrete, lower levels of control to the more 
abstract, higher levels of control. The simulation is built so that the component parts are 
independent constructs and so each can be examined in detail against available known 
outcomes in Chapter 5. At the close of each section for component construction in 
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Chapter 4, a table of parameters is introduced and parameter boundaries, as specified by 
the model’s design, are given.  
Chapter 5 then aims to restrict the ranges of the parameter values specified in Chapter 4 
to values that offer plausible representations of affect regulation. This is achieved 
through comparing the model’s dynamics to that of known outcomes of studies and 
established theory, where available. Chapter 5 closes the first part of this thesis with a 
summary of the key parameters that influence the model’s dynamics, ranges for these 
for further investigation against additional collected data, and an overview of observed 
model dynamics.  
Part 2 
The second part of this thesis covers the validation of the computational model against 
two diary studies of affect change. This section reports on the collection of diary data 
from both studies and the process of fitting the model to each of the data sets. 
Validation of the model is determined by its capacity to represent both of the data sets 
and the parameter values necessary to do so. This part of the thesis also covers the 
extension of the model to simulate affect sharing between two individuals in a network 
and the predictions made from these simulations. 
Chapter 6 reports a diary study examining affect and affect goal adjustment over time in 
university students. These data are used as a set for the model to fit across four 
dimensions: felt-affect, felt-affect goals, affect-expression goals, and perceived self-
regulatory capacity. Quality of fit is first assessed by correlating each diary and model. 
Fit quality is further assessed through examining correlations within each diary and 
model. Last, the model’s performance in estimating affect change over the course of 
two days is compared against a series of human estimates of affect change. 
Chapter 7 extends this approach of fitting the model to collected diary data by collecting 
further data – this time from staff in a local school. This environment was chosen 
because of the high likelihood for staff monitoring their affect-expressions and 
particular demands on affect goals. This study affords the opportunity to examine 
affect-expression dynamics alongside the aspects of affect regulation used in the prior 
study. This diary sample is used to validate the quality of fit of the simulation using the 
results and parameter values of the model determined by the previous diary study. Data 
fitting procedure and evaluations of fit are maintained from the last chapter.  
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Chapter 8 broadens the model and makes further predictions regarding affect regulation. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first examines the current understanding 
of dyadic interaction in theories of affect regulation and its relation to dynamic models 
of agents that both engage in affect regulation. Shortcomings in the representation of 
agents in traditional approaches are highlighted and argued to be a product of the use of 
informal, sketched, models instead of active, dynamic agents. The second section 
demonstrates a small series of simulated investigations in affect regulation in dyadic 
networks. The model is arranged as two agents sharing frequent contact, engaging in 
affect regulation processes that serve to influence both agents’ affect states. Predictions 
for affect regulation dynamics in dyads are made and implications for understanding 
and representing affect in dyads and networks are considered.  
General Discussion 
The thesis closes with a chapter for general discussion. In Chapter 9, predictions made 
by the model and results from the prior chapters are summarised and considered in 
terms of established theories of affect regulation. In addition to this, limitations of the 
approach and the research conducted are examined and implications for future research 
and applied uses are discussed. 
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PART 1 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The previous chapter briefly overviewed landmark developments in affect research and 
the transition from understanding affect as an autonomous response of physiological 
states to an active process of appraisal. It further introduced affect as being dynamic and 
a process which is, to some extent, controllable by individuals through self-regulation 
(e.g., Bosse et al., 2010; Gross, 1998a) towards known, held affect goals (e.g., 
Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Larsen, 2000; Tamir, 2009a). As with other controlled 
processes of self-regulation, the capacity to successfully regulate one’s affect is 
considered to be limited by the depletion of mental ‘resource’, which facilitates 
regulation (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).  However, to date, there is no known model 
exploring the dynamics of affect regulation, self-regulatory capacity, and affect goals, 
within a unified framework.  
This chapter therefore reviews the literature across these topics with the aim of 
developing a model of their interrelated influence on affect dynamics. The chapter is 
divided across four key distinctions concerning affect regulation. Firstly, affect 
regulation is considered in terms of regulating feelings (e.g., antecedent focused 
regulation, Gross, 1998a). Secondly, affect regulation is considered in terms of 
regulating expressions (e.g., response focused regulation, Gross, 1998a). Thirdly, affect 
regulation is considered as a process associated with the depletion of self-regulatory 
capacity. Finally, affect regulation is considered in terms of motivations to regulate 
affect and dynamic goals for regulation. 
2.1 Felt-Affect and Felt-Affect Regulation 
Historically, the folk concept representation of distinct emotions (e.g., joy, guilt, fear) 
has been used in research regarding feelings, stemming from the apparent universality 
of distinct affect-expressions across cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1971). This approach 
has been used to suggest that there are multiple discrete, felt-affect states (e.g., Petersen, 
2010), although this can lead to ambiguity about the nature of affect (Russell, 2009).  
For this thesis, affect (both as a felt state and as expression) is considered from the 
perspective of core dimensions (e.g., Russell, 1980, 2003, 2009); sensations of 
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pleasantness or unpleasantness along with sensations of activation or sleepiness 
combined as one accessible state of core affect to form what is felt (Russell 2003). 
When attached to a specific cause and salient in awareness, these (most likely strong) 
affective states are generally considered as emotions. In contrast, when typically more 
moderate, less salient, and without clear cause, affective states are generally considered 
as moods. Affect as a term may be used to subsume both the specific and broader states 
to describe, quite simply, the felt state (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Russell, 2003).  
A fundamental aspect of affect is its change over time. Affective states are characterised 
by changes in positive and negative feelings associated with the highs and lows in life 
(e.g., Kuppens et al., 2010). A change in affect can highlight the significance of changes 
to circumstances and guide individuals to make adjustments accordingly (Carver & 
Scheier, 2001; Larsen, 2000; Scherer, 2009) or reorganise behaviour (Powers, 1974). 
Affect is considered to show changes in response to events (e.g., Johnson, Husky, 
Grondin, Mazure, Doron, & Swendsen, 2008; Larsen, Diener, & Emmons, 1986; 
Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994; Stone & Neale, 1984) and these changes are thought to 
cumulatively shape affect across longer periods (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). 
Feelings also subject to more general, cyclical changes (e.g., Totterdell, 1995; Whitton, 
1978), showing variation in terms of mood changes due to interaction of sleep/wake 
patterns and circadian rhythms (Boivin et al., 1997), and also longer-term cycles such as 
that across a week (e.g., Parkinson et al., 1996). Variation in affect is prominently 
experienced in perceptions of alertness and fatigue in regular cycles, which are 
considered to be a combined function of circadian rhythm and time spent awake 
(Åkerstedt & Folkard, 1995, 1996; Åkerstedt, Folkard, & Portin, 2004). This 
understanding of affect changing in cyclical patterns is revisited in section 2.3, in which 
subjective fatigue is considered. Of particular interest to this section, though, is the 
process of actively changing affect through self-regulation. 
2.1.1 Felt-Affect Regulation 
Self-regulation can be considered the process of ensuring that the states of behaviours, 
thoughts, or feelings conform to corresponding held goal-states (Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Larsen 2000; Powers, 1974). At 
times, individuals may want to heighten or dampen the intensity of affective experience, 
such as increasing activation before competing in sports or reducing anxiety before 
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taking an exam, or to prolong or shorten affect experience such as maintaining a 
positive mood or ‘getting out of’ a negative one (Gross, 1999; Parkinson & Totterdell, 
1999). Again, for a practical use of terms, the regulation of emotion (e.g., Gross 1998a) 
and moods (e.g., Parkinson et al., 1996) can be subsumed by the universal term of affect 
regulation (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  
Affect regulation may be divided into two broadly distinct categories, namely the 
regulation of felt-affect and affect-expression (e.g., Grandey, 2000; Gross 1998a, 
1998b; Hochschild 1983). Gross (1998a) further draws the distinction between felt-
affect regulation and affect-expression regulation by the relative timing of the regulation 
processes involved. Regulation influencing the felt-affect state is considered to occur 
earlier in an affective episode than regulation influencing the affect-expression state 
(e.g., Gross & Thompson 2007). 
Specific experimental manipulation of different regulation strategy use also draws the 
distinction between felt-affect regulation and affect-expression regulation. Repeatedly, 
studies indicate that reappraisal of affective stimuli and suppression of expression show 
different outcomes (for a review see Koole, 2009) and regulation of affect-expression 
states can show little influence on the felt-affect states (e.g., Gross, 1998b; Richards & 
Gross, 2000). Moreover, habitual users of felt-affect regulation are reported to show 
better social, affective and wellbeing outcomes over habitual users of expression 
regulation (Gross & John, 2003). For the rest of this section, I focus on felt-affect 
regulation; in Gross’s terminology this would be considered the processes of antecedent 
focused regulation. The process of affect-expression regulation is further examined in 
section 2.2. 
2.1.2 Automatic and Deliberate Felt-Affect Regulation 
In addition to the division of affect regulation into felt-affect regulation and affect-
expression regulation, affect regulation can be further divided into automatic and 
deliberate processes (e.g., Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). Automatic regulation of felt-
affect refers to the non-conscious, immediate and non-deliberate means of regulating 
how individuals feel. Automatic processing and regulation of affect may arise from 
over-learned behaviours; frequently-used affect regulation strategies may eventually be 
applied in response to affective situations without requiring the deliberate attention of 
the individual (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). The study of automatic affect regulation is 
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made difficult by the hidden nature of automatic processes, though (Bargh & Williams, 
2004). Evidence for the existence of automatic regulation is thought to be seen in the 
tonic inhibition from the pre-frontal cortex, an area associated with self-regulation, on 
brain regions associated with affect (Jackson et al., 2003). Studies using priming (e.g., 
Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007; Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, 2009) indicate that 
affect regulation can be impacted by non-conscious processing. 
In contrast, deliberate felt-affect regulation refers to the conscious and controlled 
regulation of what is felt. Active involvement is required to regulate affect towards a 
held goal (Larsen, 2000). Deliberate felt-affect regulation can, in some cases, be 
considered similar to coping (the deliberate improvement of one’s affect or 
circumstances, Lazarus, 1966). However, felt-affect regulation is broader than coping, 
including the regulation of one’s felt-affect towards either more positive or more 
negative states, along with efforts made at maintaining an affect state (Parkinson & 
Totterdell, 1999).  
A number of physiological studies have indicated the brain regions associated with the 
deliberate control of affect. Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, and Gabrieli (2004) indicate that 
attempts made to regulate felt-affect through reappraisal are associated with an increase 
in pre-frontal activity. In a similar experiment, the conscious reappraisal of a stimulus 
was found to be associated with an increase in activation of the ventromedial areas of 
the prefrontal cortex and an inhibition of the amygdala (e.g., Quirk & Beer, 2006). 
Lesion studies indicate that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex restricts the 
management of felt-affect and damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex restricts the 
perception of affect (Krueger et al., 2009). There is a general agreement between 
physiological studies that deliberate affect regulation is associated with specific 
activation of pre-frontal regions. 
For the remainder of this section, I focus on the more deliberate aspects of felt-affect 
regulation, although it is to be acknowledged that much of affect regulation may involve 
both processes together (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002). Deliberate affect regulation allows 
for the observation and monitoring of regulation strategies, which in turn allows for the 
change of, and improvement to, these regulation strategies (e.g., Smyth & Arigo, 2009). 
Automatic behaviours are much harder to observe and change as over-learning any 
behaviour often makes it invisible to attention (e.g., Bargh, 1994), impairing chances for 
change.  
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2.1.3 Affect Regulation as a Continual and Dynamic Process 
Affective states are not just present during an affective event nor the immediate period 
afterwards, despite these being prominent times at which affect is consciously 
experienced (Russell 2003). Russell describes the experience of core affect as much like 
that of felt body temperature, it can be consciously accessed at any time but continues to 
exist when not consciously observed. When not at the forefront of attention, affect can 
still change over time (e.g., Oravecz et al., 2009), suggesting a continual, dynamic 
process. 
Affect regulation is argued to coincide with felt-affect to such a degree that the two 
have been considered to be functionally the same (Campos, Frankel, & Carmas, 2004; 
Kappas, 2011). Gross (1999) argues that almost every affect experience is in some way 
regulated. Much of the same regions of activity for affect regulation are also seen to be 
associated with the experience of affect when individuals are apparently not attempting 
to engage in regulation (Jackson et al., 2003). However, there are likely grounds that 
they are closely related but to some degree distinct (Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
Executive control and self-regulatory capacity may temporarily be depleted, such that a 
person may no longer be able to successfully ‘control their emotions’ suggesting a 
failure to regulate affect (Baumeister et al., 1994) and therefore some dissociation 
between the two. Even so, several researchers have considered it functionally useful to 
regard affect regulation as a continual process acting on affect states (e.g., Kuppens et 
al., 2010; Larsen, 2000; Tamir, 2009a), which is the approach considered in this thesis. 
The consideration of affect as a dynamic, unfolding process, rather than as series of 
isolated moments, is one of the remaining challenges for affect research (Eaton & 
Funder, 2001). It is only recently that the specific time courses of affects states are 
being examined (Verduyn et al., 2009). While the study of affect states across time has 
been long established in the literature (e.g., Bolger, Delongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 
1989; Stone, Hedges, Neale, & Satin, 1985), it is only recently that more complete 
models of affect and affect regulation dynamics, which seek to examine the dynamic 
processes involved, have arisen (Bosse et al., 2010; Oravecz et al., 2009). The dynamics 
of affect regulation, in particular selection of regulation strategies in affective episodes 
and variation in capacity for affect regulation, remain an existing challenge for 
investigation in affect research.  
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The understanding of the importance of affect regulation dynamics has recently been 
shown by the adaptation of classic affect regulation experimental procedures. 
Traditionally instructions for participants (such as a request to reappraise a stimulus) are 
given before the stimulus is presented (e.g., Gross 1998b). However, Sheppes, Catran, 
and Mairan, (2009) show that delaying the instructions until the affect experience is 
well underway is a viable alternative and perhaps more ecologically sound method. In 
comparison, Sheppes and Gross (2011) indicate that earlier strategies in the process 
model (such as distraction) show effectiveness regardless of affect stimuli intensity; 
whereas, later strategies (such as reappraisal) show an effectiveness contingent on the 
current felt-affect intensity. The dynamics of affect regulation have always been a part 
of the understanding of the processes of affect regulation; however, up until recently, 
process dynamics have been largely in the background of understanding. It is through 
the development in understanding of, and empirical support for, the strategies 
implemented in deliberate felt-affect regulation that a more complete examination of its 
dynamics is possible. 
2.2 Affect-Expression and Affect-Expression Regulation 
Much like felt-affect, affect-expression can be considered in terms of its dynamics and 
the process of affect-expression regulation as being both automatic and controlled. 
Affect-expression can be regarded as social phenomena, occurring as part of the 
communication with others (e.g., Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008; Parkinson, 1996). Some 
experienced affect states may necessarily require the social presence (or at least implied 
or imagined presence of others), such as embarrassment (Miller & Leary, 1992). 
Expressive behaviour is seen more prominently in social situations than when alone; 
Kraut and Johnston (1979) observed ten-pin bowlers’ expressions before and after 
turning back to their peers and noted that expressions were far more apparent when 
facing others, despite the affective component of the situation (the evaluation of 
bowling success) remaining unchanged.  
Expression may be intertwined with felt-affect, rather than just an outlet for feelings. 
Parkinson (1996) argues that emotions exist as means for communicating evaluations 
and appraisals. Emotions are said to, “make claims about the personal meaning of a 
topic of potential mutual interest in the context of an ongoing relationship” (p. 676), 
essentially requesting others to acknowledge and respond to a person’s concerns. This 
concept is developed by Parkinson (2005), suggesting that expressions may serve to 
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communicate motives in order to shape a person’s environment in the form of others’ 
behaviour. This approach draws a neat parallel with the interpretation of felt-affect as a 
signal for individuals to make changes to their situation (e.g., Scherer, 2009); 
expression signals others to make such a change. 
2.2.1 From Feelings to Expression 
It is no secret that affective states influence expressions. Common experience of affect 
indicates a ‘feed-forward’ process from experience to expression and at particularly 
strong affect intensities it can be said that ‘we are unable to contain ourselves’ and felt-
affect must be expressed (e.g., Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994). The association between 
felt-affect and expressions is apparent in a study by Colby, Lanzetta, and Kleck (1977); 
they reported a monotonically increasing relationship between experienced and 
expressed pain from administered electric shocks. More broadly, specific facial 
expressions are recognised as being associated with their experienced counterparts (e.g., 
smiling and happiness, Ekman & Friesen, 1971) and coherence of felt-affect and affect-
expressions extends to include postures and movements too (e.g., Wallbott, 1998). 
This concept of coherence of expression, experience and physiological change is 
supported by a range of researchers (for a review of positions, see Mauss & Robinson, 
2009). Recordings indicate a moderate association between subjective experience, 
expression and physiology, but when just experience and expressions are considered the 
association is considerably higher (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 
2005). Even attempts to restrict expressions, such as during impression management or 
lying, are not thought to be sufficient to prevent ‘leaking’ of felt-affect (e.g., Ekman, 
Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 1988), pointing towards a strong feed-forward relationship from 
experience to expression and the limitations of suppressing expression (e.g., Gross 
2001).  
2.2.2 From Expression to Feelings 
In addition to the ‘feed-forward’ link from felt-affect to affect-expression, there is an 
abundance of evidence that affective expressions influence felt-affect. Despite the 
decline in popularity of the James-Lange theory, its principle of affect as an embodied 
experience has remained influential in understanding affect (Dalgleish, 2004). The 
proposed effect of expressions on felt-affect is termed the facial-feedback hypothesis, 
19 
 
which argues that “facial expressions provide feedback to the responder that is 
necessary or sufficient to affect significantly his or her emotional experience and 
behavior.” (Buck, 1980, p. 812). However, Buck argued that there was little compelling 
evidence for such an effect because of methodological flaws in the studies, such as the 
potential for demand characteristics when asking participants to generate expressions. In 
a widely regarded paper in testing the facial-feedback hypothesis, Strack, Martin, and 
Stepper (1988) address many of Buck’s concerns by implementing an unobtrusive 
means of manipulating expression, providing unambiguous evidence for facial-
feedback. By inhibiting or facilitating smiling in participants, Strack et al. (1988) could 
respectively dampen or heighten participants’ reported feelings of amusement, in 
response to cartoons presented. 
Since Strack et al. (1988), there is now a wealth of evidence to suggest that one’s affect-
expression has a real, if somewhat small, effect on one’s felt-affect (for reviews see 
McIntosh, 1996; Soussignan, 2004). The generation of expressions has a greater impact 
on affective states, if individuals are made more self-aware of their expressive states 
(Kleinke, Peterson, & Rutledge, 1998); the judgment of the affective content of 
sentences is facilitated, when engaging in congruent expression (Havas, Gelnberg, & 
Rinck, 2007); blocking expression impairs recognition of other’s expressions 
(Olberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007); and maintenance of neutral 
expressions through self-regulation diminishes felt-affective response to stimuli (Davis, 
Senghas, & Ochsner, 2009). In sum, studies repeatedly indicate that affect-expression 
plays a role in shaping felt-affect.  
Recent neuropsychology studies indicate that the physical expression of affect is a 
contributing but not a necessary component for typical affect experience to occur. 
Keillor, Barrett, Crucian, Kortenkamp, and Heilman (2002) demonstrate in a single 
patient study that a sufferer of bilateral facial paralysis both reported a normal affective 
experience in her every-day life and responded to affect inducing pictures to the same 
degree as healthy controls. Temporarily induced deficits in expression manipulation, in 
the form of BotoxTM injections appear to attenuate activation of the amygdala, an area 
associated with felt-affect (Hennenlotter et al., 2009). Using a similar experimental 
design, Davis, Senghas, Brandt, and Ochsner, (2010) find a decrease in reported 
positive felt-affect in individuals having undergone BotoxTM injections in comparison to 
controls, leading them to conclude that expressions can influence felt-affect but are not 
necessary for the production of affect experiences. 
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Expanding upon the model of an embodied experience of affect, a number of studies 
have demonstrated that facial expressions are not the only means by which expressive 
states shape affective experiences (Niedenthal 2007; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, 
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). The effects of embodied changes are seen across a broad 
range of outcomes. For example, clenching muscles, such as closing a fist, may enhance 
a feeling of power in males (Schubert, 2004) and enhance self-regulatory capacity in 
both sexes (Hung & Labroo, 2010); participants required to sit in a slumped posture 
report worse mood in comparison with those sitting upright (Stepper & Strack, 1993); 
and vocalisation of affective tones is indicated to enhance associated emotions (Hatfield 
& Hsee, 1995). Affect-expression’s influence on felt-affect may then be considered 
much wider than just a facial-feedback process, but rather expressive-feedback. 
General conclusions that can be seen across these studies are first, the facilitation of 
congruent felt-affect with physical actions, and second, the diminishment of felt-affect 
with either incongruent physical actions or restrictions on physical expressions. 
Requirements of specific expressions at times may shape felt-affect through expressive-
feedback processes and external influence on affect-expression may have indirect 
influence on felt-affect.  
2.2.3 Emotion Contagion 
Expressive-feedback is considered to play a wider role in shaping an individual’s felt-
affect state through the non-conscious, automatic mimicry of others’ expressions and 
postures (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992). This proposal of primitive emotional 
contagion was later expanded upon in the book Emotional Contagion (Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), suggesting mechanisms of how emotions may be ‘caught’ 
through mimicry of expression and subsequent expressive-feedback processes. This 
suggests that social expression of affect has a unique influence on individuals in 
comparison to other affect events, potentially influencing felt-affect across direct 
(inferential) and indirect (contagion) channels (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008). 
Experimental studies indicate that, as Hatfield et al., (1994) argue, felt-affect is related 
to the intensity of the other’s expression (Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 2001). Emotion 
contagion may occur through facial expression but it may also occur through other 
modalities such as hearing another’s voice (Neumann & Strack, 2000) and even through 
written messages in computer-mediated interactions (Van Kleef, De Drew, & Manstead, 
21 
 
2004). Studies on the convergence of affect due to contagion processes indicate 
evidence for mechanisms of automatically reducing dissonance in affective states 
between individuals (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Friedman & Riggio, 1981; Sullins, 
1991). The process of affect contagion may be considered to be in part a process of 
automatic affect-expression regulation. Further to the automatic process of regulation 
through contagion, affect-expression regulation can also be achieved through controlled, 
deliberate means. 
2.2.4 Controlled Expression Regulation 
In many situations, it may be important for a person to ensure an appropriate expression 
of affect. Affect can be considered a social phenomenon, particularly that of affect-
expression (Parkinson, 2005) and across a broad range of circumstances, affect-
expression may be regulated. A polite, positive, and often enthusiastic display of affect 
is expected in many customer service roles, regardless of one’s genuinely held feelings 
towards a dissatisfied or angry customer, suggesting the need for replacing one affect-
expression with another (e.g., surface acting, Hochschild, 1983). Grandey (2003) offers 
an example of a hotel clerk who displays sympathy, while still feeling irritation towards 
a customer. In this case, the process model of affect regulation (Gross, 1998a) would 
identify these affective regulation behaviours as response focused regulation actions, 
also termed expressive suppression (e.g., Gross, 2001); although, the desired outcome 
of regulation can include response exaggeration (Côté, 2005; Schmeichel, Demaree, & 
Robinson, 2006). 
Despite the influence of affect-expression on felt-affect seen in expressive-feedback or 
embodied cognition studies, the response-focused strategy of regulating one’s 
expression is not considered to have a substantial effect on felt-affect (Gross, 1998a; 
2001; Richards & Gross, 2000). This finding is supported in literature on emotional 
labour (Hülsheger & Schewe, 2011). Repeatedly, studies indicate that surface acting, 
which is a strategy of expression regulation rather than felt-affect regulation, results in 
poorer felt-affect (Grandey, 2003; Judge, Fluegge Woolf, & Hurst, 2009; Liu, Prati, 
Perrewé, & Ferris, 2008), alongside a host of other negative outcomes. These outcomes 
include: negative ratings of authenticity of expression (Grandey, 2003); an increase in 
job tension or decrease in satisfaction associated with the job (Judge et al., 2009; Liu et 
al., 2008; Martínez-Iñigo, Totterdell, Alcover, & Holman, 2007) and elevated levels of 
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emotional exhaustion or fatigue (Goldberg & Grandey, 2007; Grandey, 2003; Toterdell 
& Holman, 2003).  
Many of the negative effects associated with regulation of expression are thought to lie 
with the formation of a dissonance between the expression and experience of affect 
(Abraham, 1998; Morris & Feldman, 1997). As described earlier, an authenticity of 
expression and a close relation between experience and expression is considered a 
desirable outcome (e.g., Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003) and the creation of a perceived 
dissonance is aversive (Gross & John, 2003; Morris & Feldman, 1996) resulting in 
negative outcomes. However, these effects may be specific to Western cultures (Butler, 
Lee, & Gross, 2007; Koole, 2009). Despite the apparent negative effects associated with 
response-focused regulation, surface acting, or affective dissonance in general, 
expression regulation is a commonly used strategy for the regulation of affect 
(Hülsheger & Schewe, 2011).  
Given the distinctions between regulation of felt-affect and affect-expression in terms of 
quality of interaction with others, onset in an affective episode, and development of 
dissonance and fatigue, it plausible that affect-expression regulation dynamics differ 
from felt-affect regulation dynamics. Affect-expression’s rooting in the social aspects of 
affect could further influence its dynamics given the dynamic nature of affect cycles 
between individuals (e.g., Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008). If a limited resource model (section 
2.3) is considered, it may be anticipated that the potential for persistence will be more 
limited for affect-expression regulation than for felt-affect regulation because 
expression regulation appears to be more demanding. Although individuals may 
typically favour one regulation strategy over another (e.g., Eftekhari, Zoellner, & Vigil, 
2009) the selection of strategy use across an extended period could vary, potentially 
seeing individuals switch regulation styles in line with physiological changes, such as 
fatigue. Factors which may influence affect-expression regulation strategy use are 
examined in sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
2.3 Effortful Self-Regulation 
So far in this chapter, affect regulation has primarily been considered in terms of being a 
conscious and deliberate process. In this section, I review the literature pertaining to the 
effortful nature of conscious and deliberate regulation. In particular, I examine research 
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pointing towards a limited capacity for self-regulation, consider its relation to subjective 
fatigue, and explore indications of the dynamics of self-regulatory capacity. 
As described earlier, self-regulation may be represented as the process of discrepancy 
reduction between one’s current states of behaviour, thought, or affect and one’s goal 
states for these (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; Powers, 1974). A distinction is made in 
the literature between automatic and deliberate regulation; automatic regulation is 
considered to be habitual and non-conscious, whereas deliberate regulation is a 
controlled and conscious process (Karoly & Kanfer, 1982).  
Numerous researchers have argued that individuals may engage in automatic self-
regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004; Mauss et al., 2007; 
Norman & Shallice, 1986) and evidence points towards the existence of automatic self-
regulation (e.g., Gross 1999; Govorun & Payne, 2006). However, issues arise in 
examining automatic self-regulation because it is less consciously accessible, more 
elusive to wilful engagement, and as a result, challenging to study through tools such as 
self-reports. In contrast to automatic self-regulation, conscious efforts at self-regulation 
can be recorded through self-reports, as can progress towards consciously held goals 
and potentially pitfalls for self-regulation efforts identified. Moreover, the results from 
the study of conscious behaviours in regards to self-regulation can be implemented in 
training or interventions for the improvement of self-regulatory behaviours in the wider 
population (e.g., Larson, 2005; Muraven, 2010; Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999). 
In parallel to the literature on automatic self-regulation, there is substantial evidence for 
the use of deliberate self-regulation (Gross, 1998a; Latham & Locke, 1991; Mischel 
1974; Parrot, 1993). Within this area, there is an abundance of literature indicating that 
deliberate self-regulation is an effortful process (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & 
Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000; Schmidt, Neubach, & Heuer, 2007). In integrating this understanding 
of an effortful process of regulation with ample evidence that indicates individuals can 
often fail to engage in successful self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994; Muraven 
& Baumeister, 2000; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000), 
the strength-model of self-control has grown to be the prevailing theory for 
understanding effortful self-regulation (Baumeister, 2002, 2003; Baumeister & 
Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et 
al., 1998). 
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The strength-model offers explanation for why individuals can fail to successfully 
engage in regulation of behaviour, thoughts, or feelings by means of analogy to 
muscular fatigue. The capacity to persist in deliberate self-regulation is considered to be 
dependent on a limited ‘resource’ for self-regulation, which, when depleted, limits the 
capacity for persisting in effortful self-regulation (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998). Self-
regulatory exertion can be considered analogous to muscular exertion, which requires 
strength and energy to be performed and depletion of physical resource impairs 
persistence. In addition to these similarities, rest and recuperation is thought to restore 
the capacity to further engage in self-control, much like physical rest restores a muscles 
capacity to exert force (e.g., Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Oaten, Williams, Jones, & 
Zadro, 2008; Tyler & Burns, 2008). 
Much of the evidence for the strength-model comes from two-task design experiments, 
in which participants either undergo a self-regulation task or a control task and then a 
second-task in which self-regulation performance is recorded (e.g., Muraven et al., 
1998). Exertion of self-regulation in the first task is anticipated to limit capacity for 
further self-regulation. Differences between experimental and control participants’ 
performances is argued to demonstrate a depletion in self-regulatory capacity (a state of 
ego-depletion). Ego-depletion affects a broad range of self-regulatory behaviours (e.g., 
Cameron & Webb, in press a), including: persistence at aversive (e.g., drinking 
something unpleasant) or impossible (e.g., working on unsolvable anagrams) tasks; 
errors made and response times in inhibition tasks (e.g., the Stroop task); and resisting 
temptation (e.g., restricting alcohol consumption). Depletion is not domain-specific so 
exertion of self-control for one task can impair subsequent exertion of regulation in 
unrelated tasks. 
A recent meta-analysis demonstrates that there is a structured relationship between the 
effects of ego-depletion and the experimental conditions designed to evoke it (Hagger et 
al., 2010). More complex tasks promote higher levels of self-regulatory fatigue. Longer 
breaks between the induction of and measurement of ego-depletion result in a larger 
restoration of the capacity for self-regulation. A subset of the studies investigating self-
regulation involves the effortful self-regulation of affect, which has been associated 
with the depletion of self-regulatory capacity and appears to be affected by the capacity 
for regulation (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000; 
Baumeister et al., 2007). In the wider context of emotional labour, the self-regulatory 
behaviours of managing one’s felt and expressed emotions have been associated with 
25 
 
feelings of exhaustion, possibly indicating a state of depletion (e.g., Grandey, 2003; 
Goldberg & Grandey, 2007; Martínez-Iñigo et al., 2007). In sum, in order to better 
understand the process of affect regulation and its dynamics it would be advantageous 
to examine the associated process of resource depletion.  
2.3.1 Limited Physical Resources 
A wide array of studies point towards a limited resource model for self-regulatory 
capacity, yet the specific nature of this resource is not well determined by a standard 
two-task design. The hypothetical resource for self-control is argued to deplete with 
self-regulation but exactly what is being depleted cannot be determined by the 
performance outcomes outlined above (e.g., Cameron & Webb, in press b). Resources 
are regarded as things of value to individuals that aid in reaching goals, such as close 
attachments and health, or means to obtain these, such as social networks and money 
(Hobfoll, 2002). Building close attachments through positive interactions can be 
considered as an investment of one’s resources in others (Brotheridge & Lee, 2002). 
These broader resources may have influence on the hypothetical resource for self-
regulatory capacity (e.g., Fitzsimons & Finkel, 2011) but are not thought to be the 
hypothetical self-regulatory resource. 
Several studies point towards an increase in self-regulatory persistence through a variety 
of means, including: experiencing positive affect (Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & 
Muraven, 2007), self-affirmation (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009) and incentives to persist 
(Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). However, these studies do not further elaborate upon 
what resource is nor do they necessarily indicate that resource is restored by these 
means. Further studies indicate that these interventions may just encourage persistence 
at self-regulation and a greater state of ego-depletion (Muraven, Shmueli, & Berkley, 
2006; Tyler & Burns, 2009). To offer an account for the material nature of resource, 
Gailliot and Baumeister (2007) proposed that a physical depletion of energy, such as 
that seen when one is fatigued, occurs during self-regulation. 
A physiological analogue has been sought for self-regulatory resource so that 
understanding it in physical terms and direct measurement is possible. A cluster of 
studies indicate that depletion of self-regulatory resource is associated with a depletion 
of blood glucose (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; Dvorak & Simons, 
2009; Gailliot et al., 2007; Gailliot, Peruche, Plant, & Baumeister, 2009; Masicampo & 
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Baumeister, 2008). Moreover, they indicate that an infusion of glucose to the blood 
stream (via a sugary drink) can restore self-regulatory capacity of ego-depleted 
individuals to that of their capacity prior to depletion. This experimental design has 
been adopted for an animal study and shown similar results (Miller, Pattison, DeWall, 
Rayburn-Reeves, & Zental, 2010). Further to this, blood glucose levels have been 
associated with perception of task difficulty (Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010), and 
executive function (Benton, Owens, & Parker, 1994; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008), 
developing the assumed relationship between executive function and self-regulation 
(e.g., Baddeley, 2007). 
Limitations of the blood glucose hypothesis have been identified, with competing 
theories suggesting that effects seen are associated with glucose allocation rather than 
depletion (Beedie & Lane, 2012), or identifying more a suitable physiological candidate 
for resource (Gailliot, 2008). Gailliot (2008) reviewed a series of studies that point to 
the limitations of the ‘glucose model’ for resource, brain glycogen’s role as an energy 
store, and, critically, evidence of executive function’s association with brain glycogen 
use. The nature of glycogen stores, depletion, and replenishment offers the integration 
of the resource-based strength-model with fatigue and rest in individual’s daily lives 
(Gailliot, 2008), expanding beyond examining short-term depletion in experimental 
designs (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2007; Muraven et al., 1998). Glycogen’s proposed role as 
an available energy store for executive control and its depletion with use serves as a 
strong candidate for the physical analogue of resource. 
2.3.2 Self-Regulatory Capacity Restoration Dynamics 
The strength-model places emphasis on the necessity of sufficient rest to restore 
depleted self-regulatory capacity (e.g., Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) and a meta-
analysis indicated longer rest periods in-between experimental self-control tasks are 
related to greater self-regulatory capacity restoration (Hagger et al., 2010). Glycogen as 
a proposed physical basis for self-regulatory resource offers account for dynamics of 
self-regulatory capacity, integrating experimental results (e.g., Hagger et al., 2010), 
observations of time-of-day effects on ego-depletion (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994), and 
the association of sleep with both executive function (e.g., Harrison & Horne, 2000) and 
affect (e.g., Zohar, Tzischinsky, Epstein, & Laive, 2005). 
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The advent of glycogen as a candidate for self-regulatory resource has been preceded by 
several suggestions that sleep and self-regulatory capacity are associated. Baumeister et 
al. (1994) suggest that self-regulation may be impaired when people are tired, such as 
late in the evening, a suggestion echoed by Baumeister and Heatherton (1996). 
Baumeister, Faber, and Wallace (1999) make explicit that assumption of a link between 
sleep and self-regulatory resource, stating, “We think sleep is probably the major way to 
replenish the ego after the depleting effects of everyday decision, making self-control 
and other volition” (p. 59). However, Vohs, Glass, Maddox, and Markman (2011), do 
not report any effects of sleep deprivation on ego-depletion across a short-term 
experimental study. Rather than ‘acute’ effects of fatigue typically measured in an 
experimental environment, sleep may serve as a long term restorative function of 
depleted resource. Barber, Munz, Bagsby, & Powell (2010) argue that sufficient sleep 
could be a means of restoring the chronic effects of continual resource depletion seen 
across a day and demonstrate that consistent and sufficient sleep together predict 
improved self-regulatory capacity. 
Gailliot’s (2008) review of glycogen and executive function points towards a potentially 
observable cycle of resource depletion and restoration across a waking/sleeping period. 
Self-regulatory capacity may be observed to change in a study where repeated measures 
of self-regulation or even subjective fatigue are made. Hagger (2010) highlights the 
current paucity of research into self-regulatory capacity and sleep, reporting on a “clear 
consensus… for more systematic and extended experimental research” (p. 184) on the 
matter. While he specifically refers to the need for more ‘objective’ measures for 
recording sleep, it is evident from the scarcity of studies linking sleep and self-
regulatory capacity at present that valuable contributions can still be made from a range 
of approaches. 
Experienced sleepiness has consistently been associated with impairments in sustaining 
attention, memory, and general decrements in cognitive executive function (e.g., 
Harrison & Horne, 2000; Nilsson et al., 2005; Killgore, Balkin, & Wesensten, 2006). 
Although fatigue does not appear to be the sole determinant of an individual’s self-
regulatory capacity (Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, & Alexander, 2010; Job, Dweck, & Walton, 
2010; Vohs et al., 2011), subjective fatigue is associated with limiting self-regulatory 
capacity (Finkel et al., 2006; Sergerstrom & Nes, 2007; Stewart, Wright, Hui, & 
Simmons, 2009). Further to this, sufficient sleep is indicated to promote improvements 
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to self-regulatory capacity (Barber & Munz, 2011), again pointing towards an 
association of self-regulatory capacity with fatigue. 
Sleep deprivation studies indicate a significantly adverse effect on individuals’ affect 
and affect regulation, most commonly an increase in negative affect (e.g., Moore et al., 
2009) and a decrease in positive affect (e.g., Franzen, Siegle, & Buysse, 2008). 
Baumeister et al. (1999) put forward that people who are sleep deprived have “difficulty 
controlling their emotion” (p. 59), which Walker and van der Helm (2009) ascribe to 
successful emotional processing as having a dependence on sleep. The effects of sleep 
on affect have been examined from both the perspective of sleep deprivation, in which 
an increase in negative affect or detriments to positive affect and alertness due to 
tiredness are normally measured (e.g., Scott, McNaughton, & Polman, 2006; Franzen 
Siegle, & Buysse, 2008; Tempesta et al., 2010), and sleep sufficiency, in which 
associations between ‘healthy’ sleep and the mitigation of strain, enhancement of well-
being, or intensity of affect states are recorded (e.g., Barber et al. 2010; Birchler-
Pedross et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2009). As a general theme throughout the literature, 
sleep is considered a contributing factor for successful regulation of affect and the 
maintenance of a positive affect state.  
It still remains to consider the potential of regular dynamics in self-regulatory capacity 
and its possible association with dynamics of affect regulation and affect. As described 
earlier, executive function is regarded to drop at the end of the day (Baumeister et al., 
1994), has been linked to brain glycogen stores (Gailliot, 2008), and associated with a 
dependency on sleep for its restoration (Barber & Munz, 2011). Beyond this though, 
there has been little examination of the dynamics of self-regulatory capacity over the 
course a day. Given these associations, it appears surprising that there has not been a 
formal investigation to understand if regular cycles of self-regulatory capacity exist.  
2.4 Goals and Affect Regulation 
The final aspect of affect regulation dynamics to be considered is that of goals. Goals 
are desired states that individuals work towards achieving (e.g., Geen, 1995) and form 
an integral part of the process of deliberate self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 
2001; Powers, 1974; Powers, Clark, & McFarland, 1960a, 1960b). Simply engaging in a 
‘blind’ process of change without self-monitoring whether the change is towards a 
desired state prevents recognition of whether progress is occurring or if the change is 
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even in the right direction (Powers, 1974; Powers et al., 1960a, 1960b). Insufficient 
monitoring of one’s current state or desired state therefore leads to failures in self-
regulation (e.g., Kirschenbaum, 1987). 
Goal setting and goal striving occur across a wide range circumstances and are often 
viewed alongside motivation. Goals can serve as a strong motivation for change to 
behaviour; for example, Bargh, Gollwitzer, Chai, Barndollar, and Trötschel (2001) 
indicate that individuals primed with achievement goals show better performance than 
controls on subsequent tasks. Motivations for goal striving can be increased if achieving 
the goals is made more desirable; this could be through priming (Custers & Aarts, 
2005), through overt incentives such as money (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & 
Twenge, 2005), through highlighting the importance of persistence, or through 
suggesting self-development benefits (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). More broadly, 
Locke and Latham (1990) reviewed the necessity for specificity for goals and feedback 
on goal progress in work-related environments. Studies on student goal-setting for 
working indicate that flexibility in goals encourages perseverance because overly rigid 
goals can become restrictive if circumstances or working behaviour changes 
(Kirshenbaum, Humphrey, & Malett, 1981; Kirshenbaum, Tomarken, & Ordman, 
1982). The achievement of short-term goals can maintain motivation in working 
towards longer-term goals due to the regular sense of achievement (Baumeister et al., 
1994).  
Self-regulation, as a whole, is considered to be largely dependent on the process of 
setting and monitoring goal progress (e.g., Schmeichel & Baumeister 2007), described 
as a test-operate-test-exit system (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). In such as system, 
the discrepancy between a current state (such as an affective state) and a desired state 
are compared and regulation efforts are made to reduce discrepancy until none is 
detected. This representation of self-regulation highlights its grounding in control theory 
as a framework for understanding goal-directed action (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001).  
2.4.1 Affect Goals 
Affect regulation goals are a vital part of the process of affect regulation in that 
individuals desire to reach them and work towards doing so (e.g., Diefendorff & 
Gosserand, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Morris & Reilly, 1987). When individuals 
engage in regulation, such as the reappraisal of a situation, it is considered to be done 
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with an aim of regulating towards a specific state (e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007). It 
should also be acknowledged that goals can influence individuals non-consciously; 
priming for non-conscious goals in affective regulation has been indicated to help 
change individual’s responses to affective stimuli (Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, 
2009). In this section, I examine held motivations for deliberately regulating affect in 
terms of two contrasting motivations for both felt-affect regulation and affect-
expression regulation. 
Felt-Affect 
Hedonistic View of Felt-Affect Regulation 
For the most part, affect regulation research has been based on the assumption that, as a 
general rule, people want to feel good (Khrone, Pieper, Knoll, & Breimer, 2002; Larsen, 
2000). It seems self-evident that positive affect is favourable over negative affect and 
people’s goals would be aligned with the maximising of pleasure and the minimisation 
of displeasure (e.g., Larsen 2000; Morris, 2000; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000).  Much of 
the literature on affect regulation and associated areas is focused on the reduction of 
negative affect, such as coping (e.g., Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), helping 
behaviour as a means of reducing sadness, (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973) or 
experimental research involving the reappraisal of negative stimuli (e.g., Gross 1998b, 
2002; Urry, 2009). Alternatively research tends to focus on the development of positive 
affect (e.g., Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Thayer, Newman, & McClain, 1994; 
Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999). 
While the literature shows evidence for the processes of increasing positive affect as a 
favourable outcome, there are limits to this: positive affect is not necessarily always 
beneficial. Positive affect can be considered as a signal that things are going well, that 
progress towards goals is greater than expected and that it may be appropriate to slow 
down goal pursuit (Carver, 2004; Carver & Scheier, 1990, 2001). Failure to limit 
positive affect in light of this has been argued to be a maladaptive affect regulation 
strategy and has been associated with diminished goal pursuit slowing, as seen during 
manic states in Bipolar Disorder (Fulford, Johnson, Llabre, & Carver, 2010). 
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Instrumental View of Felt-Affect Regulation 
An alternative consideration of the motivations for regulating felt-affect is to regard 
individuals as wanting to experience affective states that serve a useful function (e.g., 
Tsai, Miao, Seppala, Fung, & Yeung, 2007). This instrumental approach could be 
characterised by individuals actively attempting to regulate their affect, regardless of 
whether the goal felt-affect state is positive or not (e.g., Erber & Erber, 2000a, 2000b). 
In contrast to the hedonistic view of affect regulation, affective states traditionally 
considered aversive are not seen as states to be avoided or regulated away but rather as 
being beneficial in some circumstances (for a review see Tamir, 2009a).   
The research available on instrumental felt-affect regulation is somewhat restricted in 
size, in comparison to the hedonic literature. Riediger, Schiedek, Wagner, and 
Lindenberger (2009) state, “Little attention has been paid to the fact that such self-
regulatory behaviours are preceded, and fundamentally shaped by, motivational 
processes” (p. 1529). They suggest that the paucity of investigation in the area has 
arisen from the assumption that the only driving motivation for affect regulation is an 
increase in well-being. Nevertheless, despite the limited range of the area, there is 
compelling evidence to suggest that felt-affective states are better examined from a 
perspective, which forwards the view that affect goals can flexible and vary to suit an 
individual’s wider goals. 
One of the earlier examples of instrumental affect regulation is seen in a study by Erber, 
Wegner, and Therriault (1996), in which individuals down-regulated their positive 
affect states when expecting to meet a stranger. More recent studies demonstrate that 
instrumental affect regulation may occur not just as a process of down-regulating 
positive affect, but also a process of increasing negative affect. This includes the 
increase of anger, (Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008), fear, (Tamir & Ford, 2009), 
sadness, (Hackenbracht & Tamir, 2010) and worry (Tamir, 2005). Reidiger et al. (2009) 
highlight the existence of contra-hedonic motivations for increasing or maintaining 
negative affect in teenagers, and Wood, Hiempel, Manwell, and Whittington, (2009) 
highlight that individuals with lower self-esteem are less likely to be motivated to 
improve affect. Collectively, this research indicates that felt-affect goals can extend 
greatly beyond just wanting to feel positive. 
This instrumental approach to affect regulation is considered in models of affect within 
the control theory literature. Powers (1974) argues that feeling bad prompts individuals 
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to reorganise behaviour until goals are better pursued. Carver and Scheier (2001) 
suggest that experienced negative affect may act as a signal that progress towards goals 
(or away from aversive goals) is too slow. These negative affect states act as an 
indication that more effort is needed and goal striving is expected to increase. Tamir 
(2005) indicates that individuals scoring high in neuroticism prefer to increase their 
level of worry before a task, suggesting a preference for trait-consistent affect. 
Moreover, those that did so showed an increase in task performance. While, Carver and 
Scheier (2001) suggest that increased striving comes with the goal of reduction of 
experienced negative affect, it is plausible that negative affect needs to be amplified 
before it is considered a salient experience for task motivation. The control theory 
perspective and Powers (1974, 2005) and Carver and Scheier’s (2001) models of affect 
are further considered in Chapter 3 
Affect-Expression 
In section 2.2, affective expression was described as serving a social purpose. 
Expression of affect (and in some views affect as a whole) exists to serve as a 
communication tool to shape the feelings, thoughts or behaviours of other individuals 
(e.g., Parkinson 1996, 2005). This view can be seen to be related to the process of 
shaping the environment to fit a desired outcome (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 2001; 
Powers, 1974). For example, one individual may feel anxious about a deadline at work 
and a co-worker may seek to calm this individual by encouraging him or her to focus on 
what can be done. In contrast, a leader of a group may attempt to increase anxiety in 
what they perceive to be a complacent co-worker, in an attempt to encourage motivation 
to complete a task before a looming deadline.  
Having established that affect-expression may serve as communication to others as part 
of the process of shaping the environment, it still remains to examine the motives 
behind communication of affect and the regulation efforts necessary. In this section, I 
examine the motives and practices involved in deliberate affect-expression regulation. 
Automatic regulation of affect through processes, such as contagion (Hatfield et al., 
1994) or the automatic production of complimentary affective states (Hareli & Rafaeli, 
2008), are acknowledged to be a part of social affect regulation but are not the focus of 
this section. As described in section 2.1.2, narrowing the focus on deliberate regulation 
actions allows for both the more straightforward understanding of processes (given that 
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automatic processes are often hidden from attention) and the room for changes to 
actions to be made. 
Impression Management View of Affect-Expression Regulation 
Contrasting with the external focus of social affect regulation, impression management 
can be seen to be serving more immediately personal goals. Impression management 
can be regarded as the active shaping of the ‘self’ that is presented when interacting 
with others; the process has been likened to performing in front of an audience 
(Goffman, 1990). Individuals’ actions in social situations may be different to that when 
individuals are alone and this effect of others is strong enough to shape actions, even if 
their presence is only implied or imagined (e.g., Leary, 1995). Controlled affective 
expressions can play a significant part in impression management as a means of shaping 
others’ attitudes, fitting in with groups or gaining some rewards from the current social 
situation (e.g., Kelly & Barsade, 2001). Impression management as a topic is broad 
enough to include the act of a deliberate creation of a social self, in the form of 
deception. This process evidently requires the deliberate management of affective 
expression as self-regulatory efforts are necessary to prevent affective expressions that 
may betray a person’s attempts to successfully deceive (e.g., Ekman et al., 1988). 
Although there is evidence to suggest that individuals shape expressive states to manage 
presented ‘selves’, there appear to be restrictions on the degree to which this is done. 
For example, Snyder and Gangestad (1982) indicate that people prefer social situations 
that allow for impression management which is closer to their held self-concept. A 
motivation for regulating expressive affect may lie in the preference for aligning affect-
expression and perceived felt-affect states, creating a sense of authenticity (e.g., 
Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003). Tice (2002) highlights that if this coherency is 
challenged by requiring acting ‘out of character’ in front of an audience, individuals’ 
reports of their self-concept change to accommodate this. The process of aiming to align 
affect-expression with held self-concept bears a strong resemblance to that of the 
regulation of felt-affect to be congruent with personality traits (Tamir, 2009b), 
suggesting a preference for perceived authenticity in feelings and expressions.  
Instrumental View of Affect-Expression Regulation 
In some circumstances, though, authentic affective expression is not considered 
appropriate. As mentioned in section 2.2.4, affective expressions within a workplace 
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environment have been extensively studied because often the desire to express 
something and the requirements of the workplace environment come into conflict (e.g., 
Grandey, 2000, 2003; Hochschild, 1983). In terms of emotional labour, motivations for 
expression regulation may then be focused on external sources such as complying with 
workplace norms, or display rules. The expected aims for actually engaging in affective 
regulation may again be seen to be the shaping of other’s felt-affect or shaping their 
behaviour. For example a flight attendant may seek to calm down and reassure an 
anxious passenger or a worker at a call-centre may be expected to sound positive, bright 
and cheerful when handling queries or complaints.  
Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) highlight that motivations for engaging in expression 
regulation may come from distinct and possibly even conflicting goals with that of 
wanting to authentically express affect. In addition to this, they posit a number of 
effects display rules would have upon expression. If expressive goals are restricted, in 
that only a narrow, fixed range of expressions are considered suitable to meet display 
rules, then this limits the range of expressions that individuals can regulate towards, 
possibly promoting greater self-monitoring and exhaustion. In contrast, broader ranges 
of permissible expression should allow for greater variation in individual’s expression, 
which would presumably increase the chances of expressive goals and felt-affect 
aligning and limiting the potential for exhaustion. Experimental evidence (e.g., 
Goldberg & Grandey, 2007) points towards a restriction placed on the range of 
expression, in the form of an adhered to positive display rule as opposed to the 
emphasis on authentic expression, is associated with both an increase in performance 
errors and exhaustion. 
2.4.2 Goal Adjustment 
An important part of the process of goal-setting is the monitoring of the goal state itself; 
the ability to adjust goals is an integral part of self-regulation (Hollenbeck & Williams, 
1987; Lord & Hanges, 1987; Powers, 1974; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003). 
Children as young as five and six demonstrate the understanding that in order to 
alleviate negative feelings it may be necessary to adjust goals in order to reduce 
discrepancies between desired and current outcomes (Davis, Levine, Lench, & Quas, 
2010). Goal adjustment may also become necessary if goals are too difficult and cannot 
be met with available resource (Baumeister et al., 1994; Heatherton & Ambady, 1993) 
or there not sufficient incentive to continue goal pursuit (Alberts, Martijn, & de Vries, 
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2011). Flexibility in goals is also useful if circumstances or behaviour patterns change 
(Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Kirshenbaum et al., 1982) or if the goal needs to 
be corrected to accommodate for progress (Williams, Donovan, & Dodge, 2000). 
Adjustment to goals may also be seen in response to changes in self-efficacy 
(Vancouver & Kendall, 2006). Although, one apparent shortcoming in the literature is 
the lack of research on changes in affect regulation goals because affect appears to only 
be examined in terms of experienced response to achieving or failing to reach goals 
(Cron, Slocum, VandeWalle, & Fu, 2005; Ilies & Judge, 2005; Morling & Evered, 
2006). 
2.4.3 Affect Goal Dynamics 
The literature on instrumental affect regulation suggests that there is a situational 
component for the current state of held affect goals. The purpose of felt-affect as a 
guidance for behaviour implies that as behaviour needs to change across differing 
situations, goal affect also needs to change. The expectation of an upcoming avoidance 
goal prompts a change in affect goals and the increase in individual’s self-regulation of 
fear (Tamir & Ford, 2009) as fear would be a congruent experience for the situation 
(Carver, 2001). Oravecz et al. (2009) recorded individuals’ changing felt-affect states in 
terms of valence and arousal in an intensive diary study. They then modelled the felt-
affect trajectories, best representing felt-affect intensity as randomly moving but overall 
tending towards a specified focal point (termed the ‘home-base’) for each individual 
(i.e., an affect goal). Critically, the home-base varies across time, showing a positive 
linear trend in terms of valence and an inverted U for arousal across a day, suggesting 
felt-affect goals vary in cyclical patterns. 
Affect regulation goals may then, like any other held goal, be subject to change over 
time. This may be apparent when regulation efforts to meet goals are not successful and 
discrepancy reduction can only come from a change in the goal affective state (e.g., 
Carver & Scheier, 2001; Lord & Hanges, 1987; Powers et al., 1960a, 1960b). The 
process of goal adjustment may then potentially be related to the self-regulatory 
capacity for guiding affect towards these held goals; depletion of self-regulatory 
capacity may encourage the shifting of affect goals towards current affect states, 
although this remains to be investigated. While the view that affect regulation simply 
serves a hedonic purpose is a popular one, there is evidence to suggest that affect goals 
may change in terms of meeting short-term requirements to aid in broader goal pursuit 
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(e.g., Tamir, 2009a). Felt-affect regulation goals may also change in a regular cycle 
throughout the day (Oravecz et al., 2009), although this is still a tentative suggestion in 
an area of limited current research.  
2.5 Summary 
Throughout the literature associated with deliberate affect regulation, a common theme 
emerges of change in affect across time. This may be in the form of Gross’s (1998a) 
affect episodes in self-regulation, Hareli and Rafaeli’s (2008) affect cycles in dyads, 
longer-term, slower trends in affect change highlighted in Parkinson et al. (1996), 
simulations of changes of both affect and goal affect (Oravez et al., 2009), and even 
hypothesised dynamics of self-regulatory capacity to achieve these changes (Gailliot, 
2008). One of the fundamental properties of affect is its change; change in affect alerts 
individuals to events or situations as well as the apparent importance of these events 
(Kuppens et al., 2010). Yet, even though it is considered a vital aspect of affective 
research, understanding the dynamics of affect still remains limited and a current 
challenge to be met (e.g., Eaton & Funder, 2001). 
With regards to affect being a dynamic process, it is also useful to consider affect as a 
continuous process. While the process model (Gross 1998a) for affect highlights well 
the processes of regulation of both experienced and affect-expression, its linear nature 
may limit ways in which affect regulation is considered. If affect is considered as a 
dynamic and unfolding experience (e.g., Oravecz et al., 2009; Verduyn et al., 2009) it 
may be useful to assume that multiple processes can overlap or operate together. For 
example, individuals may attempt to suppress their physical reaction to a stimulus, 
while still attempting to regulate their experienced state through reappraisal. Similarly, 
the strategy chosen to engage in for regulation may be subject to dynamic changes – one 
strategy may supplant another.  
Following on from this, deliberate affect regulation is thought to be both costly in terms 
of self-regulatory resource and impacted by self-regulatory resource depletion (e.g., 
Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven et al., 1998).  Resulting dynamic changes to self-
regulatory capacity may result in the abandonment of regulatory efforts towards a goal 
during a period of regulation (e.g., Baumeister, 2002). Dynamic changes to self-
regulatory capacity could even potentially steer individuals’ regulatory strategy choice; 
less resource intensive strategies could be favoured during periods of depletion. Given 
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sufficient demands on self-regulatory resource, a narrow band of appropriate affective 
expressions could, instead of limiting expression variability, as suggested by 
Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003), create a greater variability of expression, once 
display standards are not adhered to. 
Affect regulation is frequently characterised as a process of reducing the difference 
between what individuals currently feel with goal states for feelings, or the difference 
between expressions and expected expressions (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Diefendorff & 
Gosserand, 2003; Larsen, 2000). This reflects the broader trend of examining self-
regulatory behaviour as a whole as the process of discrepancy reduction, through means 
of self-monitoring progress towards a held goal (Baumeister et al., 1994; Carver & 
Scheier, 1982; Powers, 1973, 1974). It may even be considered that social sharing of 
affect and affective expressions serve such a purpose; affective expressions 
communicate to others and can shape their affect, thoughts or behaviours. This approach 
of viewing affect regulation as progress towards held affect goals allows for a 
broadening of the examination of the processes of regulation. These held goals of what 
individuals want to feel do not by any means have to remain stationary; individuals can 
shape what they want to feel according to the perceived utility of a particular affect state 
at that time (e.g., Tamir, 2003). More generally, if a discrepancy is prolonged between a 
perceived state (such as what is felt or expressed), and a reference point (such as a goal 
state for feeling or expression) efforts are made to reduce this discrepancy by bringing 
the reference closer to the perceived state, implying goal adjustment (Carver & Scheier 
2001; Powers, 1974).  
Moreover, these processes are not implied to be distinct and separate from one another. 
While felt-affect and affective expression are examined separately in this chapter, it 
must be stressed that there are evident shared links between them (e.g., Mauss et al., 
2005; Soussignan, 2004), forming a cyclical influence. A cyclical influence is not just 
restricted to the aforementioned example; affect-expression can shape the social 
environment and the affect or actions of others. This change in turn shapes the 
environment experienced, impacting on affective states and moderating any need for 
regulatory efforts to be made. Further changes to what may be considered a complex 
system in the form of competing pressures from non-aligned felt-affect and affect-
expression goals may shape affect dynamics; again, these may be subject to continuous 
and cyclical influences from changes in self-regulatory capacity and environmental 
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changes. Figure 2.1 overviews the interrelated nature of the different aspects of affect 
regulation reviewed in this chapter. 
 
Figure 2.1 Overview of affect regulation, self-regulatory capacity (resource) and affect 
goals 
Solid boxes denote intra-individual processes; dashed boxes denote environmental or 
inter-individual processes; arrows denote proposed existence of relationships between 
processes. 
Given the prevalence of recurrent and cyclical relationships described in the literature 
and represented in Figure 2.1, traditional investigatory methods may be restricted in 
their capacity for exploring continuous, dynamic phenomenon such as affect and affect 
regulation. Chapter 3 offers a framework for exploring the relationships between affect, 
self-regulatory capacity, and affect goals based on control theory and offers 
computational simulation as a method for representing complex dynamics. 
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Chapter 3: Investigative Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 highlighted several issues arising in the current literature that are yet to be 
integrated within a unifying explanatory framework. These issues include but are not 
limited to: the dynamics of affect regulation and dynamics of affect regulation strategy 
selection, the capacity for affect regulation across time, resource competition between 
alternative affect regulation strategies, and change in affect regulation goals across time 
and in terms of self-regulatory capacity. In the current chapter, I outline a means of 
investigating these issues within a coherent framework to show how the outstanding 
issues and any overlap between them can be investigated in a single model.  
The first section of this chapter outlines how the framework of control theory (e.g., 
Powers, 1974) has been regarded as a useful means of describing goal-directed, self-
regulatory processes. Using this framework, I outline how affect regulation processes, 
described in Chapter 2, can be considered in terms of a control theory model. Existing 
descriptions of affect regulation that are based on a control theory approach are 
examined and the model proposed in this thesis is compared with these. 
The second section of this chapter overviews the use of computer simulation as an 
investigative tool in psychology. Computational modelling of affect regulation is a 
relatively new and growing means of investigating the processes involved in affect 
regulation (e.g., Bosse et al., 2010). The benefits of using computational models and 
simulated experiments, in terms of specifying hypotheses and generating new lines of 
inquiry in the dynamics of affect, that are beyond the reach of traditional methods of 
investigation, are described. Existing simulations of affect regulation are discussed and 
the requirement for a further model examining affect regulation dynamics is outlined. 
3.2 Control Theory 
This section overviews the use of, and further potential for, control theory as an 
investigative framework for affect regulation. Affect regulation, like other forms of self-
regulation, can be considered in control theory terms as a dynamic, goal-directed 
process, of changing states and goals. Control theory presupposes that information 
gained from comparing a present state (such as a person’s current status in a weight-loss 
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diet) and a goal state (such as a target weight) is fed back to effect changes to the 
present state accordingly. Through examining affect regulation as the change of affect 
towards a specific state or goal, control theory can be used to demonstrate how the 
dynamic processes involved in affect regulation can influence one’s current affect 
states. Affect regulation in control theory terms is examined in section 3.2.2.; however, 
first, I outline some key principles of control. 
Control theory provides a structured framework for examining dynamic systems. As 
part of the field of cybernetics, it examines the process of feedback of information from 
a system’s output to typically ensure stability in an observed state (Wiener, 1948). Its 
modern origins lie in the need for creation of stability in mechanical systems, such as 
that of controlled flight (e.g., Ashby, 1961). Disturbances or deviations in a system’s 
behaviour, such as a sudden gust of wind affecting an early aeroplane’s stability, needed 
to be overcome, if a stable flight was to be maintained. A control loop, which feeds 
back corrections in a closed system, offers a means for real-time changes to be made in 
response to, or even in anticipation of, disturbances, to ensure that a system remains 
stable in a dynamic environment (e.g., Clark 1996).  
A commonly-used example of a control loop, perhaps because it is an everyday, simple, 
working system, is the thermostat in a central heating system (e.g., Barone, Maddux, & 
Snyder, 1997; Carver & Scheier, 2001). A functioning thermostat compares 
measurements of room temperature against a specified reference temperature. If the 
measured room temperature is lower than the reference temperature, the thermostat 
sends a signal to heating systems to turn on and increase room temperature. This signal 
is maintained until the discrepancy between measured temperature and reference 
temperature is sufficiently reduced, at which point no further discrepancy is detected 
and the system does not need to act. The system here is termed a negative feedback loop 
because the system serves to reduce discrepancy between the measured temperature 
state and reference state.  
This simple example above reflects just a small part of the dynamics involved in 
maintaining a steady room temperature. Events (e.g., a person opening or closing a 
window) may also impact on the state (in this case room temperature) that the feedback 
loop operates on. The thermostat responds to environmental changes by modifying its 
impact on the current temperature state: an opened window might cool the room, and be 
likely to create a discrepancy between measured temperature and reference temperature. 
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The heating system must resume working to reduce the discrepancy, even if its previous 
rate of work when the window was closed used to be sufficient to keep the room at the 
reference temperature. 
The thermostat model may be further embellished by considering room temperature as a 
continuously changing value. Heat in a room dissipates over time to the outside 
environment; unless a continuous heat source is applied, the room temperature will fall 
back towards the cooler state of the wider environment (assuming that outside is cooler 
than inside). This wider environment’s temperature state can be considered the room 
temperature’s natural resting point. Disturbances to the recorded temperature, such as a 
large number of people gathering in a room, may drive recorded temperature upwards, 
beyond that of the reference point. At temperatures exceeding the reference point, the 
thermostat turning off the heating system could result in passive temperature control 
occurring, through the natural dissipation of heat. Alternatively, a combined heating and 
air-conditioning system, operated by the thermostat, could still actively regulate room 
temperature towards the reference temperature by cooling a hot room. This 
consideration of a dynamic variable that is controlled, in both positive and negative 
directions, is directly applied in representing affect regulation in section 3.2.2. 
The complete system for a closed negative feedback loop of temperature regulation is 
shown in Figure 3.1. This basic example outlines how each moment in the system is 
dependent on preceding action and will shape forthcoming action. It is not a linear 
system in which instructions for procedure flow from left to right, in a simple, causal 
chain, where the output of a system could be considered the end result. Instead, causal 
relationships become harder to define as single, isolated entities, particularly as system 
complexity increases. 
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Figure 3.1 Complete control loop for a thermostat system 
A discrepancy between the reference temperature and the detected temperature at the 
comparator drives changes (by heating or cooling) to account for external disturbances 
and maintain temperature at the reference state. 
One means by which a temperature control system may become more complex is the 
existence of a second, competing feedback loop that also serves to influence the room 
temperature (e.g., Schmidt, 1988). For example, if, instead of the above model in which 
both heating and cooling are determined by a single system, two systems exist, one for 
heating and one for cooling, each with their own thermostats. The two systems’ 
reference points could be specified at different temperature levels and so the effect of 
reducing discrepancy between room temperature and reference temperature in one 
system would act as a disturbance to the other system, creating a discrepancy in the 
second. Depending on the dynamics of the systems, room temperature might oscillate 
between approaching the two reference temperatures, or settle at an artificial point 
between the two incongruent reference temperatures (e.g., Powers, 1974). 
A balanced system, where two control loops do not come into conflict can be achieved 
through further modifications. In the above example, the two systems reference 
temperatures differ, causing conflict in the overall system. Reference values, such as the 
thermostat’s reference temperature, themselves can be changed in a control system, 
allowing for control to be achieved, even with the moving target of a changing reference 
value (e.g., Clarke, 1996). An elaboration of the control system to include multiple 
levels of control is offered by Powers (1974), in which the reference value for a lower 
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level control loop is specified as being the current state of a higher level control loop. 
Using the thermostat example, a higher level of control in this system could be a person 
changing the temperature dial (i.e., reference temperature) on the thermostat to meet his 
or her goal of feeling comfortably warm. This concept of cascading changes to 
reference values in a complex control model, ultimately shaping the system’s outputs at 
lower levels, is revisited in section 3.2.1. 
Further to the process of cascading changes to reference values as a means of 
influencing a system’s outputs, reference values may also be changed through changes 
ascending in a complex control system (e.g., Powers, 1974; Powers et al., 1960a, 
1960b). A perceived discrepancy in a control loop is ordinarily reduced by changing the 
current state towards the reference value; however, if this is no longer possible, an 
enduring discrepancy may be reduced by moving the reference value towards the static 
current state (Figure 3.2.). This process of reference value change is argued to occur 
much more slowly than that of behavioural change, accumulating gradually (e.g., 
Powers, 1974). This could be conceived as an energy saving ‘smart’ thermostat, which 
gradually lowers energy consumption by reducing the reference temperature to levels 
closer to the room’s natural resting point temperature. Again, this concept of changes to 
reference values is examined in section 3.2.1, in terms of self-regulatory capacity and 
goal pursuit. 
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Figure 3.2 Complete control loop with a second loop for changes to the reference value 
As with Figure 3.1, detected temperature is regulated towards the reference temperature 
through adjustment of heating or cooling. Over time, a prolonged discrepancy between 
detected and reference temperature is reduced by regulating the reference temperature 
state towards the detected temeperature. 
The representations of control shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 can be abstracted beyond 
that of a simple thermostat model. In general terms, the reference temperature would be 
considered a reference value, the output to heat or cool termed as an actuator, external 
factors such as a window opening or closing termed disturbances, the room temperature 
labelled as the current state, and the detected temperature would be labelled the 
perceived state or input. In terms of the generic control loop, a disturbance to the stable 
system is detected as a discrepancy between the current state and reference value, a 
correction in the form of a change to the output is necessary in order to generate a 
desired input. The principle of a negative feedback loop outlined above may be 
expanded to any number of systems that rely on correcting for changes introduced so 
that a perceived state is maintained at a reference value. 
The adaptation of the control loop to suit wider contexts than just corrections to 
mechanical systems, alongside many other developments, can be seen in the broad field 
of cybernetics. Cybernetics encompasses systems that use feedback to achieve goals in 
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recurrent patterns of sensing current states, comparing against goals, making actions to 
change progress, and then again sensing new states (e.g., Ashby, 1961; Wiener, 1948). 
Cybernetics as an interdisciplinary approach affords the study and development of 
feedback and control in many fields including robotics, computational neuroscience and 
psychology. 
3.2.1 Control Theory in Psychology 
Control theory, as described in the preceding section, allows for an understanding of 
systems in which processes are not just simple linear chains of action. Human 
behaviour, particularly goal-directed self-regulatory behaviour, can be considered to 
follow iterative steps of actions and self-monitoring of the changes made as a result of 
these actions (e.g., Miller et al., 1960). Regulation towards meeting held goals can be 
considered in terms of the closed feedback loops seen in control theory (Powers, 1974). 
In this section, I overview self-regulation, in terms of a control theory perspective, and 
look at two prominent control theory frameworks, which have influenced the study of 
self-regulation. 
The processes of self-regulation can be seen across many aspects of psychology and 
physiology. For example, in a brain physiology analogue of the thermostat model 
offered in section 3.2, the anterior hypothalamus serves to contribute to body 
temperature regulation, appearing to act as the comparator, instructing physiological or 
behavioural changes in order to warm or cool the body (e.g., Magoun, Harrison, 
Brobeck, & Ranson, 1938). Other automatically regulated physiological processes 
include (but are not limited to): blood-glucose regulation (e.g., Jarrett, 1979), caloric 
intake (e.g., Adolph, 1947) and body-weight (e.g., Keesey & Powley, 1986). Regulatory 
processes extend beyond the automatic processes offered here, and include deliberate 
control towards held goals such as the intended modification of body weight through 
changing diet. It is in terms of controlled and effortful processes of self-control that this 
thesis examines self-regulation. 
Control theory offers a template to examine both automatic regulatory processes and 
controlled, goal-directed self-regulation. Self-regulatory behaviours, such as dieting in 
order to lose weight require the formation of a goal and the monitoring of progress 
towards that goal. If behaviour is not monitored and appropriate changes to behaviour 
not enacted to move towards a goal, the whole process becomes little more than a vague 
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intention to diet (e.g., Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2011). In experimental designs, such as 
the Stroop task, the self-monitoring and control of behaviour is necessary to overcome 
over-learned impulses of word reading in order to meet the goal of colour naming (e.g., 
Macleod, 1991). Control theory concepts are also present in models within social 
psychology, such as Festinger’s (1954) Social Comparison Theory. Festinger (1954) 
argued that individuals facing unclear situations with no explicit guide for behaviour, 
such as being part of a large crowd, compare their own behaviours to similar others and 
using these cues attempt to correct for perceived differences. Across a broad spectrum, 
goal-directed or self-monitoring behaviour can be examined within the framework of 
control theory.  
Powers’s Model 
Perceptual Control Theory (PCT, Powers, 1974) is a framework for describing human 
behaviour, cognition and emotion in terms of control loops, such as those outlined in 
section 3.2 and variants thereof. Behaviour is regarded as the self-regulation of one’s 
outputs from the actuator in order to experience the correct inputs perceived at the 
comparator. For example, the general model posed in Figure 3.1 may even represent 
physiological systems such as muscle tension. An individual carrying a stack of books 
in the library must maintain a certain degree of muscle tension in the arms to counter the 
constant downward pull of gravity. If another book is added to the stack (a disturbance 
to the system’s equilibrium), the perceived change must be met with extra effort from 
the arms to continue meeting the goal of carrying the books (e.g., Powers, 1974). I now 
outline the framework of PCT, some of its key concepts, and highlight its use as a 
means of investigating goals in self-regulation and self-regulation processes. 
PCT is built upon the foundation that there exists a hierarchy of control loops, in which 
reference values at the lower levels exist as perceived states which in turn are subject to 
self-regulation at higher levels (e.g., Powers, 1974). Changes made through self-
regulation at higher levels result in a cascade down the system, enacting changes to 
reference values at lower levels. This structure enables a rich variety of possible goals to 
be held at many different levels of abstraction. In accordance with having multiple 
control loops at each level, lower level goals serve the purpose of making corrections to 
meet multiple higher level goals. For example, choosing to walk to the shops may serve 
both the higher level goals of taking some exercise and completing the week’s 
shopping. Each of these may serve a higher level goal still, such as maintaining a 
47 
 
healthy lifestyle. At the lower levels, goals are regarded as more concrete, rapidly 
changing and immediate, such as motor commands or simple procedural tasks. In 
contrast, higher level goals are viewed as being more abstract, more rigid and longer 
term, such as perceptions of held principles or generalised plans for behaviour. Powers 
(1974) offers nine levels in total for control, including system concepts (such as an 
idealised self-image), programs (chained sequences of action, analogous to Schank & 
Abelson’s, 1977, scripts), and first order perceptions (sensory perceptions such as 
luminance detection). 
One of the key concepts in PCT is the existence of conflicting goals. While people may 
have many differing goals, there are restrictions in the ability to pursue them all at any 
one time, due to the physical or cognitive limitations. This topic of resolving conflict 
has received extensive attention in recent years and is regarded as a fundamental 
question on human and animal behaviour that needs to be answered (Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Conflict may be seen when one response is favoured, 
perhaps because it is over-learned or just an influential impulse, and yet another 
response is required. PCT argues that conflict detected at one level can be resolved by 
the adjustment of reference values at higher levels. The motivations for each response 
need to be assessed and readjusted to fit required behaviours. Powers (1974) argues that 
the experience of affect (or more specifically emotions) arises from internal conflict 
limiting capability to reach held references. 
In control theory terms, conflict can be described as a product of the influence of one 
control loop on another. More specifically, conflict arises if regulating one perceived 
state towards its reference value causes another perceived state to shift away from its 
own reference value. Across the long term, it may become necessary to reprioritise 
control in the hierarchy so that the pursuit of different higher level references may alter 
the reference values at levels of experienced conflict to ensure greater coherence. 
Alternatively, the control hierarchy may need reorganisation to alleviate conflict. 
Reorganisation is the process of changing connections across the hierarchy to achieve 
higher level control through alternative means to that currently undertaken. For 
example, an injured athlete might continue his or her pursuit of excelling at a sport by 
coaching the next generation of athletes. Initial conflict between wanting to compete 
and yet being unable to is resolved by finding an alternate pathway in the control 
hierarchy that enables control at the higher level. 
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Carver and Scheier’s Model 
Carver and Scheier (1982) take elements of the framework offered by Powers (1974) to 
develop applicable models of control within social and health psychology. As before, 
illustrations of hierarchical control highlight how even simple motor commands could 
ultimately contribute progress towards higher level, abstract goals. In contrast with 
Powers (1974), Carver and Scheier’s (1982; 2001) model is not built up from lowest 
level perceptual control to higher order control as a biophysical model of the brain. 
Instead, Carver and Scheier largely use the control theory framework of a hierarchy of 
competing control systems as models of cognitive processes (and affective processes, 
discussed in section 3.2.2) with varying tiers as different abstractions of the cognitive 
action examined. Carver and Scheier (2001) primarily consider regulation in terms of 
changes to the current state and goal state, offering a suitable template for examining 
the model of affect regulation dynamics put forward at the close of Chapter 2. 
One key representation of regulation in Carver and Scheier’s (2001) model is the use of 
information from the comparator to influence both the current measured state (via the 
primary actuator) and the goal state (via a secondary actuator). This model offers a 
means to reduce discrepancies between the current state and goal state through two 
means and is an adaptation of the model proposed by Powers et al. (1960a). Carver and 
Scheier (2001) focus on two controlled states ‘behaviour’ and ‘cognition’, with 
behaviour being at a level lower than cognition. They argue that should regulatory 
efforts in changing behaviour be insufficient to reach its goal (that of the cognition’s 
current state) and an enduring discrepancy is created, cognition will be regulated to 
reduce the discrepancy and shift towards the current behaviour state. This is considered 
by Carver and Scheier (2001) to be the process by which higher-level control is 
temporarily diminished and behaviour becomes more poorly regulated (p. 239); lower 
level control is considered to be functionally super-ordinate during periods of higher-
tier change towards lower-tier references. 
Carver and Scheier (2001) do not specify the timeframe for a change in a higher-tier 
loop relative to changes at lower-tier loops; they simply say that higher change takes 
longer. They suggest that whenever a discrepancy is detected between the current state 
and the reference value, a small change is made bringing the reference closer (as shown 
in the extra loop at the top of Figure 3.2). The expectation in this model is that there 
may be many discrepancies between the state and the reference, some of which show 
49 
 
the state to be greater than the reference and some lower. Over time, the small changes 
both in a positive and negative direction would not greatly affect the reference’s 
position, providing progress towards the reference runs relatively smoothly. If a longer 
term discrepancy is present, then reference may be adjusted in one continual direction, 
slowly creating a changed reference to reduce discrepancy. Static inputs and prolonged 
periods of detected errors may arise from insufficient control, potentially as a result of 
fatigue, or from two conflicting references. 
The representation of a higher tier of control becoming subordinate to a lower tier is 
considered by Carver and Scheier (2001) to be similar to that of self-regulatory failure 
offered by Baumeister and Heatherton (1996). While there are substantial similarities, 
Carver and Scheier (2001) represent self-control failure as disengagement with higher-
tier control so that an individual would no longer be attending to the ideal goal for the 
self. The strength-model of self-control is broad enough to accommodate this as a 
model for self-regulatory failure but can also include an individual still being aware of 
the higher-tier goals and yet not engaging any regulatory efforts towards them (e.g., 
Baumeister et al., 1994). The proposed model of goal adjustment contrasts with Carver 
and Scheier’s (2001) suggestion of diminished attention paid to inconvenient higher 
goals, suggesting that Carver and Scheier’s (2001) model might be improved through a 
closer integration with the strength-model of control. 
3.2.2 Application of Control Theory in Affect regulation 
Control theory offers, as Carver and Scheier (1982, p. 111) describe, “a useful 
conceptual framework” for examining psychological processes. While the previous 
section examined control theory in terms of the general contribution to psychology, this 
section focuses on control theory representations of affect regulation. Control theory has 
proven to be highly influential, albeit indirectly, in shaping affect regulation research 
with Gross’s (1998a) landmark model being based upon Miller et al.’s (1960) work 
depicting control loops (Gross & Thompson, 2007). In this section, I discuss an 
important divergence in representing affect between Powers’s (1974) control framework 
and Carver and Scheier’s framework (1982; 2001; 2004) and further examine a third 
control theory based model dedicated to representing of affect regulation.  
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Powers’s Model 
In models of control, a difference between the perceived state and reference is compared 
and the error corrected for; however, there appears limited academic attention paid to 
the nature of this intrinsic error signal itself. Powers (1974) addresses emotions, 
describing the feeling sensation as being the intrinsic error signal: existence of error is 
felt as being bad (i.e. negative valence affect). Powers (2005) goes on to describe that 
the pursuit of maintaining a perception at the reference is to, “make the feeling go away” 
(p. 257), suggesting that people seek to reduce emotional experiences because presence 
of emotion points toward prolonged errors. In an example offered regarding a person’s 
chronic experience of anger, Powers (2005) offers means of regulating the affect state, 
which are strikingly similar to strategies listed in Gross’s (1998a) process model: 
situation selection, situation modification and reappraisal.  
The experience of emotion in the PCT framework is closely related to the experience of 
conflict within the hierarchy of control. Conflict arising due to the pursuit of two 
incompatible goals can result with neither goal state being reached, resulting in 
perceptions coming to rest at stable points away from that of references (Powers, 1974). 
Greater errors or errors regarded as most important to correct are considered to be 
associated with more intense emotional experiences (Powers, 2005). At times of 
conflicting states existing in the hierarchy, regulation of enduring error signal may be 
blocked for long enough for an abstracted feeling (such as muscle tension, elevated 
heart rate) to be perceived as emotions (Powers, 2005). Reorganisation of the control 
network may serve to reduce these experiences of conflict, although the process may 
invoke temporary error signals at levels of perception more core to the self. Research 
points towards this influence of goal conflict upon individuals’ felt state (e.g., Emmons 
& King, 1988) suggesting that enduring conflict, particularly at higher levels (e.g., King 
& Emmons, 1991; Kelly, Mansell, & Wood, 2011), is detrimental to well-being. 
Carver and Scheier’s Model 
While Carver and Scheier (2001) also look to the intrinsic error signal as the seat of 
affective experience, unlike Powers (1974; 2005), they suggest that felt-affect reflects 
the progress of error reduction. Their model of goal-directed behaviour broadens out the 
simple ‘first order’ control loop structure (the hierarchy outlined in section 3.2.1) to 
include a ‘second order’ control loop, which monitors the progress of the first control 
loop against a held goal of ideal progress rate. This second order control loop is 
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regarded as affective information, meaning that, in their model, affect arises from 
perceived progress towards a goal. Faster progress than expected towards a goal elicits 
more positive feelings; slower progress than expected towards a goal elicits more 
negative feelings. 
Affect experienced is then used as instruction to change progress rates towards a 
specific goal (e.g., Carver 2004; Carver & Scheier, 2011). Individuals wishing to reduce 
negative feelings would want to expend more effort while working towards a goal, 
whereas positive feelings allow for, and may even encourage, coasting and reducing 
effort expended while working towards a goal. In this instance, it is worth noting that 
there is a meaningful difference in positive (attractive) goals and negative (aversive) 
goals and that progress towards, or away, from these different types of goal is argued to 
be associated with different affect states. Faster progress than expected towards a 
positive goal or away from a negative goal respectively is argued to elicit elation and 
relief, while slower progress than expected towards a positive goal or away from a 
negative goal respectively elicits depression and anxiety (Carver & Scheier, 2011).  
In this model of dual control hierarchies (a hierarchy of behaviour and of affect 
regulation), information is fed back on progress towards goals and an individual may 
then use this information to change effort expended towards goals or even to change the 
goals themselves (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001). Carver (2004) expands on this 
understanding to explain why people seek to limit affect experiences: people slow down 
and coast towards goals specifically to reduce positive affect so other important goals 
are not neglected. Failure to suitably temper goal progress when approaching a goal too 
quickly may be associated with maladaptive behaviour in individuals, such as that seen 
in bipolar disorder. Fulford, Johnson, Llabre and Carver (2010) report that individuals 
with bipolar disorder do not coast when exceeding expectations for goal progress to the 
same degree as control subjects, partially supporting the control model of affect. 
Unrestrained positive affect and the continual pursuit thereof may indeed result in the 
neglecting of other important goals, highlighting the maladaptive nature of a manic 
episode. 
Limitations of Both Models 
There are two main issues with the representation of affect regulation presented by these 
hierarchies of control. Firstly, affect is presented as an experience that needs to be 
limited, or restricted. Powers (2005) argues that emotions arise from conflict and the 
52 
 
presence of persistent error, and exclusively focuses on negative emotion. Positive 
emotion is not associated with an absence of error because Powers (2005) describes this 
as an absence of conscious affective state. Carver and Scheier (2001, 2011), while 
approaching the topic of intrinsic error reduction by a different means, still point 
towards affect as a state that is restricted through regulation. Goal striving is argued to 
be increased or decreased so that affect states are regulated away, rather than affect 
being something that is regulated for its own sake. Moreover, empirical evidence 
(Holman, Totterdell, & Rogelberg, 2005) is not wholly supportive of Carver and 
Scheier’s (2001, 2011) model as rate of progress towards goals shows some 
independence with felt-affect. 
Hedonic models of affect (e.g., Larsen, 2000; Westen, 1994) argue that affect regulation 
directs affect towards more positive states rather than regulating them away. The 
frameworks offered do not appear to account for the active process of seeking out 
affective experience. Typically, hedonic views approach positive affect as the focus for 
people’s regulation efforts: it can be assumed intuitively that people want to be happy 
(e.g., Larsen, 2000). Larsen (2000) outlines that certain affect states, such as feeling 
happy, are desired by individuals and that people may specifically regulate towards 
these states for their hedonic value alone. More broadly, individuals may want to 
experience a range of affect states (Labouvie-Vief & Medler, 2002), including 
regulation specifically towards negative states (Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007), or not 
wanting to improve a negative state (Wood, Heimpel, Manwell, & Whittington, 2009). 
While the regulation of affect can serve a utilitarian purpose, such as individuals’ 
increase of worry before a challenging task to improve task performance (Tamir, 2005), 
it still demonstrates that individuals are actively seeking affect states for their own 
perceived value rather than just seeking to diminish affect experience. 
Secondly, in Carver and Scheier’s (2001; 2011) conception, affect’s purpose is solely 
expressed as means to guide progress towards held goals. The reaching of an affect state 
(other than the stable, limited affect experience) is not regarded as a goal within the 
vertical structure of the primary control hierarchy. Affect in Carver and Scheier’s (2001; 
2011) model appears to be considered a by-product of approaching goals, which is then 
used to inform progress. As described earlier, affect regulation may be explicitly sought 
out and there are numerous instances where affect regulation can be considered essential 
to the control hierarchy as it is necessary in meeting higher-tier goals (e.g., Hoschild 
2003; Grandey 2000; Totterdell & Holman 2003). Carver and Scheier’s (2001; 2011) 
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model offers no account for such deliberate regulation of felt-affect or affect-expression 
as part of an integrated hierarchy of goal directed behaviour. An alternative method of 
describing emotional experience and expression within the control theory framework 
through the integration of these into the primary vertical hierarchy of control loops has 
been described by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003). 
Diefendorff and Gosserand’s Model 
The model of emotional labour offered by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) addresses 
one of the limitations outlined above: affect regulation can be purposeful as a goal in 
itself in order to work towards higher goals. Their model presents potential conflict 
between one’s goal felt state and one’s goal expressed state, a situation commonly faced 
by service industry workers, where genuinely felt-affect may not be appropriate for 
customer interaction (Hochschild, 1983). Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) construct a 
sketch of a hierarchical model of four levels to represent potential points of conflict 
during affect regulation to meet affect goals required by the work environment. In the 
construction of this model they offer a series of propositions regarding the nature of 
affect regulation; many of these have evidently been derived as a result of the control 
theory approach used. 
Some of the propositions posed by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) are specified 
forms of more generalised rules found in control theory. For example, “Specific display 
rules lead to less variance in emotional displays… than general display rules” (p.956) 
is an applied understanding of the more general rule that a fixed reference value should 
result in less variability in input than a reference value subject to change. Ascending 
changes to reference values in the face of an unsuccessful attempt to reduce perceived 
error through change at lower levels are also included. The model claims to offer, 
through the dynamic nature of control theory models, a more comprehensive account of 
affect regulation than that of more traditional, static models. The authors further suggest 
that their model offers a deeper level of understanding of observable results. They use, 
by way of example, Grandey’s (2000) model, which argues there is a positive 
relationship between customer interaction and use of affect regulation. In comparison, 
Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) model’s offers to explain why this is the case, based 
on the greater occurrence of perceived errors in control and the subsequent requirement 
for more frequent error reduction efforts through affect regulation.  
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Limitations of Diefendorff and Gosserand’s Model 
Although Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) offer a control theory framework model 
that places affect regulation at the forefront, there are still limitations to its use as an 
investigative tool in understanding affect regulation dynamics. Carver and Scheier 
(1982) describe the control theory framework as being the only means that they know of 
to successfully relate the micro actions of movements (such as expressions) with the 
macro aspects of abstracted goal pursuit (such as maintaining a positive self-identity). 
Where this is typically considered across nine levels of control (e.g., Powers, 1974), 
Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) reduce this to just four, yet still appear to seek a 
similar scope of representation of behaviour.  
Appropriate timescales are not considered in Diefendorff and Gosserand’s (2003) 
model. As mentioned, their model, as a tool for making predictions regarding emotional 
labour, covers actions on the order of seconds or shorter, such as maintaining eye 
contact, and concepts that may endure across a lifetime, such as maintaining a desired 
self-concept (Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003, p. 949). The practicalities of examining 
both short and enduring changes within the control model could serve to prove 
prohibitively complex. This may be reflected in the propositions made arising from the 
model’s design, which largely focus on the middle tiers of the model and conflict 
between meeting personal emotional goals and work related emotional goals.  
Further to this, Diefendorff and Gosserand’s (2003) model is limited in its capacity to 
examine and make predictions regarding affect across time. Control models, by their 
design, reflect change across time (Miller et al., 1960; Powers, 1974) and their value 
comes from being able to represent complex dynamics that cannot be achieved 
otherwise. Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) offer some predictions regarding affect 
dynamics; however these are lacking in specificity and consideration of how some 
aspects of the model may influence aspects across an extended period. Examples of 
influence of one aspect of the model on another over time are further considered in 
section 3.3. This representation of an active process of affect regulation and the 
associated unfolding conflicts between affect regulation for personal or for work related 
goals as a static, sketched model limits the model’s utility as a predictive and 
investigative tool. 
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A New Approach in Examining Affect Dynamics 
In summary, control theory can be used to describe complex recurrent relationships 
between multiple factors, such as those between affect, affect regulation efforts and the 
environment. A simple control loop can demonstrate that a linear causal relationship is 
not always sufficient to explain the behaviour of systems (Powers, 1973). Introduction 
of multiple control loops arranged as layers of competing systems may be able to 
generate complex, dynamic behaviour (Powers, 1974). In terms of control theory, affect 
is traditionally considered a secondary outcome, useful for monitoring the progress of 
goals and serving as indications to alter efforts towards reaching goals (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 2001). However, more recent concepts of affect within a control framework 
(e.g., Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003) allow for affect regulation to be integrated into a 
hierarchy of control. 
In recent years, it has been argued that understanding the dynamics of affect is an 
essential aspect of affect itself (Oravecz et al., 2009; Verduyn et al., 2009). While 
control theory offers an excellent framework for representing and understanding the 
dynamics of complex processes, such as affect and affect regulation, current control 
models (e.g., Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003) do not extend beyond drawn sketches of 
static models. As a result of this, there are many questions and propositions left 
unaddressed regarding the dynamic nature of affect. In the next section, I overview a 
method of representing such models that addresses the dynamic aspects of affect 
regulation: computational simulation. 
3.3 Computational Models 
Computational models are a relatively underused approach for exploring questions 
about affect regulation. In this section, I outline some of the benefits that computational 
models offer over more traditional means of investigating affect regulation, the 
development of current computational models of affect and propose a further model of 
affect regulation dynamics built within a control theory framework 
3.3.1 Advantages of Computational Modelling 
Traditional means of examining affect regulation, such as correlational (e.g., Grandey 
2003) or experimental (e.g., Gross, 1998b) studies have their limitations in 
56 
 
understanding the processes involved. Some of these limitations will be described. 
Moreover, models constructed as pen-and-paper diagrams (e.g., Diefendorff & 
Gosserand, 2003; Larsen, 2000) designed to examine or explain affect regulation 
processes are limited by their reliance on implicit assumptions due to a lack of 
specificity or formalisation of constructs described. Unlike these informal models, 
computational modelling offers a means to create specific, testable predictions and 
explanations about the underlying processes for observed phenomena (e.g., Epstein 
2008) such as affect regulation. 
Limitations of Traditional Approaches 
Correlational studies have proven to be an enduring means of examining affect 
regulation, particularly in workplace environments in which affect regulation is an 
everyday facet of occupations (e.g., Diefendorff, Croyle, & Gosserand, 2005; Grandey, 
2003; Pugliesi, 1999). However, correlational studies have a significant limitation in 
that they only show that a relationship between variables exists. Correlations do not 
establish causality between variables or go so far as to explain underlying mechanisms 
by which variables relate. As a result, they are unable to answer such questions as: If 
one strategy for managing affect is more effective than others, why do individuals use a 
range of strategies of varying effectiveness, and how does the decision to do so arise? 
How do recurrent relationships between concepts, such as the need for and depletion of 
self-regulatory resource by affect regulation, impact on how affect regulation occurs 
over time? 
Experimental studies offer a means to establish causality and so can be used to approach 
questions about affect regulation in different ways to that in correlational research. 
However, often in the pursuit of creating a controlled environment for experimental 
investigation of affect regulation, participants are exposed to situations which may 
influence the processes of affect regulation. For example, experimental studies indicate 
that antecedent focused regulation strategies, such as reappraisal of a stimulus, are an 
effective means of regulating affect both in terms of efficacy of affect change (Gross, 
1998b) and cost of resource depletion (Baumeister et al., 2007). However, in laboratory 
settings, participants are often instructed in advance how to regulate their feelings, 
allowing individuals to anticipate affective stimuli and prepare regulation strategies 
(Sheppes et al., 2009). The cost of reappraising a stimulus might therefore be 
underestimated as a product of experimental design. The dynamics of unfolding affect, 
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the efforts to regulate them and the interaction between them represent further 
challenges for experiments that either focus on affect as a static phenomena or as a 
linear system. Larsen (2005) catalogues a variety of means and methods to reflect the 
dynamics of affect, to which repeated data collection methods, such as diary studies, 
prove invaluable in better understanding affect.  
Verduyn et al. (2009) argue that a full understanding of affect can only be achieved 
when dynamics are considered. As described by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003), 
developing an account for the dynamics of affect change is a fundamental issue in affect 
regulation, as is searching for the deeper relations between affect regulation concepts. 
They argue that some of these relations may be predicted through the construction of 
informal models like their own. However, there are still many more assumptions within 
their model that are not stated, and several assertions that require testing across time. 
For example, their assertion that a narrow range of permissible expressions would result 
in less variation of expression than a broad permissible range would (p. 950); however, 
they also assert that a narrow range of expressions may require greater regulatory efforts 
than a broad range (p. 951). In turn, the greater expended effort may impede the ability 
to subsequently manage one’s own expressions (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998), resulting in 
greater variability overall. The influences of each proposition in the model on the others 
are not considered by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) because propositions are not 
fully specified and assumptions in the model are left unstated. 
Advantages of Computation 
A computational model offers the opportunity to formally test hypotheses put forward 
by informal models. Within each informal model, there may lie a series of unstated 
assumptions about the nature of the relationships between concepts. By constructing a 
computational model and formally describing these assumptions, the researcher makes 
assumptions explicit and effectively creates specific, testable hypotheses (Epstein, 
2008). Beyond this, computer models serve many other useful purposes, such as 
identifying new research questions and areas for data collection (Carley, 1999),  testing 
plausibility of explanations (Stafford, 2009), and escaping limitations of intuitive or pre-
conceived theories (Farrel & Lewandowsky, 2010a). 
To focus on just one of the functions of a computational model, formalising predictions, 
I shall briefly revisit the informal model by Diefendorff and Gosserand, (2003). They 
propose a “dynamic, process-oriented approach to understanding emotional labor” (p. 
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945), and while their expansive model does successfully outline the problem of affect 
regulation dynamics, the underlying rules in the model for achieving this are left 
unstated. Simply put, their dynamic model of affect does not include mention of 
fundamental properties such as rates of affect change or timescales of affect and so 
faces issues outlined earlier in this section. A computational model introduces these 
rules and can address these issues by consideration of what Marr (1982) terms the 
algorithmic level of analysis. 
Marr’s (1982) proposal of the computational modelling approach itemises three levels 
of understanding a problem. First is the computational level: the problem undertaken 
and solved by the system (for example, engaging in affect-improving intrapersonal 
regulation). Second is the algorithmic level: the processes and representations necessary 
to function and achieve the aims outlined at the computational level (for example, 
detection of the current affect state and the comparison with the desired affect state). 
Third is the implementation level: the physical realisation of the model as both a 
plausible design and a functionally appropriate one for the task (for example, a negative 
feedback control loop that monitors errors and enacts change to the affective state). 
Diefendorff and Gosserand’s (2003) model only exists as a top level of Marr’s (1982) 
framework and so does not adequately specify how these operations occur, leading to 
propositions which may prove incompatible with each other. It is only through 
examination of such models at all of Marr’s (1982) levels that such propositions of 
computation can be adequately examined.  
Expanding on the use of computer models for informing data collection, computer 
models have potential for raising new research questions. Carley (1999) argues that 
computational models have a vital role to play in the continuing investigation of 
complex systems, such as group behaviour, and aid in understanding non-linear 
systems, where dynamic processes may interact. The generation of new hypotheses, 
which may not be immediately available via traditional studies, can occur through the 
running of virtual experiments in computer simulations. By specifying key parameter 
values in complex models, the outcomes of subsequent simulations based on these 
parameters can be used to inform further questions. Virtual experiments allow for 
testing systems that have high complexity, multiple interacting elements, impractically 
large sample sizes or even investigating dynamic behaviour. Carley (1999) 
demonstrates such a process in a large simulation of individuals’ learning within an 
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organisation, providing clear and testable hypothesis and predictions derived from 
simulated experiments.  
A further benefit of simulated experiments and, more broadly, computational modelling, 
is the capacity to represent phenomena that may be too complex to examine in sum 
through more traditional approaches. Sun, Coward, and ZenZen (2005) regard 
computational models as being “necessary to explicate the intricacies of the mind” (p. 
615), further arguing that research without the guidance of computational models 
representing complex processes is just the accumulation of data without a purpose. 
Lewis (2005) highlights affect in particular as being a domain that would benefit greatly 
from the representation in terms of computational, dynamic systems and that an 
integration of affective science and computational modelling would further help 
understand the complex process of affect. In the following section, I outline some of the 
computational models of affect to date that have shaped understanding of complex 
affect dynamics. 
3.3.2 Computational Models of Affect Regulation 
This section outlines some established computational models of affect dynamics and 
affect regulation. They vary in both approach and specific focus of investigation but 
share commonalties in their specification of affect in formal, mathematical terms and 
offer predictions or descriptions of complex affect dynamics. These computational 
models include connectionist models of affect transition (Thagard & Nerb, 2002), 
Bayesian networks of probabilistic affect states (Conati & Maclaren, 2009), complete 
agents in which affect supports behavioural choices (Maria & Zitar, 2006; Velazquez, 
1997), fully embodied robotic representations of expression, such as Kismet (e.g., 
Breazeal, 2003), and even commercial attempts at simulating affect change seen in 
some computer games (e.g., Chaplin & Rhalibi, 2004). Outlined below are just three of 
the many models available, chosen because elements of each have influenced aspects of 
this thesis’ proposed model. 
Gratch and Marsella’s Model 
Gratch and Marsella (2001; 2004) aimed to integrate a model of emotion into a model 
of cognition, with the focus on designing human-like agents. Their model focuses on the 
appraisal of events to inform felt-affect, based on appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., 
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Smith & Lazarus, 1990). An event that impairs progress or undoes the achievement of a 
held goal may be appraised by the model as a fear inducing event (Gratch & Marsella. 
2004). This affect state is used as information to drive coping strategies based on the 
model’s beliefs about the environment and its intentions for action. Affect, as well as 
being the modelled response to environmental change, is used to inform the model’s 
plans and beliefs about the environment, ultimately shaping how it responds to 
environmental change in the future.  
Gratch and Marsella (2004) structure their model to highlight the interaction between 
the environment and emotion through affective events and appraisals of these events. 
Affect events shape emotional responses through appraisals and affect responses are 
used to shape the experienced environment; this forms a complex relationship in the 
model between affect and the environment because a closed loop is formed. A strength 
of the model is rooted in this complexity because it enables the capture of dynamic 
responses to affective events that are contextual, based on prior experiences. Examples 
of this complexity between the influence of circumstances and affect on each other are 
addressed in Chapter 8, where multiple instances of this thesis’ developed model are 
cast as agents in a network of two individuals.  
One of the limitations of Gratch and Marsella’s (2004) model comes from its wide remit 
of development. While this model illustrates appraisal of affective events and 
subsequent regulation of affect, these aspects are but a part of the model’s operation, 
which extends to include: belief formation, planning, action, dialogue, and intentions (p. 
278). As a result, this model serves to represent affect within the context of all these 
surrounding cognitive and behavioural processes and so exists as an extensive model, 
with many free parameters. This presents issues with the capacity for the model to make 
specific and scientifically useful predictions for affect regulation because the range of 
possible outcomes within the model is vast (e.g., Roberts & Pashler, 2000). Further to 
this, the model represents affect in terms of goal pursuit and, like the control models 
described in section 3.2.2, Gratch and Marsella (2004) do not consider affect as a goal 
state in itself. A further limitation to the use of this model as an investigative tool for 
examining affect regulation is that Gratch and Marsella (2004) focus on coping, which 
is considered to be less well defined in comparison with affect regulation (Parkinson & 
Totterdell, 1999) and too narrow to cover processes such as affect worsening (e.g., 
Parrott, 1993; Tamir, 2005). 
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Oravecz et al.’s Model 
Oravecz et al. (2009) present a diffusion model of affect dynamics (DynAffect). This 
model differs substantially from the one presented by Gratch and Marsella (2001; 2004) 
in that it represents affect as a stochastic process rather than the outcome of a 
production system of structured rules towards held goals. Oravecz et al. (2009) 
represent affect as a random walk on the Russell Grid (e.g., Russell, 2003) about a focal 
point of the home-base. At any given moment in the model, the trajectory of affect is 
determined by the continuous decay towards the home-base and by the next step in the 
random walk. Parameter values in the model pertaining to the location of this home-
base and the ‘spread’ of recorded steps around it are regarded as representing an 
individual’s extraversion and neuroticism, respectively. Individual differences in these 
personality traits are said to shape the profile of the random walk created by the model: 
higher extraversion leads to a higher valence home-base and higher neuroticism leads to 
greater distance in the random walk from the home-base.  
A strength of Oravecz et al.’s (2009) model is its foundation in affect data and the use of 
this data in the model to describe hidden trends in affect change. Higher intensity affect 
states are considered to more rapidly decay towards the home-base than that of low 
intensity affect states. This model further outlines that while affect might continually 
shift about the home-base of felt-affect intensity, the home-base itself shifts over time. 
A stronger fit of the collected data is seen to be achieved by the model if this shift in the 
home-base takes place. The affect home-base is modelled to drift over the course of a 
day, increasing slightly in valence as a day progresses and following an inverted U for 
activation. With just a few parameters, the model successfully offers a representation of 
affect changing across time. 
However, the model offered by Oravecz et al. (2009) has several limitations from an 
affect regulation perspective. Firstly, the authors argue that influencing factors on one’s 
current affect state, such as affect events and intentional, goal-directed affect regulation, 
are too numerous to adequately capture in a model. As a result, affect’s trajectory across 
the day is arranged to be largely determined by random values. While perhaps not the 
intention of the authors, their design does imply that people are substantially limited in 
ability to shape their own emotional experience or even adequately change what they 
may want to feel. Building on from this, there is only one point in the model that affect 
tends towards, implied as a unique typical felt state each person ordinarily experiences. 
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However, individuals can drive their affect states to specific held states (e.g., Gross, 
1998a; Tamir, 2005) and potentially away from this home-base. In this sense, the model 
offered by Oravecz et al. (2009) is limited in its capacity to represent affect regulation 
dynamics. At a more fundamental level, the probabilistic model of affect outlined by 
Oravecz et al. (2009) does not offer accounts of the processes behind affect regulation 
and how they may relate to outcomes of the model; it just describes affect change.  
Bosse et al.’s Model 
Bosse et al. (2010) have formalised a model for emotion regulation that was originally 
informally described by Gross (1998a). The model conceptualises emotion regulation as 
a dynamical system based on feedback loops correcting the current level of emotion 
towards an optimal level of emotion. The sensitivity of the feedback loops are argued to 
necessarily require an adaptation mechanism to allow for change during an emotional 
episode, a departure from Gross’s model. Unlike Oravecz et al. (2009) but like Gratch 
and Marsella’s (2004) model, this model accounts for changes in emotional states as a 
result of emotional events. Bosse et al.’s (2010) model is used to demonstrate several 
hypothetical scenarios through parameter adjustment, including: over- and under-
regulation, adaptive change in regulation to reach an affect goal, and a response to 
training in improving a personal tendency to regulate behaviour (a model of anger-
management therapy). Their model as a formalisation of Gross’s informal model shows 
consistent agreement with predictions made by Gross (1998a).  
Bosse et al. (2010) highlight the need for inclusion of costs to a model of affect change. 
This does not reflect the limited self-regulatory capacity (e.g., Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000) or motivation (e.g., Alberts et al., 2011) models of regulation but is a step 
towards forming integrated models of affect. Bosse et al.’s (2010) representation of cost 
is associated with the model’s changes to the ‘willingness’ to change an emotional state 
and so is removed somewhat from that actual process of regulating affect. Like the 
model by Oravecz et al. (2009), Bosse et al. (2010) present the affect state as tending 
towards a singular state over time, although in this model, the tendency for affect to 
change is regarded as wholly due to regulation. Because of this specificity offered, 
Bosse et al. (2010) also include affective events in their model, allowing for the 
representation of regulation of affect overcoming momentary disturbances in affect. 
A limitation seen in Bosse et al. (2010) is the general lack of specificity regarding 
current model dynamics. While affect responses during regulation are seen to change, 
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the timescale behind these changes is not clear. In one instance, a scenario is created for 
the model: a simulated response to an anger management therapy session. Angry affect 
in the model is seen to decrease once a parameter value for the capacity to change affect 
is altered to reflect this simulated ‘therapy session’. However, without appropriate 
timescales represented in the model it cannot be determined if this is a rapid change or 
one across many days. This issue extends to the remaining tests conducted on the model 
and the regulatory processes during the models operation.  
Bosse et al. (2010) also offer an open-ended suggestion for an extension to their model: 
an inclusion of dynamics to their static goal affect state. They acknowledge that a goal 
affect state can depend on specific circumstances and that people search for emotional 
variation. As with the Oravecz et al. (2009) model, there just exists one state that affect 
tends towards over time, which limits the model’s capacity for representing affect 
regulation dynamics. 
Affect Models Summary 
Each of the models described above offers means to better understand affect regulation 
or affect dynamics. Gratch and Marsella (2004) and Bosse et al. (2010) share 
commonalities in examining changes in affect as a complex process and in terms of 
regulating the experience of affective events. Though they approach affect change from 
different theoretical backgrounds (coping and affect regulation, respectively), the most 
substantive difference is that Gratch and Marsella’s (2004) model shapes future 
affective events through interaction with the modelled environment. In contrast, Bosse 
et al.’s (2010) model does not interact with the affect inducing environments, leaving 
the model as a more passive recipient of affect events. Gratch and Marsella’s (2004) 
model offers a means to understand affect dynamics as part of a complex unfolding 
relationship between a modelled agent and the affective environment.  
Both Bosse et al. (2010) and Oravecz et al. (2009) represent affect change as a stand-
alone concept for investigation. Unlike affect as a response to, or indicator for, goal 
progress, as represented by Gratch and Marsella (2004), affect change or affect 
regulation are considered on their own terms. From this standpoint of examining affect 
irrespective of wider cognitive processes, Bosse et al. (2010) and Oravecz et al. (2010) 
diverge in focus. Bosse et al. (2010) examine affect regulation, in part, in terms of the 
cost of changing feelings; whereas Oravecz et al. (2009) examine affect change, in part, 
in terms of changing goal states, something that Bosse et al. (2010) consider valuable 
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further direction for affect models. It still remains for an integrated model to examine 
affect regulation across: changing affect goals, a limited capacity for enacting affect 
change, and a complex interaction with the affective environment. 
In summary, computational models, and particularly computational models of affect 
(e.g., Lewis, 2005), allow specifications to be made that turn underlying assumptions of 
a generally understood but not well examined aspect of a phenomenon into specific 
hypotheses (e.g., Epstein, 2008). In this instance, the dynamics of affect and affect 
regulation are yet to be appropriately examined as even computational models designed 
for the task do not yet achieve this. However, because specification is fundamental to a 
computational model, the approach at least makes clear the questions that remain 
unanswered. In the next section, I outline the necessity for a further model of affect 
regulation dynamics. 
3.4 A Control Theory Model of Affect Regulation Dynamics 
As previously described, affect regulation is a complex, dynamic process, which can be 
suitably understood through the framework of control theory (e.g., Carver, 2004; Carver 
& Scheier, 2001; 2011; Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Powers, 1974; 2005). Control 
theory as a framework lends itself well to the study of phenomena through the 
development of computational models, given its origins in cybernetic theory (e.g., 
Wiener, 1948). Computational modelling offers a means for formal specification of 
assumptions in theories (e.g., Epstein, 2008) and avenues for greater explanatory power 
of the underlying processes involved (e.g., Lewis, 2005; Sun et al., 2005).  
At present, there are many attempts made to represent and understand the dynamics of 
affect and affect regulation through computational models. In a sense, Bosse et al. 
(2010) have developed a computational model of affect regulation with origins based in 
control theory, given that Gross’s process model (1998a) builds upon the test-operate-
test-exit control system outlined by Miller et al. (1960). However, this approach sought 
to model one self-contained theory of affect regulation (i.e., Gross, 1998a) with ad-hoc 
expansion suggested in order to accommodate further development.  
In section 3.3.2, elements of three existing models were outlined and identified as useful 
avenues for better understanding affect regulation dynamics. Here I describe how these, 
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and further elements not yet addressed by current computational models of affect, are 
incorporated into a single control theory framework computational model. 
Of primary interest to this thesis are the changes in affect regulation over time. In the 
strength-model of self-regulation, affect regulation is repeatedly demonstrated to both 
deplete self-regulatory resource and be impacted by a depletion of this resource (e.g., 
Hagger et al., 2010). Like Bosse et al. (2010), an effective model of affect regulation 
would include a ‘cost’ to controlled change in affect. However, unlike the approach 
proposed by Bosse et al. (2010), this cost may be better suited to a direct relation with 
the degree of control enacted (i.e., the extent and duration of regulation towards a held 
goal of a particular affect intensity) rather than associated with making changes to a 
‘willingness’ to regulate affect.  
This proposal for inclusion of a limited resource for affect regulation dovetails with that 
of the regulation of affect goals. Oravecz et al. (2009) propose that the goal state for 
affect drifts in regular patterns across days, although they do not consider the active 
process of deliberately changing affect goals. In a control hierarchy, the process of 
affect goal regulation would be considered a higher tier level of control and particularly 
useful as a means to limit resource depletion when standard regulatory efforts do not 
reduce discrepancy between experienced and goal states (e.g., Lord & Hanges, 1987, 
Powers, 1974). Individuals are known to seek a variety of affect experiences (e.g., 
Tamir 2005) and affect goals may appropriately be included within a structured 
hierarchy of actively pursued goals (Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003). These held goals 
may in turn be incorporated into a wider understanding of goal-directed behaviour; 
however, at this stage, a model of affect change is considered a complex enough 
problem, particularly if active, changing goals are considered.  
Further to the inclusion of self-regulatory resource and goal adjustment, an important 
aspect of understanding affect regulation dynamics is examining affect as both its felt 
and expressive components. As outlined in section 3.2., changes to the states of control 
loops can influence the current states in other loops (Powers, 1974), a process which has 
direct application in understanding the reciprocal influences of felt-affect and affect-
expression. Moreover, felt-affect and affect-expression may be independently regulated 
to distinct held goals (e.g., Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Hochschild, 1983) and 
these regulation processes have influence on the capacity to further engage in regulation 
(e.g., Muraven et al., 2000). 
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The development and investigation of affect regulation dynamics to include affect-
expression regulation broadens substantially the scope for which affect regulation can 
be examined. While there is much to be examined in terms of the potential conflict 
arising between felt-affect and affect-expression drawing from the same, limited 
resource, further understanding comes from the model as an interacting agent with the 
emotional environment. A computational model including affect-expression makes 
room for examining the complete model as a social agent, alongside the individual 
processes within the model, leading to understanding affect regulation processes on 
what Sun et al. (2005) term multiple levels of analysis. As with Gratch and Marsella’s 
(2004) model, an expressive agent allows for the shaping of the affective information 
that an agent receives. This is further explored in Chapter 8.  
In this thesis, I present a new computational Model of Affect Regulation Dynamics 
(MARDy) that uses a control theory framework.  Having identified the requirements for 
a computational model of affect regulation dynamics, the next chapter outlines the 
structure and development of a modular model of control that meets criteria for 
examining affect regulation dynamics, within the context of changing affect goals and a 
limited capacity for affect regulation.  
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Chapter 4: Model Design and Specification 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the process of designing a computer simulation of affect 
regulation dynamics using a control theory framework. In Chapter 2, four aspects of 
affect regulation were examined: (i) the regulation of felt-affect, (ii) regulation of affect-
expression, (iii) self-regulatory capacity, and (iv) affect goal regulation. In this section, I 
outline a visual representation of a computational model connecting these related 
aspects of affect regulation dynamics and the parameters used in the model. 
This chapter has been arranged so that the requirements for each model section are 
presented first, such as the aspects of affect and affect regulation to be modelled, and 
then the approach for modelling the outlined aspects is described. The intention is to 
present each separate part of the whole model as a self-contained unit, which can be 
tested as an independent construct and then tested as part of the wider model. At the end 
of each section, the parameters used are listed alongside range limits imposed on them 
by the structure of the model. In Chapter 5, plausible ranges for these parameters are 
established, based on existing studies where appropriate.  
The environment chosen to be used to simulate affect regulation dynamics is Simulink 
(Version No. 7.1) in the Matlab (Version No. 7.6.0.324) software. Simulink is an ideal 
environment for the design and running of control systems because of its graphical 
representation of systems. The visual modelling offered by Simulink allows for a clear 
and accessible means of representing recurrent relationships in systems, enabling a more 
direct comparison between the form of a computer simulation model and an informal 
‘box-and-arrow’ model used in papers outlining affect regulation theory. 
Across the literature, there exist a number of informal models of affect regulation, 
ranging from the small (e.g., Gross, 1998a; Larsen 2000) to the more comprehensive 
(e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003). The current model aims 
to outline the related nature of felt-affect regulation, affect-expression regulation, self-
regulatory capacity and the adjustment of affect goals over time. Each of the 
substructures of the model is related to all others through a shared dependency on self-
regulatory resource. This chapter outlines the development of a model from a sketched 
representation of affect regulation dynamics (Figure 2.1) towards a functioning 
68 
 
computational model (MARDy schematic in Figure 4.1), which aims to capture the 
connected and related nature of self-regulatory systems in affect regulation.  
 
Figure 4.1 Schematic of MARDy 
Representations of felt-affect regulation, affect-expression regulation, self-regulatory 
capacity (resource), felt goal regulation, and expression goal regulation are shown as 
two competing primary and secondary control loops. Solid boxes denote intra-
individual processes; dashed boxes denote environmental or inter-individual processes; 
arrows denote proposed direct effects from one process to another. 
4.2 Felt-Affect Regulation 
4.2.1 Felt-Affect 
This part of the model refers to the process of felt-affect change across time. Felt-affect 
dynamics are considered in terms of change due to affective events or expressions from 
others and the regulation of felt-affect towards a held goal state. For this part of the 
model, it is first necessary to consider how felt-affect can be represented in a simulation 
and how changes across time may unfold. After this, affect regulation, in the form of a 
feedback loop, can then be constructed to direct felt-affect towards particular held goal 
states. Characteristics of affect dynamics are highlighted in this section and 
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representations of these are compared on their suitability for simulating affect dynamics 
in this model.  
In this thesis affect is considered in terms of core dimensions (e.g., Russell, 1980, 2003, 
2009) and within the proposed model, as varying valence intensities. Indeed, affective 
intensity is regarded as one of the most noticeable aspects of the experience of affect 
(Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994). Felt-affect intensity may be shaped by things such as the 
strength of a stimulus (Larsen, et al., 1986) and responses to affective stimulus have 
been mapped out creating intensity profiles over time (Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994; 
Verduyn et al., 2009). When considering the intensity of felt-affect, changes to intensity 
over time are considered a significantly important factor (e.g., Kuppens et al., 2010). 
Affective events play an important part in the model because they shall serve as 
disturbances to the current state, ultimately contributing to felt-affect dynamics (see 
also, affective events theory, e.g., Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Further aspects of 
affective events, such as the dynamics offered by the opponent-process theory (Soloman 
& Corbit, 1964), are examined in the testing stage of the model in Chapter 5. 
Across studies examining affect intensity, an argument is made that, over time, felt-
affect returns to a baseline level (e.g., Oravecz et al., 2009; Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994). 
Affective events may be considered to destabilise the felt-affect state about this base 
This is mirrored in the more general literature on well-being in which it is argued that 
individuals have a (mostly static) set-point for life satisfaction and that life events may 
cause deviations from this (e.g., Lucas, 2007). In terms of overall well-being, it is 
argued that people generally feel somewhat positive (Diener & Diener, 1996), whereas 
in terms of examining affect on a momentary basis, the general resting point for 
affective states appears to vary according to personality traits (e.g., Oravecz et al., 
2009). 
Requirements for a model of affect change in a control framework are straightforward. 
Aspects of felt-affect, such as valence can be represented as a bipolar scale from more 
positive to more negative, felt-affect intensity can be shaped by affective events and, 
over time, affect will return towards a baseline level. Processes such as these can be 
represented with a single formula, described in Section 4.2.3. However, before moving 
on to formally represent felt-affect, felt-affect’s place in the felt-affect regulation control 
loop is examined. 
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4.2.2 Felt-Affect Regulation 
As described in Chapter 3, self-regulation can be viewed from a control theory 
perspective as a means of reducing discrepancy between an observed current state of a 
system (such as felt-affect) and a goal state for the system (such as desired felt-affect). 
Across several different approaches felt-affect regulation is conceived of as just this 
(e.g., Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Muraven et al., 1998). 
Informal models also make this distinction, suggesting a distinct goal state as a 
plausible focus for regulation towards (e.g., Larsen, 2000). In order for successful 
regulation towards this held goal state, regulation efforts must be sufficient to overcome 
any influence pushing felt-affect away from the held goal state. 
Given the decision in section 4.2.1 to consider current felt-affect as a point ranging from 
more positive to more negative valence, as argued in Russell’s (2003) model of affect, a 
goal affect state can also be considered by a point on the same range. The distance 
between these two points can then be considered the discrepancy between the current 
felt-affect and goal affect. The process of reducing this discrepancy between current and 
goal affect can therefore represent the regulation of felt-affect. It would be anticipated 
that a greater distance on the scale from the current felt-affect state to the goal affect 
state would be associated with more regulation effort expended (as will be explained in 
section 4.4). 
As described in section 4.2.1, felt-affect may exhibit a general trend of decay of affect 
intensity towards a base state, as time passes (e.g., Oravecz et al., 2009; Verduyn et al., 
2009). An existing model of affect regulation (Oravecz et al., 2009) subsumes self-
regulation into the singular process of returning to a fixed home-base. This assumption 
removes the possibility of regulating towards a specific held goal state away from the 
point that felt-affect intensity decays towards. Unlike Oravecz et al.’s (2009) model, the 
current model offers two points for felt-affect to move towards: the home-base (through 
a passive decay of felt-affect intensity) and the goal state (through the active process of 
regulation). As a result, the current model offers predictions that the model by Oravecz 
et al. (2009) cannot; affective events of the same intensity will have differing influences 
depending on whether these events steer felt-affect towards the home-base, towards the 
goal state or away from both. 
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4.2.3 Representing Felt-Affect 
The process of affect change during affective events and a gradual continual return to a 
specific base level may be represented mathematically in a recurrent formula in which 
the state of a single variable (in this case felt-affect intensity) and its derivative (change 
in felt-affect intensity) are represented. Three differential equations, as used in the 
literature, are examined below for their suitability for modelling affect in this current 
simulation. 
In a simulation of affect dynamics, Oravecz et al. (2009) use a stochastic differential 
equation to model affects changes across time. Specifically, they represent affect as a 
randomly moving value about the home-base using an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model; the 
process of constructing the model is outlined in Oravecz et al. (2009). This approach 
captures the general trend of felt-affect intensity returning to an approximate baseline 
from any given point, with higher intensities decaying at faster rates than more 
moderate affect intensities. The two parameters used in the differential equation 
represent the location of the home-base and the extent to which one’s affect varies from 
this point, represented on an affect grid (e.g., Russell, 2003). For the purpose of their 
simulations, all affect events and processes such as self-regulation of felt-affect are 
subsumed into the stochastic movement and continual ‘pull’ of the home-base. 
Limitations of Orvacez et al.’s (2009) model are seen by introducing affect events in the 
form of a stimulus signal; using parameters specified for typical model operation, the 
introduction of even a low intensity persistent stimulus (i.e. an enduring affect event) 
can result in ever increasing affect response by the model. This outcome is not suitable 
for models required to represent every day affect dynamics, including response to affect 
events. 
A second and alternative means of representing affect change using a differential 
equation may be achieved through use of a leaky integrator model. While retaining 
much of the same functionality as the above approach, such as a continual return to a 
home-base and rates of return dependent on felt-affect intensity, the approach also has 
the benefit of limiting the intensity of response to stimuli. Rather than having a 
parameter for the variation in felt-affect used in the prior approach, the leaky integrator 
has a parameter that represents the rate at which felt-affect changes so that regardless of 
the value of this parameter, response and input to the integrator remain comparable. 
This creates a transparent relationship between simulated affective events and simulated 
72 
 
felt-affect intensity. One limitation of the approach is that the rate of affect change is the 
same for both affect response and decay back to a home-base, restricting this approach 
to either a model of rapid felt-affect change with affect events or a slower change in 
affect across a longer period of time. 
A third means examined for representing affect is through a second order differential 
equation: a damped oscillator. Bennett (n.d.) outlines an approach for representing felt-
affect intensity dynamics as a vibration of a damped spring; energy in the system, as 
indicated by oscillation amplitude, represents current felt-affect intensity. This method 
has advantages over ordinary differential equations because it allows for a richer means 
of modelling affect, capturing both felt-affect’s rapid onset and gradual decay, and has 
been used in models covering an extended period of time (e.g., Chow, Ram, Boker, 
Fujita, & Clore, 2005). A limitation of this approach is the complexity necessary for 
modelling affect over time. In Bennett’s (n.d.) model, the energy of the oscillations at 
their peak is needed to model gradual trends in affect change, rather than a rapid 
switching back and forth from one state to another if amplitude itself is recorded. 
Further to this, affective stimuli are required to be presented to the model as matching 
the natural frequency of the system or else the end of an affective event results in 
dramatic changes in felt-affect. Rounding errors in Simulink over time invariably result 
in the modelled affect becoming desynchronised with stimuli representing affect, 
resulting in diminished or even inverse responses by the model to affective events. 
Across the range of possible means of representing affect, the leaky integrator model 
stands out as the most practical approach because of the necessity of a close relationship 
between response and affective input. Affect change is described by Formula 1, in 
which affect intensity (R) at time t is dependent on both the affect intensity at time t-1 
and affective events (S) at time t; these values are weighted by a single parameter k, 
which determines the rate of change of affect. The home state, to which affect returns 
towards, is determined at a point in the model beyond this loop, which over time would 
return affect to a base state of zero.  
 R t = k ( S t – R t-1 ) + R t-1 (1) 
Figure 4.2 shows a visual representation of the leaky integrator circuit in the Simulink 
environment. Formula 1 is represented by the feedback loop created from linking the 
centre of the figure back to the left side. The home state (H) is added to the perceived 
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affect state outside of the differential equation loop, giving a perceived affect state 
dependent on both the differential equation (1) and the home-base (H). The saturation 
component of the circuit limits the model’s maximum and minimum response to 
affective events at an upper limit of 1 (feeling most positive) and a lower limit of -1 
(feeling most negative). Because the complete model is large, covering several different 
aspects of affect regulation, only a single dimension of affect, valence, is modelled here.  
 
Figure 4.2 Model of felt-affect change in the Simulink environment 
Information regarding affect intensity flows from left to right in the diagram, through 
pathways marked with arrows. Current affect (R) is determined by ongoing affect events 
(S), past affect intensity (held in the loop passing through the block labelled unit delay), 
and the home-base (H). The rate at which affect changes is determined by the time 
constant block (k), which acts as a gain on affect intensity passing through it. 
4.2.4 Representing Felt-Affect Regulation 
There are four parts to the control loop necessary for a model of self-regulation (e.g., 
Powers et al. 1960a). The first, perceived felt-affect state, has been introduced in section 
4.2.3. The second, the goal felt-affect state, is examined more closely in section 4.5 and 
in this section can just be considered a constant value. The third and fourth parts to the 
control loop, the comparator and actuator, are described in this section. 
Comparator 
The comparator’s role in the control circuit is the detection of a discrepancy between the 
current state and goal state (e.g., Miller et al., 1960; Powers et al. 1960a). This 
information regarding the existence of a discrepancy (or not) is then sent to the actuator 
so a change can be enacted. How the comparison between the current state and the goal 
is made is not considered important (Carver & Scheier, 2001, p. 11) in terms of the 
modelled implementation or the physical process to do so. The important aspect is that 
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the comparator provides sufficient information to the actuator and that the control loop 
as a whole is recognised as a purposive system (p. 12). 
I examine two means of describing a discrepancy between perceived and goal states. 
First, a discrepancy can be described as a simple detection of whether a discrepancy 
exists or not; the output of the comparator describes if the current affect intensity is 
higher or lower than the goal state. Second, a discrepancy can be described in terms of 
how dissimilar the two states are; the output of the comparator is equal to the difference 
between the two states. The choice between these two approaches may be considered as 
a choice between an analogue and a digital signal. Caver and Scheier (2001) discuss the 
distinction between analogue and digital means of control, although in terms of goal 
pursuit rather than individual components of the control loop. They come to the open 
conclusion that pursuit of higher levels goals could be analogue and programs 
(sequences of action) could be digital, endorsing Powers’s (1974) propositions.  
For the purpose of this thesis, a digital comparator is considered, given the special case 
of the actuator used to enable resource depletion effects, which is further explored in 
section 4.4. This also offers a straightforward means of testing Diefendorff and 
Gosserand’s (2003) proposition regarding the different influences of a broad versus a 
narrow range of acceptable affective states on affect, by varying the sensitivity of the 
comparator. The alternative approach of using an analogue comparator would require 
the addition of further parameter values in order to broaden model testing to include 
tests of such propositions.  
The logic used by the digital comparator to describe the current detected discrepancy is 
shown in Formula 2. A positive discrepancy, where the goal state (G) is greater in 
intensity than the current perceived felt-affect state (R) results in a positive comparator 
output (C), whereas a negative discrepancy results in a negative output.  
 G – R > 0 ⇒ C = 1,      G – R < 0 ⇒ C = –1  (2)   
Actuator 
Typically, the actuator’s role in a negative feedback control loop is the input of stimulus 
to the current state to reduce the comparator’s detected discrepancy between state and 
goal (i.e., reference state, Miller et al., 1960; Powers, 1974). Likewise, actuator outputs 
are dynamically adjusted to maintain the current state at goal level. This section 
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describes a special-case actuator that, looking ahead to section 4.4 and representation of 
limited capacity for regulation, will not always have the capacity to maintain felt-affect 
at the goal level. 
In control systems, the input from an actuator to the current state is a transformation of 
the discrepancy detected; typically, this transformation is proportional (input based on 
current discrepancy), integral (input based on past cumulative discrepancy), derivative 
(input based on current change in discrepancy), or a combination of any of these (e.g., 
Bennett, 1993).  In a standard, analogue control loop, systems just using proportional 
control may exhibit a phenomenon known as droop, which is persistent-under 
regulation of the perceived state. As error is reduced towards zero, control influence is 
also reduced because the comparator signal decreases and subsequently, the held state 
does not ever reach the goal. An actuator with an additional integrator component 
corrects for this by increasing control based on all previous error and not just current 
error. With a digital comparator, proportional control can result in oscillations about the 
goal state; integral control, even without a proportional component, reduces oscillatory 
behaviour. Derivative control can reduce errors ahead of predicted disturbances but in 
both cases of analogue and digital comparators, can cause substantial control errors in 
presence of noise.  
One type of controller is used in this current model: an integral actuator, modified from 
its more traditional use in control systems to form another leaky integrator system. This 
adjustment allows for representation of variation in the capacity to regulate affect as a 
function of self-regulatory capacity (further considered in section 4.4). Use of a standard 
integrator actuator indicates that once control reduces discrepancy and the felt-affect 
state reaches the affect goal, actuator input to the felt-affect state is stable, even if the 
actuator’s capacity for regulation is altered. In contrast, use of a leaky integrator 
actuator indicates maintenance of the felt-affect state at the affect goal does depend on 
current capacity for regulation: insufficient capacity results in insufficient control and 
felt-affect drifting away from the goal state and towards its home-base. 
Use of a leaky integrator actuator determines the choice for comparator. An analogue 
comparator results in persistent droop with the leaky integrator actuator design due to 
the decrease in signal intensity to the actuator when discrepancy decreases. In contrast, 
the digital comparator enables control of the felt-state to reach the affect goal (actuator 
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capacity for regulation notwithstanding) because its signal to the actuator is not 
influence by the degree of discrepancy. 
The described regulatory behaviour of the actuator is determined by a single parameter, 
k2, which, like the leaky integrator from section 4.2.3, determines rate of change in the 
leaky integrator. In the case of use in the actuator, this refers to the degree of change 
that the model makes in its regulation efforts, given a detected discrepancy. A low k2 
value represents a sluggish change in the model’s regulatory action, leaving the model 
prone to under-regulation, whereas a high k2 value results in a high level of oscillation 
in both the regulatory system and the felt-affect state during control; in the current 
model, this parameter is therefore termed regulatory momentum. 
At this stage in model development, the output of affect regulation is determined by 
Formula 3. Affect regulation (R2) at time t is dependent on both the regulation intensity 
at time t-1 and comparator signal (C) at time t, and these values are weighted by the 
single parameter k2, regulatory momentum. The output of the system is increased by a 
factor of two at a point in the model after the differential equation loop to enable 
regulation from the lowest affect point in the model to the highest. 
 R2 t = k2 ( C t – R2 t-1 ) + R2 t-1 (3) 
Figure 4.3 shows a visual representation of Formula 3. In comparison with Figure 4.2, 
the model shows a differential equation with rate of change determined by a single 
parameter. In contrast with Figure 4.2, the system here does not have a parameter for 
home-base value to return to, so the system would return to a state of zero output (no 
regulation) if an absence of signal from the comparator persisted (no discrepancy). 
Further to this, the outcome of the differential equation is doubled to increase the range 
to which the model can regulate towards, covering the whole range of affect states from 
-1 to 1. 
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Figure 4.3 Model of felt-affect regulation change in the Simulink environment 
Information regarding affect intensity flows from left to right in the diagram, through 
pathways marked with arrows. Current regulation (R2) is determined by the current 
signal of discrepancy from the comparator (C) and past regulation output (held in the 
loop passing through the block labelled unit delay). The rate at which regulation 
changes is determined by the time constant block (k2), which acts as a gain on affect 
intensity passing through it. 
The complete system can then be represented in a single, simple figure, if the Figures 
4.2 and 4.3 are represented as simple boxes that contain the two leaky integrator 
systems. The resulting system (Figure 4.4) is a control loop, such as that seen in the 
control literature (e.g., Powers et al. 1960a, p.76). 
 
Figure 4.4 Complete control circuit for felt-affect regulation 
Schematic representation of the felt-affect control loop. Felt affect state is determined 
by external disturbances, the current felt goal state and dynamics as a product of 
Simulink models described in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 and Formula 2. 
As a conclusion of this section on the affect regulation loop, Table 4.1 details the 
parameters used by the current section of the model, their function and the limits 
imposed on their range by the structure and design of the model.  
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Table 4.1 Parameters used in the model of felt-affect regulation 
Parameter Name 
Parameter 
Symbol 
Parameter Function Parameter Limits 
Felt-Affect 
Change Rate 
k 
Determines the rate of change 
of felt-affect. 
Maximum < 1 
Minimum > 0 
Home-Base H 
Felt-affect resting point in 
absence of affect events or 
regulation 
Maximum = 1 
Minimum = -1 
Regulatory 
Momentum 
k2 
Determines the rate of change 
of felt-affect regulation. 
Maximum < 1 
Minimum > 0 
4.3 Affect-Expression Regulation 
4.3.1 Affect-Expression 
This section refers to the process of affect-expression change across time in terms of the 
current felt-affect and regulation of affect-expression towards a held goal. For this 
section, the relationship between felt-affect and affect-expression is reviewed and 
change in affect-expression through the process of emotional contagion considered. 
After this, the process of affect-expression regulation is then applied in the model to the 
affect-expression state. Decisions made in Section 4.2 in part determine the 
representation of affect-expression. 
Affect-expression, like felt-affect could be represented as a number of differing discrete 
states based on facial musculature movement (e.g., Ekman & Freisen, 1971). Specific 
muscle movements have long been associated with unique expressive states; for 
example, the Duchenne smile, an apparent expression of authentic happiness, is 
characterised by the non-conscious movement of orbicularis oculi muscles (e.g., Frank 
& Ekman, 1993). This process was thought to be unique to the expression of genuine 
happiness, although recent evidence suggests that individuals can fake this expression 
on demand and that the authenticity of a smile can be determined even when the upper 
half of a face is obscured (Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009). Representing an 
exhaustively accurate model of authentic expression could require a multitude of 
controlled processes representing each of the facial muscles. Given the constraints of 
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the output of the single dimension of affect valence from the represented felt-affect 
model, this was not a practical solution in the model. 
As an alternative to the representation of affect-expression as discrete states, affect-
expression, like felt-affect in section 4.2.1, can be represented as a single dimension of 
valence. While this restricts the scope and intricacies of expression and its dynamics at a 
micro-level (that of short-term or subtle changes of expression such as those described 
by Ekman, 1985), it still affords a general representation of expression over time in 
relation to that of felt-affect. From this, affect-expression and felt-affect are regarded in 
terms of their relation to one another, rather than considering the specific measuring of 
affect-expression in terms of its physical properties. This can be thought of as a degree 
of coherence with the felt-affect state. Expression intensity values on the measure of 
valence, which closely correspond with values of felt-affect indicate a high coherency 
between the two states and an authentic expression of affect; whereas, a mismatch 
between the two states indicates that there is a dissonance experienced and the presence 
of inauthentic expression (e.g., Grandey, 2000; Hochschild, 1983; Totterdell & Holman, 
2001). This section therefore considers expression in a broad, general term of potential 
or probable expression. More advanced or complex adaptations of the model could 
allow for the outcome of this affect-expression state to operate as a goal for lower level 
control loops regulating the physical aspects of expression, such as that described by 
Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003). 
There are two additional considerations for affect-expression in the model: first, the 
process of emotional contagion and second, a feedback mechanism from expression to 
felt-affect. Firstly, emotional contagion automatically shapes expressive states through 
processes such as expressive mimicry (e.g., Hatfield et al., 1994). This creates a 
distinction between the two external environment disturbances to the model: affect 
events, which only directly impact on felt-affect, and other’s affect-expressions, which 
directly impact on both felt-affect (e.g., through cognitive appraisal of the expression, 
Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008) and affect-expression (e.g., through contagion, Hatfield et al., 
1994). Secondly, the expressive state also shapes felt-affect through expressive-
feedback (e.g., Buck, 1980; Strack et al., 1988). A link back from expression to felt-
affect, as well as the existing feed-forward link from felt-affect to expression is 
therefore necessary to represent this established phenomenon. 
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4.3.2 Affect-Expression Regulation 
Like the representation of felt-affect regulation in section 4.2.2, affect-expression 
regulation can be represented as a process of discrepancy reduction between a current 
state of expression and a goal state of expression (e.g., Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; 
Gross & Thompson, 2007). A goal state for expression is by no means restricted to 
matching that of the goal state for felt-affect; there are many situations that require the 
regulation of affect-expression while not necessarily requiring the regulation of felt-
affect, such as that of emotional labour (e.g., Hochschild, 1983). 
The process of expression regulation is often regarded as the creation of a discrepancy 
between affect-expression and felt-affect (e.g., Gross & John, 2003), often resulting in 
aversive outcomes (e.g., Grandey, 2003; Totterdell & Holman, 2003). This has been 
particularly well examined in terms of surface acting in the emotional labour literature 
(Goldberg & Grandey, 2007; Martínez-Iñigo et al., 2007). Aversive outcomes will be 
more thoroughly examined in terms of fatigue and emotional exhaustion in section 4.4 
but in this section the discrepancy created is considered in terms of a hypothesised 
preference for authentic expression in individuals. Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) 
describe, in their model of emotional labour, a held goal for “Being true to one’s 
feelings” (p. 949), which is analogous to authentically expressing a felt state. Also, 
Grandey (2003) highlights that use of surface acting correlates with negative ratings of 
authenticity of expression. In this regard, affect-expression regulation can be considered 
as a process of regulating expression without substantially changing the felt-affect state. 
This process may include creating a discrepancy between felt-affect and affect-
expression in order to reduce a discrepancy between current affect-expression and goal 
affect-expression. 
4.3.3 Representing Affect-Expression 
The main process of affect-expression that this model seeks to capture is the preference 
for congruence between felt-affect and affect-expression. This process is achieved by 
taking the concept of Diefendorff and Gosserand’s (2003) description of a control loop 
for maintaining authenticity as a goal for expression and reshaping this to become a 
hardwired, unchanging element of the model. Affect-expression is therefore assumed to 
continually tend back towards a home-base unless active regulation towards a goal state 
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is sufficient. This home-base for affect-expression is the current perception of the felt-
affect state, resulting in a tendency towards coherency and authentic expression. 
The model for affect-expression can be built based around the same principles used for 
the model of felt-affect. Given that affect events have been considered in section 4.2.3 
as disturbances to the felt-affect state in a control system, expressions from others can 
also be considered as a disturbance to the affect-expression control circuit. In Formula 
4, affect-expression intensity (R3) at time t is dependent on both the affect-expression 
intensity at time t-1 and others’ affective expressions (E) at time t. These values are 
weighted by a single parameter k3 determining rate of change of affect-expression1. The 
home state for affect-expression, the perceived felt-affect (R) is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 R3 t = k3 ( E t – R3 t-1 ) + R3 t-1 (4) 
Figure 4.5 shows the visual representation of the leaky integrator circuit for affect-
expression. Formula 4 is represented by the loop on the left side of the figure. The home 
state is an input to the system taken from Formula 1 representing perceived felt-affect 
(R) and is added to the outcome of Formula 4. In addition to the outcome of this circuit 
as a representation of perceived affect-expression, a feedback link from affect-
expression is sent to the felt-affect circuit, combining with the existing signals to the 
felt-affect system: the affective events and felt-affect regulation. This strength of 
feedback is weighted (F) to represent the influence that affect-expression has upon felt-
affect. The influence of this positive feedback is discussed in section 4.3.4. 
                                                 
1
      While Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) consider affect-expression states to be a lower tier of 
control (and therefore liable to more rapid change), the current model represents affect-expression in 
broad terms only and situates affect-expression on the same tier as felt-affect. Nevertheless, the potential 
for more rapid dynamics is acknowledged with use of a separate parameter for affect-expression rate of 
change. 
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Figure 4.5 Model of affect-expression change in the Simulink environment 
Information regarding affect-expression intensity flows from left to right in the diagram, 
through pathways marked with arrows. Current expression (R3) is determined by 
ongoing affective expressions from others (E), past expression states held in the loop 
passing through the block labelled unit delay), and the current perceived felt-affect (R). 
The rate at which expression changes is determined by the time constant block (k3), 
which acts as a gain on affect intensity passing through it. Feedback from affect 
expression to the felt state is determined by multiplying the current expressed state by a 
factor of F. 
 
4.3.4 Representing Affect-Expression Regulation 
As indicated in section 4.3.3, the established design for the felt-affect system can be 
adapted to suit the needs of the affect-expression system. The circuit’s design for 
regulation is that of a generic, modular template, in which a system (such as Figures 4.2 
or 4.5) can be interchanged and successfully regulated. The design intention of this is to 
keep the structure as simple and universal as possible to restrict the amount of 
individual assumptions and unique parameters for each section. As a result, the 
functional regulation circuit components of goal, comparator and actuator can be 
duplicated entirely to make a circuit for affect-expression regulation.  
The regulatory circuit in section 4.2.4 introduces a single parameter, that of the time 
constant k2, determining the rate at which regulatory actions occur. A faster rate of 
change represents a greater degree of sensitivity to discrepancies and a larger output of 
regulation effort in response. In this section, a duplicate parameter for k2 is created. The 
relative sizes of the regulatory constants for felt-affect and affect-expression regulation 
could be regarded as an individual’s sensitivity to the two different regulation strategies, 
of reappraisal and suppression, respectively. This difference could reflect individual’s 
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preferential regulatory behaviours, for example being habitual reappraisers or 
suppressors, akin to the differences outlined by Gross and John (2003). For the purpose 
of parsimony in this chapter the two parameters (k2 and its affect-expression regulation 
counterpart) are considered as identical. 
In terms of regulation processes, the model now has two potentially competing goal 
states and the current affect-expression state is heavily dependent on the current felt-
affect state (Figure 4.6). Moreover, there exists a feedback loop from the affect-
expression state to influence the felt-affect state. Powers (1974) regards the interaction 
of one control loop on another as if it was any other typical disturbance. In terms of the 
loop formed by the influence of the affect-expression state to the felt-affect state, it is 
positive feedback. Positive feedback loops serve to destabilise control: a negative felt-
affect state promotes a negative affect-expression, in turn increasing negative felt-affect 
in a continuous cycle. The existing negative control loops controlling both affective 
states must also serve to limit any runaway positive feedback effects; this is further 
explored in Chapter 5. 
For the current design, two characteristics already emerge based on the structure of the 
model alone. Firstly, if both goal states are set at the same level, the model does not 
need to engage in prolonged affect-expression regulation (e.g., suppression) because 
affect-expression will be guided towards its goal through the changes made via 
regulating felt-affect. Once discrepancy is sufficiently reduced and regulation efforts are 
made to maintain felt-affect, affect-expression would be resting at the goal level without 
any need for affect-expression regulation. This may be considered akin to the 
effectiveness of deep acting reported in the emotional labour literature (Grandey et al., 
2003).  
Secondly, if the goals between the two states differ, then it becomes necessary for both 
control loops to engage in regulation as there would be a discrepancy between both held 
states and their goals. This may occur as an additional effort made to regulate affect-
expression if the affect-expression goal is a higher intensity than that of the goal felt-
affect state. If the goal states lie at the opposite ends of the valence scale, it may require 
a substantial regulatory effort in the expression loop. As the distance between these two 
goals increases, the greater efforts must be made to maintain a discrepancy between the 
two affective states; this process is further examined in section 4.4. 
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Figure 4.6. Complete control circuits for felt-affect and affect-expression regulation 
Schematic representation of the felt-affect and affect expression control loop. Affective 
states are determined by external disturbances, the current goal states and dynamics as a 
product of Simulink models described in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 and 4.5 and Formula 2. 
Table 4.2 details the parameters used by the current section of the model, their function 
and the limits imposed on their range by the structure and design of the model. The 
minimum value of the expression time constant is dependent on the value of the felt-
affect time constant reflecting the proposed faster rate of change. Regulatory 
momentum used in this section is the same as that outlined in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.2 Parameters used in the model of affect-expression regulation 
Parameter 
Name 
Parameter 
Symbol 
Parameter Function Parameter Limits 
Affect-
Expression 
Change Rate 
k3 
Determines the rate of change of 
affect-expression. 
Maximum < 1 
Minimum ≥ k 
Expressive-
Feedback 
F 
Determines expressive-feedback 
intensity to felt-affect. 
Maximum = 1 
Minimum = 0 
Regulatory 
Momentum 
k2 
Determines the rate of change of 
affect-expression regulation. 
Maximum < 1 
Minimum > 0 
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4.4 Self-Regulatory Resource Control 
4.4.1 Self-Regulatory Resources  
There are two requirements for representing the capacity for regulation of affect in the 
model as it stands. Firstly, the capacity to regulate affect is considered to be dependent 
on a self-regulatory resource. Secondly, the process of affect regulation depletes this 
limited resource (e.g., Hagger et al. 2010). Harder tasks, ones requiring a greater degree 
of self-control, appear to result in a greater level of depletion (Hagger et al., 2010). In 
terms of affect regulation, as described in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2, this indicates that the 
greater the discrepancy between the goal state and the current affective state, the more 
regulation is necessary and therefore a greater depletion of resource. Similarly, an 
affective event which causes a disturbance away from the goal state will result in an 
increase in regulatory efforts to compensate for this, given that the purpose of the affect 
regulating behaviour is to prevent perceptions changing away from the references (e.g., 
Powers, 1974).  
After sufficiently depleting regulatory efforts, subsequent regulation attempts are seen 
to suffer (e.g., Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Resource is thought to be conserved and 
self-regulation activity is diminished. There are two means of representing this 
phenomenon and they have different implications for regulation. A threshold system 
may be introduced to the model; if a limited resource falls below a designated value of 
available resource, self-regulatory capacity is restricted so that remaining resource is 
conserved. Both felt-affect regulation and affect-expression regulation may have a 
threshold, below which the respective regulation efforts are limited. Dynamics of the 
model may then be structured around the relative levels of these thresholds, so that an 
individual may persist at one type of regulation longer than the other (for example, a 
customer service employee may persist longer with affect-expression regulation despite 
feeling depleted so that he or she meets job requirements).  
Alternatively, the model for depletion can be structured so that a gradual depletion in 
resource is associated with a gradual detriment to self-regulatory capacity and thus 
regulation efforts. This process of a decrease in self-regulatory capacity, as measure in 
self-control tasks, being proportional to the self-perceptions or physical measures of 
depletion is indicated in ego-depletion research (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2007) and supported 
in Hagger et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis. Again, this consideration of using an analogue 
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or digital representation arises in the model design, although, in this instance, the 
analogue representation has an unambiguous support in the literature; a gradual 
depletion process is implemented in the model.  
As described in section 4.3.4, if the two goal states are congruent, then the model would 
tend to exhibit felt-affect regulation and not affect-expression regulation. However, it is 
plausible that as the capacity for felt-affect regulation begins to wane with the depletion 
of resource, the detected discrepancy between expression and goal expression generated 
by the movement of expression’s home-base (felt-affect) is reduced through expression 
regulation. Expression regulation could therefore be both a cause and a symptom of 
resource depletion. 
While depletion of resource has so far been considered in the model, it is also necessary 
to consider how resource is restored. Given that the model is designed to examine affect 
regulation across a multiple number of days, it becomes necessary to include a 
representation of resource restoration over an extended time. Across a long period of 
time, such as that of days, it is thought that sleep is the main mechanism for the 
restoration of the hypothetical resource and recovery of chronic depletion experienced 
through the pervasive need for regulation in everyday life (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1999; 
Gailliot, 2008; Hagger, 2010). Similarities between recovery from subjective or 
physical fatigue and self-regulatory fatigue are seen in these proposals.  
4.4.2 Representing Regulatory Resource 
An existing model of subjective alertness (the three process model: Åkerstedt & 
Folkard, 1996; Åkerstedt et al., 2004) is chosen to represent the daily cycle of self-
regulatory resource. This model consists of alertness as a function of both a circadian 
cycle and the time since awakening. Alertness falls throughout the waking period due to 
the function representing time since awakening and is restored by its inverse during 
designated sleep periods. Sleep periods are determined by two factors, firstly through a 
manually set command to ‘wake up’ at a designated time. Secondly, if alertness reaches 
a specified level before the model is instructed to wake, it ‘wakes’ on its own accord 
(Åkerstedt et al., 2004). The model sleeps only when specifically instructed to, allowing 
for investigation into sleep deprivation, if required. Should the sleep/wake cycle not 
align with the circadian cycle, the model’s alertness can vary substantially across a 24-
hour period. For brevity, only a general description of the system is presented here, the 
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formulae used in this current model representation of the three process model are 
presented in Appendix 1.  
The output of this alertness model is used as an analogue for self-regulatory resource. 
The resource component implemented in the current control model varies from an 
output of 1 (maximum alertness) to 0 (maximum fatigue), and the output is used as a 
simple multiplier for the actuators’ self-regulatory capacity. As a day progresses and 
resource depletes, the output from the actuator to the current felt-affect or affect-
expression state decreases. The capacity to change affect decrease as the model grows 
fatigued and extreme states of fatigue result in a severely diminished impact from 
regulation on the current affective states. The self-regulatory capacity of the actuators is 
automatically restored, when the model restores self-regulatory resource through 
sufficient sleep. Regulation efforts and affective change are suspended during periods in 
which the model is asleep because no reasonable inferences in the model can be made 
about these processes at this time. Formula 3, the representation of affect regulation 
efforts, is modified to include the variable of resource capacity (Rc), to give resource 
capacity dependent control in Formula 5 
 R2 t = k2 (C t * Rc t – R2 t-1 ) + R2 t-1 (5) 
As well as being dependent on self-regulatory resource, regulatory processes in the 
model are designed so that they deplete self-regulatory resource. The actuators output 
(Figure 4.3) is also fed to the alertness model’s ‘resource tank’. Both the outputs from 
the regulation of felt-affect and affect-expression are weighted so that a small amount of 
resource is used during the process of regulation (Table 4.3). This represents the 
depleting nature of regulation and the greater use of regulation coinciding with greater 
depletion. This use of, and dependency on, self-regulatory resource by the regulatory 
processes creates a closed loop between affect regulation and self-regulatory resource. 
Figure 4.7 outlines the closed loops between both forms of regulation and the central 
resource tank. 
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Figure 4.7 Self-regulatory resource included in the control circuits for felt-affect and 
affect-expression regulation 
Schematic representation of the felt-affect and affect expression control loop. Affective 
states are determined by external disturbances, the current goal states and dynamics as a 
product of Simulink models described in Figures 4.2 and 4.5 and Formulas 2 and 5. The 
process of regulation drains resource from the Regulatory Resource Capacity block.  
A number of predicted outcomes can be made, given the model’s current structure. 
Rather than the control loops for regulation coming to rest at a stable state, as would be 
expected in the design seen in Figure 4.4, there is a continual change towards, or even 
away from the goal states, in this resource-dependent model. A particularly high 
intensity goal state could then result in sufficient resource depletion so that it is only 
pursued for a limited time before fatigue restricts self-reulatory capacity. Felt-affect’s 
continual trend back towards the home-base may then no longer be overcome, 
effectively creating the observed behaviour of abandoning regulation towards a held 
goal. In contrast, a more moderate intensity goal state would require less regulatory 
efforts and so be maintained over a longer period of time. If a discrepancy between the 
two existing goal states is introduced, then, as described in section 4.4.4, the two 
regulatory processes need to both engage in regulation. This introduced discrepancy 
results in a greater use of self-regulatory resource and a more rapid onset of self-
regulatory fatigue. The relative depleting nature of felt-affect and affect-expression 
regulation in the model is represented by the parameters seen in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Parameters used in the model for resource depletion 
Parameter Name 
Parameter 
Symbol 
Parameter Function Parameter Limits 
Felt-Affect 
Regulation Cost 
Da 
Depletion of resource due 
to felt-affect regulation. 
Minimum > 0 
Maximum < ∞ 
Affect-Expression 
Regulation Cost 
Sa 
Depletion of resource due 
to affect-expression 
regulation. 
Minimum > 0 
Maximum < ∞ 
4.5 Regulation of Goal States 
4.5.1 Goal States 
Affect goals in the model have so far been described in terms of static references for the 
lower level regulatory processes. A control model may have tiers of loops, regulating a 
state to meet a higher goal, which in turn acts as a state to be regulated to meet a higher 
tier goal still (e.g., Powers, 1974). For example, the informal control model of 
emotional labour by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) has specific and concrete states 
at its lowest level (physical movement over a short term) which serve higher and more 
abstract goals so that at the highest tier, three levels above, the abstract process of 
maintaining a desired self-concept is met. It is in this light, of a tiered structure of 
changeable goals, that the process of affect regulation dynamics is examined in this 
section. 
4.5.2 Goal State Regulation 
One outcome of the system designed in section 4.4 is the now dynamic changes in the 
model due to self-regulatory capacity. As self-regulatory resource depletes, regulation 
efforts are impaired and the model may appear to reduce regulation efforts towards the 
held goal states. Higher intensity goal states require more regulation to reach as the 
discrepancy between them and the at-rest point of the affect states is larger. As it stands, 
the model will work towards these fixed states until depletion inhibits further effective 
regulation. However, further dynamics in the model may be introduced by considering 
the goal states as changeable values rather than fixed, broadening the range of affective 
goals across a day and subsequently testing a mechanism of goal adjustment. 
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Goal adjustment is considered a process of alleviating discrepancy in the model when 
attempts to reach a goal are unfruitful (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; Lord & Hanges, 
1987, Powers, 1974). Carver and Scheier (2001) suggest that the goal for a lower state 
is also regulated by the actuator via a secondary feedback link similar to that shown in 
Figure 4.1. This process is considered to be performed through making small changes to 
the goal value, which are maintained if they are successful in reducing discrepancy. 
Over time, a gradual decrease in the goal state towards the lower state’s current value 
would reduce the discrepancy to more manageable levels. This process described 
loosely arises from the concept of reorganisation in perceptual control theory and makes 
use of its idea of a series of tiered control loops.  If goal adjustment is unsuccessful in 
reducing perceived errors then more fundamental reorganisation of hierarchies may be 
required (e.g., Powers, 1974); however, this is beyond the scope of the current thesis. 
When examining the hierarchy of control, formed by the inclusion of multiple, tiered 
control loops, it becomes necessary to consider which processes are active at any given 
moment. One of the guiding principles of perceptual control theory is the multilevel and 
parallel execution of control (e.g., Powers, 1974): control happens at the same time 
across all levels. 
4.5.3 Representing Goal States 
If goal states are considered to be flexible, changing components of the model, they 
cannot be represented by a static value as they have been in sections 4.2 and 4.3. Instead 
a changeable value, which can be altered through regulation, is necessary. For this, 
again, the leaky integrator mechanism is an appropriate representation. At rest, without 
any goal regulation present, the goal state sits at a predetermined value, given by a 
constant (Hg), a home-base for goals. This value would nominally be determined by a 
higher control loop, a potential third tier of the model; however, for simplicity it is 
considered as just a static value. Given that states in higher tier control loops are 
considered to be slower changing than states in lower ones (e.g., Powers 1974), an even 
higher tier control loop may be sufficiently slow to not show any change over the course 
of a simulated week. In terms of rate of change for this system it is considered to be 
slower than that of the lower tier control loop, establishing the need for another time 
constant (k4). There are not expected to be external disturbances to the system so the 
flexible goal can be represented by the simple schematic in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8 Model of goal adjustment in the Simulink environment 
Information regarding affect goals intensity flows from left to right in the diagram, 
through pathways marked with arrows. Current goal state (G) is determined by ongoing 
affect goal regulation (Gr), past goal states held in the loop passing through the block 
labelled unit delay), and the home-base for the goal (Gh). The rate at which the goal 
changes is determined by the time constant block (k4), which acts as a gain on goal state 
intensity passing through it.  
4.5.4 Representing Goal State Regulation 
For the purposes of parsimony in this model, both the processes of goal adjustment for 
felt-affect and affect-expression are considered to operate in the same manner. 
Carver and Scheier (2001, p. 151) describe ‘meta loop’ which takes information from 
the comparator and, using a second actuator, adjusts goal states so that longer term 
discrepancies between states and goals are reduced. In the case of this current model, 
goal adjustment is considered to primarily occur during times of resource depletion, 
when discrepancies cannot be reduced through affect regulation. This design of 
adjusting higher goals to reduce discrepancy when lower states cannot be changed 
reflects proposed models of regulation (Lord & Hanges, 1987; Powers, 1974). Given the 
comparatively more depleting nature of more intense affect goal states, this represents, 
in effect, the process of adjusting more difficult goals to make them more achievable. 
Affect goal regulation is represented with Formula 6. This formula is a modified version 
of resource contingent affect-regulation (Formula 5). There are two key modifications 
so that goal adjustment may be represented in the model. Firstly, signal from the 
comparator (C) is multiplied by -1; if in the control loop the comparator gives a signal 
of 1 (i.e., current state is less than goal state), the meta loop regards this as -1 (i.e., the 
goal state is greater than the current state). Secondly, the comparator signal is multiplied 
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by resource depletion (1 - Rc) rather than resource capacity: greater resource capacity 
limits goal adjustment, while depleted resource capacity promotes goal adjustment. 
This negative signal directs regulation in the meta loop in the opposite direction to that 
in the control loop, reducing discrepancy. The meta loop enacts changes when resource 
is depleted to reduce discrepancy because, during points of depletion, affect cannot be 
successfully regulated towards the held goals (Formula 5). This process of two parallel 
actions of reducing discrepancy reflects the process described in the control literature by 
(Lord & Hanges, 1987; Powers, 1974; Powers et al., 1960a, 1960b): with the persistent 
but unsuccessful attempt to regulate at the lower level, comes a change to reduce the 
discrepancy at the higher level. 
 Gr t = k2 (-C t * (1- Rc t ) – Gr t-1 ) + Gr t-1 (6) 
A further consideration for the system is that this operation is occurring as a means of 
conserving self-regulatory resource so the process of reducing a goal to more 
manageable, less depleting intensities: the process of changing affect goal intensity has 
no direct influence on resource. Instead, conservation of resource is seen on account of 
the affect goal’s intensity adjustment because affect goals closer to the home-base for 
affect are less demanding to regulate towards. 
The additional parameters used in representing goal regulation dynamics are shown in 
Table 4.4. The completed model is shown in Figure 4.10, with the added control loops 
for both felt and expression goal adjustment.  
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Table 4.4 Parameters used in the model of affect goal regulation 
Parameter Name 
Parameter 
Symbol 
Parameter Function Parameter Limits 
Goal Change Rate k4 
Determines the rate of 
adjustment for affect goals. 
Maximum < k 
Minimum > 0 
Felt-Affect Goal 
Home-Base 
Felt_Goal 
Felt-affect goal resting point in 
absence of regulation. 
Maximum = 1 
Minimum = -1 
Affect-Expression 
Goal Home-Base 
Exp_Goal 
Affect-expression goal resting 
point in absence of regulation. 
Maximum = 1 
Minimum = -1 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Representation of the complete model 
Schematic representation of the complete model. Affective states and affective goal 
states are determined by external disturbances and dynamics produced by Simulink 
models described in Figures 4.2, 4.5, and 4.8 and Formulas 2, 5 and 6. The process of 
regulation drains resource from the Regulatory Resource Capacity block.  
 
94 
 
4.6 Noise and Parameter Variation in the Model 
Across the model, there are a number of points in which noise in the system can impact 
on the system’s behaviour. For example, the momentary perception of one’s own affect 
state is unlikely to be a perfectly stable and accurate representation of the underlying 
core affect. Noise representing errors in perception may then be appropriate in the 
system as an input in the loop depicting affect change, shaping the overall input 
detected by the comparator. This difference between the perception of a state and the 
‘correct’ noise-free underlying state can be more widely applicable so that at each 
comparator point in the model there is representation of a perception of the specific 
state.  
In addition to this, noise may be applicable in the external disturbances introduced to 
the model in the form of affect events or affect-expressions from others. Again, 
perceptions of an affect event may differ across time and not be a stable nor accurate 
representation of its supposed ‘objective’ affective intensity. Noise introduced to the 
model at this point can represent such variation in perceptions of an appraised affective 
event. Even standardised affective stimuli, such as those in the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS manual, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) show substantial 
variability in their affective influence on individuals.  
Finally, variations in the parameter strengths need consideration. As described earlier, 
individuals may have a preference for a particular form of regulation strategy 
(reappraisers or suppressors; Gross & John, 2003). Variation in the regulatory 
momentum parameters k2 between simulations could represent the differences between 
individuals. Moreover, the costs of regulating both felt-affect and affect-expression 
could differ between individuals, as does the home-base for felt-affect and potentially 
the home-base for affect goals. Plausible ranges for each of these are considered in 
Chapter 5. While individual differences that may exist are not of primary concern in this 
endeavour to give a general representation of affect regulation dynamics, the potential 
differences between individuals may be worth bearing in mind for further model 
developments. 
95 
 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, requirements for the development and implementation of a model of 
affect regulation have been outlined. Each sub-structure in the model has been 
constructed to meet the requirements presented to adequately capture the affect 
regulation and related phenomena examined in the preceding chapters.  Further to this, 
the design of the model stays within the remit of keeping the number of free parameters 
limited, while still seeking to capture a broad range of behaviours and processes in 
affect regulation.  
Working from the original, informal design offered in Chapter 2, using control theory 
framework in Chapter 3, this current chapter offers a formalisation of affect regulation 
dynamics. Parameter values, and the predictions associated with these, can therefore be 
examined in a structured and systematic approach through the means of examining 
influence of parameter variation on the dynamics of the model. This computational 
representation of affect regulation dynamics can be used to represent current known 
phenomena in affect regulation and offers a means of examining plausible affect 
dynamics in ways that informal models are not capable of. The process of testing the 
model against known data or informal models of affect dynamics is undertaken in 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Parameter Testing 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 introduced the overall structure of the model and suggested how each 
individual component of the model may interact to simulate affect and affect goal 
regulation. While Chapter 4 may highlight that there are relationships and interactions 
between two values in the model (for example resource depletion may relate to a 
discrepancy between affect-expression and felt-affect states), the strengths of such 
relationships are still left to be determined. Appropriate parameterisation of the model is 
necessary to ensure that the model’s behaviour faithfully reflects the phenomena 
modelled. This chapter details the systematic approach taken to identify parameter 
values that firstly, are in keeping with reasonable estimates based on theory, and 
secondly, provide model behaviour that can be compared with known, empirical data. 
An organised, structured approach to testing the model will ensure that each parameter 
is adequately defined and, where possible, is grounded in relevant, existing data. An 
exhaustive exploration of each plausible parameter value against all others in the model 
is impractical because of the large numbers of parameters in the complete model and the 
factorial number of parameter combinations. This chapter outlines an approach that 
systematically identifies stand-alone components in the model for practical testing of 
low numbers of parameters and gradually builds up the complexity of circuits until the 
full model can be tested against empirical data. 
5.2 Theory for Model Testing 
This section offers an outline of the approach taken in this thesis to constrain the values 
of parameters within this model. Chapter 4 offered hard limits to the parameter ranges, 
based on the structure and design of the model; this chapter seeks to identify ranges of 
parameter values that reflect affect dynamics in the literature. Roberts and Pashler 
(2000) argue that for a model to be of value it must effectively constrain possible 
outcomes. They suggest that cognitive architectures, with many free parameters, such as 
the Adaptive Control of Thought model (ACT, Anderson, 1976) offer little in terms of 
theory development because parameter adjustments enable them to predict both A and 
Not A. If a model’s predictions encompass all possible plausible outcomes, the fact it 
can fit results to known data offers no support for the model. An acceptable model 
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design is dependent on having plausible outcomes that lie outside the range of possible 
model predictions. If actual, observed data then lie within the model's range of predicted 
outcomes, some support for the model is shown. 
Parameter setting therefore should seek to constrain the possible outcomes of the model 
tightly: predictions from the model should result in narrow and specific results. Roberts 
and Pashler (2000) also suggest that with every additional parameter in the model a 
greater degree of flexibility in the range of outcomes occurs. A flexible model may be 
better able to fit more data but this may not necessarily provide any more support for 
the model because model results could have just been expanded to encompass the new 
data. Parsimony is therefore preferred.  
However, having a large number of parameters does not automatically leave a model 
without merit. Louie and Carley (2008) argue that a large number of parameters, 
“allows one to explore factors that are suspected but not yet known to have an influence 
on the target system” (p. 254). Such models may be refined and simplified as better 
understandings of the modelled phenomena arise. The model in this thesis is designed 
with the focus of exploring a range of phenomena including: response to affect events; 
affect regulation effectiveness; and the rate of change of affect goals. This may inform 
future, simpler models or relationships in the areas examined. This exploratory 
approach may, in many cases, not have empirical evidence to compare against. Yet 
some circuits within the model may represent known behaviours that can be represented 
through parameter fitting. Although Roberts and Pashler (2000) argue parameter fitting 
is a weak approach for model testing, this has been challenged by others, who instead 
argue that fitting data is an important starting point for model development (Rodgers & 
Rowe, 2002).  
Humphries and Gurney (2007) argue that data fitting is useful as a diagnostic tool. They 
outline a strong approach to the testing and validation of computer simulations, termed 
models as animals. They suggest that a model's quality can be measured by the degree 
of fit with empirical data by arguing that if the model does not fit existing data it may 
well be inadequate. They highlight four tiers of quality for fitting experimental data, 
each subsuming a lower tier (p.1892). First, by matching trends: replicating the correct 
direction in a relationship between variables. Second, by matching means: replicating 
mean changes in variables between experimental conditions. Third, by matching 
distributions: replicating the distribution of results across experimental conditions. Last, 
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by matching exact values: replicating individual responses to experimental 
manipulation. 
To achieve this, they recommend a framework of aiming to emulate not only the final 
outcome of empirical papers but also the procedure by which the results were collected. 
To this extent the sample size and method of collecting data is considered when running 
a simulation. While their framework is described in the context of neuroscience, it is 
applicable within the context of this thesis. For example, in section 5.4.5 trends reported 
by Franzen et al. (2008, p. 35) are replicated; in section 5.4.3, mean values reported by 
Strack et al. (1988, p. 772) are replicated; and in section 5.4.1, distribution of responses 
reported by Lang et al. (2005, p. 10-21) are replicated. 
A consideration for the model is the potential for substantial variation across 
participants. This may include: differences in the effectiveness of their affect regulation 
strategies; their typical, or baseline, affect; and responses to affect events or stimuli. 
Variation reported in empirical data may offer appropriate limits or guidelines for the 
permissible variation within model parameters. For example, the IAPS manual offers 
both a mean valence and the standard deviation in participant affective responses to 
pictures (Lang et al., 2005, p. 10-21). A bank of data across a modelled group of 
participants may be compared to original, empirical findings to represent variations in 
responses to stimuli. 
5.3 Model Testing 
Testing is divided into two stages: setting parameter values based on theoretical 
constraints, and setting parameter ranges based on empirical data. The first tests specify 
a central value for each parameter that aims to constrain model behaviour to very 
narrow, theory-driven outcomes. The second tests aim to broaden the behaviour of the 
model by creating ranges of plausible parameter values around the initial, central value.  
For both approaches to testing parameters, each component block of the model is 
isolated into the simplest circuit possible and plausible parameters are determined. The 
component blocks are tested in this manner for two reasons: 
a. Theoretical Validity: If a component of the model represents a simple stand-
alone behaviour outside the wider scope of the whole model (for example a 
dynamic model of affect regulation would necessarily contain a dynamic model 
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of affect experience) it ought to be able to adequately represent such behaviour. 
Each component must be a valid representation of its purpose otherwise other 
components’ behaviours are compromised.  
The control theory literature suggests a hierarchy of behaviours; each higher 
layer impacts on the behaviour of those below it (Powers, 1974; Powers et al. 
1960b). However, lower level behaviours can operate independently of higher 
control commands and the same low level activity may serve multiple 
independent goals. As lower levels can exist independent of the higher levels, a 
sufficient hierarchical model must be capable of modelling lower levels in an 
isolated circuit. 
b. Simplicity of Testing: The results of testing a single parameter within the context 
of the whole model may be dependent on the values of each other parameter in 
the model. As a result, testing each parameter against variations of every other 
parameter becomes a factorial problem that could require an impractically large 
number of simulations to be run. A specific parameter may be highlighted as the 
optimal value but only within the context of all other parameters in the model 
but not necessarily a viable option if the component block is isolated and tested.   
The above points suggest that an expedient and practical method of parameter testing is 
to work from the simplest, lower level operations, such as affect response to an event, 
upwards to the more generalised wider-reaching model components, such as the rate of 
resource depletion. The process of examining a model from its lowest structures 
upwards at the individual component level is outlined by Larsen (2000). This 
methodical approach can be adapted to fit a multi-layered, multi-pathway model by 
identifying the more basic, lower circuits as a starting point for testing parameters. Once 
these have been set, higher levels and more complicated circuits can be introduced, 
building on the established lower levels. The parameters tested and their locations are 
shown in Table 5.1. 
100 
 
Table 5.1 Outline of parameters to test and their colour coded location in the model 
Parameter Test conducted Parameter Location Parameters Examined 
Felt-affect Dynamics   
 Felt-affect Perceived felt-affect Response variability 
 Felt-affect regulation Felt-affect regulation Regulation momentum 
Affect-expression Dynamics   
 Affect-expression and feedback 
Perceived affect-
expression 
Feedback strength 
 Affect-expression regulation 
Affect-expression 
regulation 
Regulation momentum 
Resource Dynamics   
 Resource depletion Resource control 
Regulatory capacity 
Regulation depletion 
Higher levels of control   
 Felt-affect goal adjustment Felt-affect goal regulation Rate of change 
 
Affect-expression goal 
adjustment 
Affect-expression goal 
regulation 
Rate of change 
Many of the parameter tests listed in Table 5.1 may be thought of as small, stand-alone, 
investigations, an approach previously used in examining affect model plausibility. 
Bosse et al. (2010) evaluated their computer model of Gross’s (1998a) informal model 
of emotion regulation through a series of self-contained scenarios. They track the 
model’s emotion response level, analogous to this thesis’ modelled felt-affect state, 
during periods of under-regulation, over-regulation, and appropriate regulation to 
highlight how variation in parameters causes change to modelled outcomes. For 
example, they offer a hypothetical scenario of an individual’s response to anger 
management therapy. The outcome of the therapy is represented in the model by an 
increase in the parameter related to one’s willingness to change the emotional state of 
anger. This change to the model’s parameters in turn affects the emotion response level, 
reducing anger over time.  
This thesis also presents parameter testing in the form of experimental investigation, 
where appropriate. This approach may prove a useful guide when investigating 
phenomena not commonly measured in the literature (such as goal adjustment rate) or 
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when testing the limits of plausible outcomes against known outcomes. Specific 
parameter changes to affect the outcome of the model are regarded as predictions made 
by the model that can be compared against known data or serve as guide for what 
phenomena to examine when collecting data. 
5.4 Component Testing 
Components are tested in the descending order described in Table 5.1 to enable a 
progressive approach from the simpler, lower structures in the model to more 
comprehensive whole model tests. Each component is taken directly from the model 
shown in section 4.5.4 (copied as Figure 5.1 in this section) and each parameter test 
builds on the previous until the whole model is tested. Parameters in the following 
sections below refer to component blocks; these contain collected units, such as 
mathematical functions, which combine to form a specified and individual role within 
the model. Blocks may range in content from a simple difference comparison between 
values to that of a replication of Åkerstedt et al.’s (2004) three process model of 
alertness.  
Where possible, parameter values are identified based on known data. In some cases, 
plausible estimates of parameter values are necessary, particularly where there is no 
available analogue in empirical data yet. In addition to this, an estimate of the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal variability can be offered for some parameters. 
Variability in the model is created by introducing a random modification of key 
parameters. For example some individuals may be more proficient at affect regulation 
than others; this may be modelled as variations between simulations in the parameter 
relating to regulation effectiveness. 
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Figure 5.1 Representation of the complete model 
Schematic representation of the complete model. Affective states and affective goal 
states are determined by external disturbances and dynamics produced by Simulink 
models described in Figures 4.2, 4.5, and 4.8 and Formulas 2, 5 and 6. The process of 
regulation drains resource from the Regulatory Resource Capacity block.  
5.4.1 Felt-Affect 
The Perceived Felt-Affect (PFA) block is the basic starting component of the model. It 
serves as both the main point that affective stimuli (such as another's affective 
expression or affective events) can impact on the model's behaviour and as a home-base 
for the affect-expression state (explored in section 5.4.3). The purpose of the following 
parameter tests is to ensure that the output of the PFA block plausibly represents 
responses to affective stimuli across a wide range of valences.  
Affective events theory (e.g., Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002; Wegge, Dick, Fisher, West, & 
Dawson, 2006; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) suggests that experienced feelings 
(represented by the output of the PFA block) are directly affected by experienced 
events, such as daily hassles or uplifts. As the PFA block is the primary point of 
influence on the model from external stimuli, it is necessary that it can respond to 
stimuli in a manner that is useful to the rest of the model. In this instance, it needs to be 
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able discriminate between stimuli of varying affective valence and represent typical 
affective change coinciding with the occurrence of affective events.  
In section 4.2.3, a model of felt-affect is offered, based around a simple, leaky integrator 
model. This system was chosen because it meets the remit of representing changes in 
output intensity in accordance with input intensity and representing a return to a resting 
home-base in absence of input. Moreover, it is a simple system, with few free 
parameters (see Figure 5.2). In the preceding chapter, two parameters in this part of the 
model were identified: k, a value representing the rate of felt-affect change and H, a 
value representing the home-base that affect returns to. At present, plausible values of k 
are not examined because passing of time in current simulations is considered in 
arbitrary units ‘ticks’. k is further examined in section 5.4.5, which introduces the 
resource model and a representation of time, based on daily cycles and sleeping and 
waking schedules but for all simulations leading to this specified at 0.01. For the 
purposes of this section H is specified at 0, meaning that affect returns to a neutral state 
in absence of affective input. H is further examined in section 5.4.2 in terms of affect 
regulation. 
 
Figure 5.2 Model of felt-affect change 
Information regarding affect intensity flows from left to right in the diagram, through 
pathways marked with arrows. Current affect (R) is determined by ongoing affect events 
(S), past affect intensity (held in the loop passing through the block labelled unit delay), 
and the home-base (H). The rate at which affect changes is determined by the time 
constant block (k), which acts as a gain on affect intensity passing through it. 
In this section, the PFA block is tested and parameters specified to ensure that the 
block’s output (perceived affect intensity) both accurately reflects the input values 
(affect events) and is constrained within a limited range of output values. A pre-
determined limited range of output values is a necessary requirement for the model, if it 
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is to be compared against empirical data. Scales measuring affect (e.g., Russell, 1980; 
2003; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) limit maximum and minimum affect intensity 
self-report scores; to make appropriate comparisons with self-report data, modelled 
affect intensity should be also constrained within similar bounds. 
Constraining model affect intensity offers clarity in understanding differences between 
intensity values reported: a change in affect intensity scores from 1 to 5 implies a 
substantial change, if an intensity of 5 is the maximum possible output the model 
affords, but a minor change, if the maximum possible output is 100. This section looks 
at existing self-report data for perceived affective responses to a standardised set of 
affective stimuli: images taken from the IAPS manual (Lang et al., 2005).  
While an aim for testing the model is to ensure that perceived affect intensity accurately 
reflects the input intensity of affect events in simulation, this cannot be well determined 
in real-life studies or observations. Affect experience is necessarily a subjective process 
of evaluation of affective stimuli (Lazarus, 1968, 1991). To enable a comparison to be 
made between responses to stimuli from the IAPS set and model responses to inputs, the 
distributions of participant responses to IAPS stimuli are used and a distribution of 
model responses to stimuli are generated. Participant response to multiple IAPS stimuli 
are first presented; following this, two means of constraining model data are examined 
and advantages and limitations considered. 
Affect image standardisation procedure in the IPAS manual (Lang et al. 2005) is 
described as being: 60 images representative of a broad range of valences are shown to 
between 8 and 25 individuals. Individuals are asked to rate their first impressions of the 
image on a scale from 1 to 9 where 5 represents a neutral response. To reflect this in the 
current empirical data set used, 60 responses and response distributions to a range of 
IAPS pictures are selected from the IAPS database. Response intensities to IAPS slides 
were chosen to represent the complete range of mean valence responses and drawn from 
the ‘All Subjects’ database (p. 11 – 22). Because the standard distributions of responses 
are the values to be compared with the model data, these were not taken into account 
when selecting IAPS slide numbers, to reduce the potential for a biased data set. The 
affect responses to a variety of IAPS slides are given in Figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5.3 Affect response and response variation to slides from the IAPS database. 
Data retrieved from Lang et al. (2005); 60 independent measures of valence responses 
to affect image stimuli. Mean valence response and standard deviation shown. 
The results presented in Figure 5.3 indicate that there is an overall general consistency 
in the variation of response to affective stimuli presented. As the mean image affect 
intensity (either as more positive or more negative) increases, standard deviation of 
perceived valence remains approximately consistent with that seen of neutral valence 
images.  
To form a distribution of responses by the models to an affective stimulus, multiple 
instances of the models must be run. Variation in simulated evaluation of stimuli can be 
introduced by adding random values to the intensity of affective events. Random values 
have previously been used in emotion models to represent effects in affect change 
(Kuppens et al., 2010) and as an acknowledgment of the uncertainty in affect dynamics, 
given the multitude of internal and external factors that may change affect (Oravecz et 
al., 2009). As such, it is not the aim of this section to uncover how variation in response 
to affective stimuli may arise but to make a reasonable estimate on the variability in 
response to stimuli, given known data. 
For the current model, a random value added to each stimulus is chosen as an 
approximate representation of variability in evaluation, both within and between 
individuals. Simulated evaluation of stimuli is achieved through a two-step process. 
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Firstly, what may be termed a variation in disposition is set; it may be considered an 
interpersonal variation that determines if the model is inclined to respond more 
positively or negatively to a stimulus. This value is fixed for the duration of a 
simulation and is only varied between simulation runs. Secondly, what may be termed 
variability is set; this determines an individual simulation’s consistency in response to 
stimuli. This range is set for each simulation run but random values within this range 
are selected for each stimulus presented.  
In terms of the model, the variation in evaluation is determined by a normal distribution 
random number generator. Disposition is represented in the mean value of the normal 
distribution and variability in represented in the normal distribution’s standard 
deviation. Interpersonal differences are created at the start of a simulation run by the 
formation of a unique normal distribution. Intrapersonal differences are represented by 
the drawing of a new random number to add to (or subtract from) the valence of the 
stimuli presented.  
Values for both disposition and variability for the model are determined by examining 
the standard deviations in individuals’ affective judgements for neutral stimuli in the 
IAPS. Each picture has been rated by approximately 100 individuals (IAPS manual, 
Lang et al., 2005, p .3) and results given include the mean valence and the standard 
deviation in responses for each image (p. 10-21). On the affective scale used of 1 (most 
unpleasant) to 9 (most pleasant), neutral valence images (mean rating approximately 5) 
typically show a standard deviation of 1.1. To achieve this in simulations run, using the 
scale of -1 (most negative affect) to +1 (most positive affect), disposition values are 
randomly selected from between -0.15 and 0.15 (on the scale of -1 to +1 for affect 
response) and variability values from 0.01 to 0.05 for a sample of 20 simulations per 
stimulus. 
In order to compare simulation data with the data shown in Figure 5.3, a protocol for 
generating model results is drawn from the standard procedure for rating IAPS pictures, 
outlined in the IAPS manual (p. 3); 60 images of varying affect intensity are shown to a 
group of between 8 and 25 individuals. To simulate this, 60 affective stimuli are created 
equally spaced in affective intensity values between -1 and +1. Twenty instances of 
both versions of the model are created, each with their own disposition and variability 
scores, representing differences between individuals. Each of the individual models is 
then subject to the varying affective intensities; affective response, once stable, is 
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recorded for each affective input. For each of the 60 affective stimuli presented, the 
mean and standard deviation of the responses are recorded. 
To simulate the largely uniform variation in response to all affect stimuli, a saturation 
function for constraining model affect output range is used. This saturation design does 
not influence the output values between -1 and +1 so, over time, any input value (e.g., 
affective events) to the PFA block leaky integrator between -1 and +1 will be reflected 
in the same output value (i.e., perceived felt-affect). However, if affective event 
intensities exceed the fixed thresholds, the perceived affect is capped at maximum 
affective intensities of +1 or -1. Figure 5.4 reports the means and standard deviations for 
20 simulated individual’s responses. 
 
Figure 5.4 Modelled response to affective stimuli, using a saturation function. 
60 independent measures of valence responses to affect image stimuli. Mean valence 
response and standard deviation shown. 
The model results reflect the general trend seen in the IAPS data (Figure 5.3); 
distribution of responses is generally consistent across all stimuli intensities. Moreover, 
the model displays accurate representation of stimuli inputs as perceived felt-affect 
outputs. However, as previously mentioned, if hypothetical affect stimuli were 
presented which exceed the upper or lower bounds of the saturation function, perceived 
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felt-affect outputs would no longer show accurate representation of the stimuli intensity. 
Therefore it becomes critical that affect intensity inputs are carefully monitored and 
specified to remain within the boundary limits produced by the saturation function. If 
the saturation function is replaced with an alternate means of representing affect output 
range limits, such saturation effects do not occur. 
An alternative means of constraining affect response is the use of a nonlinear 
transformation of values output from the leaky integrator circuit to ensure that perceived 
felt-affect intensities remain bound between -1 and +1. The nonlinear transformation 
used for this comparison is the hyperbolic tangent function, a sigmoid compression of 
input values into output values ranging from -1 to +1. This function and the similar, 
logistic function are commonly used in firing neuron models (e.g., Kunkle & Merrigan, 
2002). Unlike the saturation function, this approach offers differentiation at the output 
between any input intensities, although there is a variation in sensitivity to differences 
in input values, which is subject to parameter specification. A standard parameter 
specification might see model response to show substantial perceived affect differences 
between lower magnitude stimuli (i.e., 0.1 and 0.2 strength stimuli might give 0.1 and 
0.2 affect intensities) when compared to higher magnitude stimuli (i.e., 10 and 20 
strength stimuli might give 0.998 and 0.999 affect intensities). Figure 5.5 reports the 
means and standard deviations for 20 simulated individual’s responses. 
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Figure 5.5 Modelled response to affective stimuli, using a hyperbolic tangent function 
60 independent measures of valence responses to affect image stimuli. Mean valence 
response and standard deviation shown. 
Results show that the modelled responses tend to deviate away from the ‘true’ values at 
both the more positive and more negative affective inputs. In addition to this, the 
distributions of responses begin to narrow at both the more positive and more negative 
inputs. While the hyperbolic tangent model solves the potential problem associated with 
the use of a saturation model, in its current form, the hyperbolic tangent model creates 
different issues in representing affect output. These issues may be resolved by just using 
a portion of the hyperbolic tangent function to transform the affective inputs. In the 
central range of the hyperbolic tangent, the transform from input to output is 
approximately linear. By increasing the limits of the function’s outputs so that the 
approximately linear potion of the function reaches from +1 to -1, while restricting the 
ranges of input intensities to the PFA to ensure that the outputs do not exceed the 
designated range of +1 to -1, an accurate and consistent representation across all 
affective input intensities can be produced in the outputs. Moreover, should hypothetical 
affective events extend beyond the +1 to -1 range, the hyperbolic tangent function can 
accommodate for this and also show an increase in output within the wider range of the 
function.  
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However, the use of this function as a means of controlling affect output in response to 
affect inputs does introduce complexities as further parameters are necessary to 
determine the ‘slope’ of the transfer from the input to the output. In addition to this, the 
function ideally requires restrictions placed on affective input ranges to ensure that 
output ranges do not typically exceed the +1 to -1 limits. These restrictions on affect 
inputs are also used by the simpler saturation function, which aside from hypothetical 
affect inputs to the model beyond intensity ranges allowed in the simulation, adequately 
meets the needs for representing affective outputs. The saturation function is chosen for 
use in simulation over the hyperbolic tangent function because of the fewer parameters 
required for specification, promoting a simpler and faster running model. The use of this 
function does require that affective inputs are controlled so that they do not go beyond 
+1 or -1 in intensity. 
 This block is now integrated into the first control loop, felt-affect regulation, ahead of 
examining affect change in terms of both affective events and regulatory processes. 
5.4.2 Felt-Affect Regulation 
In this section, the relative cost of regulation is determined, which arises from parameter 
variations in the actuator component of the affect regulation loop. In addition to this, 
this section examines affective response to events, while affect regulation is ongoing. 
Affect regulation, in the context of a control loop, aims to keep a constantly changing 
value (affective intensity) as close to a specified goal state as possible (e.g., Powers et 
al., 1960a). The model is designed based on the theory that resource is recruited in order 
to meet regulation demands (e.g., Hagger et al., 2010). For this section, resource is 
unlimited (i.e., there is no impairment in the capacity for regulation) and the parameter 
examined is that of regulatory momentum. This refers to the degree of change that the 
model makes to the felt-affect state, given a detected discrepancy. A low regulatory 
momentum may represent an individual who insufficiently regulates; he or she fails to 
act on the known discrepancy. A high regulatory momentum would ensure that 
individuals rapidly regulate towards goals and makes frequent corrections to their state 
to maintain at that intensity.  
The felt-affect regulation control loop examined in this section is shown in Figure 5.6, 
which builds upon the felt-affect block of Figure 5.2. The results from parameter 
variation in the affect regulation control loop can be measured in two ways: latency for 
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affect reach the goal through regulation, and effort expended in maintaining affect at the 
goal. A starting point for parameter specification is to examine if there is a trade-off 
between expediency (i.e. rapid regulation and maintenance of affect at the goal state) 
and regulatory efficiency (i.e. the self-regulatory resource ‘cost’ associated with 
successful regulation). Once this has been established, further examination of affect 
regulation dynamics in light of affective events can occur.  
 
Figure 5.6 Felt-affect regulation control circuit with stimulus and results plotting 
Model represented in the Simulink environment; each block contains previously 
developed formulas or models specified using Simulink modelling. From top to bottom 
& left to right: Perceived felt goal is a specified constant; Comparator contains Formula 
2; Felt-Affect Regulation contains Formula 3; Perceived Felt-Affect contains Figure 
4.2; Evaluation contains additive random noise (specified in section 5.4.1); Stimulus 
contains variable strength inputs. Acronyms and abbreviations used in the figure are 
listed in Appendix 2. Information regarding affect and affect regulation flows through 
pathways marked with arrows.  
To briefly recap the affect regulation process: a comparator detects discrepancy between 
current perceived affect and a held goal. If a discrepancy is detected, the comparator 
signals to the actuator to engage in regulation; this output of the actuator and input from 
any stimulus enact change on the felt-affect state. Input from the Felt-Affect Regulation 
(FAR) block occurring alongside an input from an affective event or stimulus may be 
considered akin to re-evaluation, should the subsequent perceived affect state change 
away from its typical response to the affective stimulus. 
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The regulation process examined is considered deliberate and effortful so variation in 
regulation momentum between individuals is plausible, and potentially measurable. A 
maximum and minimum possible value for regulation momentum is 0 and 1 where a 
momentum of 0 would predict no change during regulation and 1 would predict the 
model constantly making large corrections. Figure 5.7 highlights the difference in rate 
of change towards a held affect goal (a moderately positive value of 0.4) across 100 
different degrees of regulatory momentum ranging in a logarithmic distribution from 
0.002 to 0.5. As with the previous section, time is measured in the arbitrary unit of ticks. 
 
Figure 5.7 Variations in relative response time to reach a held felt-affect goal through 
felt-affect regulation 
Felt affect goal is specified at 0.4 for the duration of each simulation. Time taken to 
reach the held goal is arbitrary and measured in ticks. 
Results indicate that low regulatory momentum results in a comparatively slow shift 
towards the target state, taking over 3 times as long as a high regulatory momentum. At 
all values of regulatory momentum felt-affect overshoots the goal value of 0.4 
marginally and settles at, or oscillates about, the goal value. Higher regulatory 
momentum parameter values show slight oscillation about the goal value as the 
relatively rapid changes made in regulatory output cause some overcorrection in the 
felt-affect state. This degree of oscillation about the goal value increases with higher 
regulatory momentum and given, sufficient time lower regulatory momentum offers a 
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more stable maintenance of felt-affect at the held goal. However, there is the 
consideration of the time it takes affect to reach the held goal value for affect. 
To further differentiate the influence of parameter values for regulatory momentum, the 
effort involved in regulating to held goal values is considered. Effort is calculated by 
summing the total output from the affect regulation block over the course of a single 
simulation. It is anticipated that the greater degree of oscillation about the goal value 
seen in models with a higher regulation momentum parameter will be associated with a 
greater overall effort in regulating affect towards the goal value. A further factor that is 
anticipated to influence the total effort in regulating affect is the affect intensity of the 
goal value regulated towards.  
To examine resource depletion due to affect regulation, the total output from the 
model’s FAR block is recorded. This recording is taken from the duration of all 
simulations, each lasting 3000 ticks: a time sufficient to allow the lower regulatory 
momentum models to reach all affect goal intensities. Fifty different parameter values 
for regulatory momentum are tested, again ranging in a logarithmic distribution from 
0.002 to 0.5. For each of these parameter values, the felt-affect goal value is varied, 
ranging in a linear distribution from 0.1 (slightly positive affect) to 1 (maximally 
positive affect) for twenty values. Felt-affect home-base is specified at zero throughout 
for each simulation. In sum, 1000 simulations are run to examine the influence of both 
parameter variations and interaction between these variations. Results are shown in 
Figure 5.8, comparing the relative resource depletion. The influence of self-regulatory 
resource depletion on the capacity for affect regulation is not considered in this test. 
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Figure 5.8 Relative resource depletion as a function of regulatory momentum and goal 
intensity 
Figure 5.8 indicates that as the degree of regulatory momentum increases, the resource 
depleted in regulating towards even low affect goals, close to the home-base, increases. 
As predicted, as discrepancy between affect goal intensity and current affect state 
increases, resource depletion also increases. Low regulatory momentum appears to 
deplete less resource at high levels of affect regulation goals than either moderate or 
high regulatory momentum. Results further point towards regulatory momentum and 
intensity of affect goal value having a compounded influence on relative resource 
depletion. 
Further analysis of the influence of felt-affect regulation can be achieved through 
examining how felt-affect regulation influences felt-affect’s course during affective 
events. In the previous section, it is taken as axiomatic that felt-affect intensity tends 
towards current affective event intensity (or rather, the evaluated intensity of this 
affective event). In this section, with the introduction of the affect regulation loop, this 
may no longer be the case as, in response to an affective event disturbing the current 
affect state, regulatory processes engage to modify current felt-affect intensity.  
Affect regulation’s influence on the affective response to events is demonstrated in 
Figure 5.9. For this example, regulatory momentum is specified at k2 = 0.005, a value 
which shows relatively limited oscillation about the goal values and a relatively 
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moderate cost of self-regulatory resource. The felt-affect home-base is specified at 0.2, 
representing the slightly positive affect typically reported as the most commonly felt 
state (e.g., Biswas-Diener, Diener, & Tamir, 2004). The felt-affect goal state is specified 
at 0.3, while the affective evaluation of the event presented is determined at an intensity 
of 0.6, which is presented at 500 ticks into the simulation and for duration of 500 ticks.  
 
Figure 5.9 Felt-affect dynamics for affective event during felt-affect regulation 
Felt affect goal is specified at 0.3 for the duration of each simulation. Both the duration 
of simulation and the period of affect event are arbitrary and measured in ticks. 
Results indicate that affective dynamics are substantially influenced by the felt-affect 
regulation control loop. There are three key points of affect change in the simulation of 
affect regulation in Figure 5.9, which will be examined chronologically. To begin, 
between 0 and 500 ticks, affect is regulated away from the home-base of 0.2 and begins 
to stabilise at the goal state of 0.3. Secondly, at the introduction of the affect event, 
further self-regulatory resource is recruited to limit the influence of the affective event 
and again begin to stabilise affect at 0.3. While the affective event drives felt-affect 
upwards, regulation downwards is accumulating to counteract this affect change and is 
sufficient to do so shortly after felt-affect crosses the 0.5 intensity valence. Lastly, at the 
point of the affective event ending, the downwards affect regulation persists and is 
gradually reduced to ensure that affect again stabilises at the goal value.  
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The dynamics seen in Figure 5.9 closely resemble Solomon and Corbit’s (1974) 
description of ‘standard pattern of affective dynamics’ (p. 120), visually represented in 
Figure 5.10. If, in Figure 5.9, affect regulation was considered to only begin to occur 
with the affective event rather than throughout the simulation, the resemblance to their 
projected affect dynamics would be a stronger match still. Of particular note in Figure 
5.9 are the relative deviations away from the goal value, 0.3, at the peak of the affective 
reaction and the peak of the after-effects. Like Solomon and Corbit’s (1974) sketched 
model, the peak of the affective reaction is a further distance from the stable resting 
state than the affective after-effects (a difference of 0.05 in Figure 5.9). Matching 
dynamics predicted to occur in theories of affect and of actual affect data in the 
preceding section point towards the affect regulation loop as being an appropriate 
mechanism for representing affect regulation dynamics. 
 
Figure 5.10 The standard pattern of affective dynamics  
The standard pattern of affective dynamics showing the five distinctive features: the 
peak of the primary affective reaction, the adaptation phase, the steady level, the peak of 
the affective after-reaction, and, finally, the decay of the after-reaction. (The heavy 
black bar represents the time during which the affect-arousing stimulus is present. The 
ordinate represents two hedonic scales, each departing from neutrality, one for the 
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primary affect, the other for the affective after-reaction.) Figure and caption reproduced 
with permission from Solomon and Corbit (1974). 
5.4.3 Affect-Expression and Expressive-Feedback 
In this thesis, the experience of affect and the expression of affect are considered as 
distinct but connected constructs. In the design of the model this is represented through 
the development of two different states (felt-affect and affect-expression) and two 
distinct control loops regulating these. The expressed state builds upon the previously 
defined felt-affect regulatory loop, existing outside of the prior control loop but 
nevertheless still interacting with the felt-affect state. The expressed state is designed to 
‘follow’ the PFA block’s output so that under typical conditions, the affect-expression 
state and felt-affect state maintain coherency. While the causative mechanism linking 
the felt-affect and affect-expression state is unclear, studies indicate that coherency 
exists (e.g., Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005) and that it may be 
effortful to introduce a discrepancy between the two (e.g., Goldberg & Grandey, 2007). 
It is plausible then that an affect-expression state is at least partially dependent on the 
current felt-affect state. 
The model represents this link between felt-affect and affect-expression by designating 
the output from the PFA block as the home-base for the Perceived Affect-Expression 
(PAE) block. Rather than returning to a neutral baseline after expression regulation, 
expression will return towards the dynamically shifting felt-affect state. Establishing the 
current felt-affect state as the expressed state’s home-base also has the benefit of 
explicitly encoding into the model an assertion by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) 
that individuals may prefer to display genuine, authentic representations of felt-affect.  
By positioning felt-affect as the home-base for affect-expression, this obviates issues of 
maintaining coherency, which arise if alternate means of linking felt-affect and affect-
expression are used. For example, if felt-affect is fed into the PAE block as if it were an 
affective stimulus, there is a continual lag between felt-affect and affect-expression; the 
leaky integrator for affect-expression continually tries to catch up with changing felt-
affect. Degree of coherence would become dependent on the rate of affect-expression 
change, which is the parameter termed k3; fitting k3 to this aspect of the model would 
also inadvertently influence affect-expression dynamics in response to affective stimuli 
such as expression from others. 
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In the previous section, addition of a regulatory control loop for felt-affect had influence 
on the affective response to an affective stimulus (Figure 5.9). Affective response can 
be further influenced through the development of a feedback loop from affect-
expression to felt-affect. Feedback from affect-expression to influence felt-affect has 
long been theorised (e.g., Laird, 1984; Lange, 1885/1922) and manipulation of the 
expressed state has been demonstrated to influence individuals’ felt state (e.g., Strack et 
al., 1988). In the model, a sufficiently strong connection from affect-expression back to 
felt-affect could serve to push peak affective response closer that of stimuli evaluation 
(i.e., closing the gap seen in Figure 5.9 between peak response and stimuli intensity). 
The addition of affect-expression and the expressive-feedback link are shown in Figure 
5.11. In addition to this; a felt-affect junction box is included in the existing control loop 
in Figure 5.11. This simply sums the affective components entering the PFA block and 
is used to maintain clarity in the visual overview of the model; it does not influence 
results. 
 
Figure 5.11 Felt-affect regulation control loop, affect-expression and expressive-
feedback 
Model represented in the Simulink environment, building upon Figure 5.6. Additional 
block used contains previously developed formulas or models specified using Simulink 
modelling: Perceived Affect-expression contains Figure 4.5. Acronyms and 
abbreviations used in the figure are listed in Appendix 2. Information regarding affect 
and affect regulation flows through pathways marked with arrows.  
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The final simulation from section 5.4.2 is rerun with the new model structure. The 
expressive-feedback link is varied in intensity in increments of 0.05 with each 
simulation until the peak felt-affect in response to the affective event reaches the affect 
event’s intensity. This value is considered as the maximum strength of the expressive-
feedback appropriate at this point in the model. Figure 5.12 indicates that expressive-
feedback strength of 0.5 results in the peak amplitude of felt-affect intensity (and affect-
expression in coherence) reaching the value of affective event intensity. 
 
Figure 5.12 Felt-affect dynamics with expressive-feedback 
Felt affect goal is specified at 0.3 for the duration of each simulation. Both the duration 
of simulation and the period of affect event are arbitrary and measured in ticks. 
However, further results indicate that the current feedback strength has an adverse effect 
on the model’s operation. Because the introduced feed-forward process of affect 
coherency and the feed-back process together form a closed, positive feedback loop, 
felt-affect and affect-expression can show affect change where none is anticipated. For 
example, felt-affect in the isolated PFA block will gradually return to the home-base in 
absence of affective stimuli or affective regulation; however, with the PAE block 
attached, felt-affect returns to a different level. For the given example of 0.2 as the 
home-base for felt-affect, expressive-feedback of strength 0.5 ensures that felt-affect 
will return to a ‘created’ resting point of 0.4, a moderate difference in the model. So it 
remains to determine appropriate expressive-feedback strength, which can influence the 
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felt-affect state but not to such a degree that it requires continual and effortful 
regulation to prevent the runaway effects of a strong, positive feedback loop. 
Recall from section 2.2.2, Strack et al. (1988) demonstrate affect-expression’s influence 
upon felt-affect, through manipulation of expression; their results are used as a 
benchmark for determining appropriate expressive-feedback in the model. Because 
Strack et al. (1988) do not report distribution of results, only mean values can be 
replicated in the simulation. Model results are generated by applying a positive stimulus 
value to represent the positive valence cartoons used in their study. Facilitation or 
suppression of expression was achieved by further applying an expression enhancing or 
diminishing stimulus to the PAE block, increasing or decreasing the affect-expression 
state by 0.2 or -0.2 respectively. Results are shown in Table 5.2; positive valence in the 
model is rescaled and compared against mean scores of amusement from Strack et al. 
(1988, p. 772). Stimuli intensity and feedback strength were calibrated using the 
‘control’ condition from Strack et al. (1988, p. 772) to best match empirical data. Peak 
amplitude of the initial affective response for a simulation regulating towards a felt 
intensity of 0.3 was recorded as the affective intensities in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Comparison of empirical data and modelled response to positive stimuli 
during manipulation of expression 
 Mean affect intensity (0 – 9 Scale) 
 Inhibition Control Facilitation 
Strack et al. (1988) 4.32 4.77 5.14 
Simulation 4.49 4.77 4.82 
The model results indicate an approximation of the empirical data, showing both the 
correct direction of the effects but a slightly reduced size of effects. Results indicate that 
feedback strength of 0.2 (with no feedback being 0 and maximum possible feedback 
being 1) gave both an exact fit of the control condition and the closest approximation to 
the experimental conditions. Expressive-feedback strength of 0.2 shows comparatively 
little influence on the resting state of felt-affect and limits possibility of a runaway 
positive feedback loop and high felt-affect intensities at rest. 
The introduction of affect-expression allows for a further test on the influence of 
expressive-feedback to be run, repeating an earlier simulation. Keillor et al. (2002) 
report a case study of a female patient with bilateral Bell’s palsy and thus the inability 
for facial expression. Despite the lack of facial-feedback, patient F.P showed no 
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significant reduction in affective response to IAPS pictures. To examine this in a 
simulation, the IAPS design simulation seen in section 5.4.1 is run again, this time with 
a series of models that include the expressive-feedback loop. Further to this, a single 
model with the feedback loop removed, representing patient F.P, is run and results 
compared with the control models. At no point does the ‘lesion’ model respond with 
values outside the 95% confidence interval from the previous IAPS test and so matches 
the null result seen in Keillor et al. (2002). The results, while being from an extremely 
limited sample, suggest that expressive-feedback effects are small and the parameter 
value chosen for expressive-feedback is plausible. 
5.4.4 Affect-Expression Regulation 
There may be times when an individual chooses to display something other than what 
he or she feels, for example, when required to meet appropriate requirements of 
emotional display at work. This may be achieved through expression regulation, such as 
suppressing the outward signs of emotion or presenting a more intense affect state than 
that currently felt (e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
As indicated in section 5.4.2, the outcomes of regulation differ in the model depending 
on the value of the parameter for regulatory momentum. Lower values resulted in 
under-correction or substantially extended durations to reach the goal state for felt-
affect, while higher values resulted in over-correction and higher resource depletion. In 
this section, regulatory momentum for affect-expression is tested. 
The perceived affect-expression regulation circuit is largely similar to that of the 
perceived felt-affect regulation circuit (Figure 5.6). The affect-expression comparator, 
seen at the top right of Figure 5.13, detects discrepancy between the current perceived 
affect-expression state and a held expressed goal. If a discrepancy is detected, the 
comparator signals to the Affect-Expression Regulation (AER) block, to engage in 
regulation. Regulatory momentum, like that in the FAR block, refers to the degree of 
change that the model makes to the affect-expression state, given a detected 
discrepancy. 
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Figure 5.13 Complete circuit of affect-expression regulation added to existing model 
Model represented in the Simulink environment, building upon Figure 5.11. Additional 
blocks used contain previously developed formulas or models specified using Simulink 
modelling: The top right comparator contains Formula 2; Affect Expression Regulation 
contains Formula 3. Acronyms and abbreviations used in the figure are listed in 
Appendix 2. Information regarding affect and affect regulation flows through pathways 
marked with arrows.  
 
The general purpose of the affect-expression regulation loop in this model is to drive 
affect-expression away from the moving home-base of felt-affect and towards a held 
goal state. However, if the goal state for affect-expression matches with current felt-
affect, this might preclude affect-expression regulation away from the current felt-affect 
because no change is necessary. As with the results from parameter variation 
simulations in section 5.4.2, it is anticipated that a greater discrepancy between the goal 
state for affect-expression and current felt-affect state will result in more necessary 
regulation and a greater depletion of resource (to be further examined in section 5.4.5). 
Again, a single parameter determines regulation momentum and a value for this 
parameter may be determined which serves to balance the requirements for expedient 
regulation and limited resource depletion. As with the parameter for felt-affect 
regulation momentum, the maximum and minimum possible values are 0 and 1 
respectively, where a momentum of 0 would predict no change during regulation and 1 
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would predict the model constantly making large corrections. 100 different degrees of 
regulation momentum uniformly distributed on a logarithmic scale between 0.002 and 
0.5 are shown in Figure 5.14. To reduce the influence of felt-affect on the process of 
affect-expression regulation, for all simulations felt-affect regulation is maintained at a 
goal value of 0. The affect-expression goal is held at 0.4 for each of the simulations. 
Rate of affect-expression change (k3) is specified at 0.04. 
 
Figure 5.14 Relative response times to reach a held affect-expression goal through 
affect-expression regulation. 
Affect-expression goal is specified at 0.4 for the duration of each simulation. Time 
taken to reach the held goal is arbitrary and measured in ticks. 
The results indicate that for this goal state for affect-expression, higher regulation 
momentum results in faster regulation towards the held goal. This outcome resembles 
that of Figure 5.7, which is expected because of the similar design of the control loops. 
A model with lower regulation momentum may take up to four times as long as models 
with moderate to high regulation momentum to reach the held goal. However, models 
with higher regulation momentum over-correct far more and show more oscillation than 
models with lower regulation momentum. The shorter time to reach the held goal and 
greater degree of oscillation in Figure 5.14 compared to Figure 5.7 can be attributed to 
the faster rate of change of affect-expression in comparison to felt-affect (k3 is greater 
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than k). Relative rates of change were specified to reflect Diefendorff and Gosserand’s 
(2003) original model design.  
To further examine the influence of regulatory momentum parameter variation on 
affect-expression regulation, self-regulatory resource depletion is considered. Like the 
test run in section 5.4.2, resource depletion is recorded in simulations which vary both 
regulatory momentum and the goal state for affect-expression. However, there is a 
further consideration in this test; while felt-affect regulation simply looked at the 
intensity of the held goal, this test also examines the discrepancy between the felt-affect 
state (home-base for affect-expression) and the goal for affect-expression. The 
distinction made here can therefore be inclusive of expression regulation processes such 
as suppression of expression (e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007) and highlights that it may 
not just be affective intensity that influences resource depletion but rather a discrepancy 
between the two states. 
As with the resource depletion test from section 5.4.2, the total output from the model’s 
AER block is recorded. This recording is taken from the duration of all simulations, 
each lasting 1500 ticks: sufficient time to allow models with less regulatory momentum 
to reach all affect goal states. The felt-affect goal is specified as being maintained at an 
intensity of 0.5 for all simulations. Fifty different parameter values for regulatory 
momentum are tested, ranging in a logarithmic distribution from 0.002 to 0.5. For each 
of these parameter values, the affect-expression goal value is varied, ranging in a linear 
distribution from 0 (neutral affect) to 1 (maximum positive affect) for 21 values. In 
sum, 1050 simulations are run to examine the influence of both parameter variations 
and interaction between these variations. Results are shown in Figure 5.15, comparing 
the relative resource depletion. The influence of self-regulatory resource depletion on 
the capacity for affect regulation is not considered in this test. 
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Figure 5.15 Relative resource depletion as a function of regulatory momentum and 
affect-expression intensity 
Figure 5.15 indicates that affect-expression intensity itself does not linearly influence 
relative resource depletion. Rather, the relative discrepancy between felt-affect (in this 
instance, intensity of 0.5) and affect-expression influences relative resource depletion. 
As discrepancy between felt-affect and affect-expression increases, relative resource 
depletion increases; this occurs for both higher and lower affect-expression intensities. 
Results further point towards regulatory momentum and discrepancy having a 
compounded influence on relative resource depletion; as the degree of regulatory 
momentum increases, resource depletion for regulating to any expression goal state 
increases. 
The results from this section point to some agreement and some contrast with previous 
findings in the literature. For example, Mann and Cowburn (2005) indicate that the 
main predictor variable for reports of fatigue in emotional labour was expression 
regulation (25%) and that the second predictor was expression intensity (16%). While 
the first aspect of their findings is comfortably met by the model, the model does not 
show the same indication that affect intensity necessarily predicts fatigue. However, it 
is conceivable that the more common aspects of emotional labour are the emphasising 
of positive expressions beyond that which are currently felt (e.g., salespersons, airline 
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attendants, call-centre phone operators). In such examples, discrepancy increase 
between felt-affect and affect-expression could well coincide with expression intensity. 
The model also concurs with the Morris and Feldman (1996) proposition that 
attentiveness to expression is positively related to exhaustion; specifically, Figure 5.15 
indicates that an increase in regulatory momentum (analogous to their proposal) 
depletes more resource.  
5.4.5 Regulatory Resource 
In sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.4, affect regulation was examined in terms of self-regulatory 
resource depleted. In both the prior parameter tests, the resource (the energy supply in 
the system enabling regulation) was unlimited. In this section I examine the effects of a 
depletion of this self-regulatory resource on affect regulation processes. Regulation of 
both felt-affect and affect-expression is considered to deplete resource (e.g., Muraven et 
al., 1998). Further to this, I introduce a limited resource capacity based on an 
established model of fatigue (Åkerstedt et al., 2004) to simulate the hypothesised 
dynamic effects of affect regulation in response to variation in resource availability 
across a daily cycle.  
There are two interactions between resource and affect regulation to consider in 
designing and testing the model. Firstly, the requirements of resource by the regulation 
circuits must be considered. Resource depletion is known to limit individuals’ capacity 
for further self-regulation (e.g., Hagger et al., 2010). It is therefore necessary to 
determine what in the model constitutes depleted resource. Secondly, there is the 
associated cost of affect regulation (Gailliot et al., 2007). In this model, affect regulation 
is considered an effortful process, both in the regulation towards a held goal and 
maintenance of affect at that goal. The relative cost of perceived felt-affect and affect-
expression regulation therefore also needs to be examined. In the first test of this 
section, just the effects of resource depletion on regulatory processes are considered. To 
maintain simplicity in representation, the recurrent loop of regulation requiring presence 
of resource and regulation depleting resource is reduced to an open loop of resource 
depleting at a continuous rate. The complex, recurrent loop is considered in later tests in 
this section.  
While there is only limited research on differing degrees of depletion, some studies do 
extend the concept of individuals being either ‘depleted’ or ‘not-depleted’ to a graded, 
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continuous state (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2007; Muraven et al., 2002). This 
conceptualisation of resource capacity as a continuous state is used in the model. The 
actuator in both regulation circuits can be modified to include a percentage capacity 
based on resource. As resource varies from 0 to 1, the outputs of the actuators and so 
regulation toward goal states are varied as a function of this resource capacity. 
The relationship between resource capacity and success at regulating towards goals 
requires consideration. A linear transformation is the simplest relationship between 
available resource and affect regulation; this would imply a continual and gradual 
decrease in affect regulation with the depletion of resource. In contrast, an exponential 
decay would imply that affect regulation is most susceptible to change at higher 
resource levels; individuals would become quickly impaired at affect regulation as 
resource depletes but would show little difference in regulation between moderately low 
levels of resource and complete depletion. Finally, a logarithmic decay model would 
predict an initial resistance in regulation to changes in resource but then substantial 
impairment in affect regulation if resource dropped sufficiently. 
Results in the self-control literature suggest that significant drop in self-regulatory 
capacity can be induced through often brief requirements of self-regulation (e.g., 
Gailliot et al., 2007; Muraven et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 2002). This indicates that a 
logarithmic decay from available resource to self-regulatory capacity is not suitable and 
suggests that self-regulatory capacity may fall at least at a linear rate. The specific 
weighting on the actuators may only broadly be determined through estimation of 
parameter values. Estimates may be made to ensure that capacity for affect regulation is 
substantially limited during periods of low resource. The use of the 0 to 1 scale of 
available resource as a direct moderator of self-regulatory capacity currently achieves 
this purpose, although this range is considered to be subject to individual differences 
and may be appropriately changed to enable fitting of the model to collected data. For 
further consideration in this chapter, a linear model is used, although this may be 
revised in light of fitting collected data; use of an exponential model influences the 
onset and speed of changes seen in the following test but not the overall pattern of 
results.  
Resource Depletion 
Maintenance of affect states at goal values requires regulation and in sections 5.4.2 and 
5.4.4, it was indicated that a greater distance between the home-bases (of either the set-
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point for felt-affect or the felt-affect state for affect-expression) and the goal value was 
associated with greater regulatory effort. It is anticipated that easier regulation tasks 
show a greater immunity to depletion effects and so affect regulation will appear to 
persist for longer. This is expected to occur for both felt-affect regulation and affect-
expression regulation. The items of interest in this test are the relative timings that felt-
affect and affect-expression show for depletion effects to become apparent. In adjusting 
the relative difficulty of the two tasks, felt-affect regulation and affect-expression 
regulation, it follows that the relative apparent persistence will also vary.  
For this test, the capacity to engage in both felt-affect regulation and affect-expression 
regulation is depleted at a continuous fixed rate, determined by factors external to the 
model’s typical operation. At a point during simulation at which both felt-affect and 
affect-expression are stable, a signal is sent to the model that restricts the capacity for 
further regulation. This signal lasts 1000 ticks and reduces self-regulatory capacity for 
affect regulation from maximum (1) to minimum (0) at a continuous rate over the 
duration of the signal. For the first part, the felt-affect goal is varied across 11 
intensities, ranging from 0 to 1, with a home-base of 0 for each simulation. For the 
second part, the affect-expression goal is varied across 11 intensities, forming a 
discrepancy between felt-affect and affect-expression ranging from 0 to 1 also.  
To compare the relative persistence at regulating towards the varying held goals, results 
output from the simulations are adjusted to reflect affect change, rather than actual 
affect intensity. This is achieved by simply subtracting the goal value from each 
simulation’s affect results; this forms a baseline that affect deviates from during periods 
of depletion. Results are presented in Figure 5.16. The time ‘0’ on the x axis refers to 
the starting point of depletion, which continues until available resource reaches 0 at 
1000 ticks. The left graph shows change to felt-affect and the right shows change to 
affect-expression. Given affect-expression’s higher value for parameter k3 over felt-
affect’s value for parameter k, results for affect-expression show a faster change, 
although the overall pattern of results is unchanged. 
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Figure 5.16 A) Relative persistence for felt-affect regulation B) Relative persistence for 
affect-expression regulation 
Relative durations for maintaining affect at respective goal affect intensities and the 
subsequent dynamics of affect as depletion increases. Depletion limits capacity to 
regulate towards affect goals prompting further deviation away from greater intensity 
affect goals. Time in these simulations is arbitrary and measured in ticks. 
 
The results indicate that, as anticipated, persistence at maintenance of affect at the held 
goal state is longer for goals deemed less effortful than goals deemed more effortful. A 
goal state that matches the respective home-bases shows no depletion under these 
conditions because no regulation is required to maintain affect. The mechanism for this 
relative difference in persistence arises from the distance between the goal and home-
base and so the output from the affect regulation blocks. More effortful goals require 
substantially more regulation and so even slight depletion impairs capacity to reach 
effortful affect goals. In contrast, less effortful affect goals are to a greater degree 
immune from depletion because even small amounts of resource are sufficient to 
maintain sufficient regulation. The affective states do not follow a linear decline with 
self-regulatory resource depletion because of the gradual decline in a leaky integrator 
actuator output and affect’s gradual return to the home-base. Use of a standard 
integrator, as discussed in section 4.2.4, does not show appropriate decline in regulation 
with depletion, further supporting use of the current model design. 
Results from this test point towards a potential for developing propositions and 
predictions regarding affect regulation strategies. In the model, felt-affect regulation and 
affect-expression regulation are concurrent processes, which can direct their respective 
affective states towards independent affect goals. It has been determined that as the 
effort required to reach a goal state decreases, persistence in regulating at this goal state 
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increases. The selection of regulation strategies in the model (i.e., the use of felt-affect 
regulation over affect-expression regulation, or vice-versa) is ultimately dependent on 
the relative effort required to regulate towards goals and current self-regulatory 
capacity. 
Strategy switching behaviour can be seen in the model if goal states for felt-affect and 
affect-expression are congruent and a moderate to large distance from the felt-affect 
home-base. In a ‘real life’ analogy, this state of positive affect-expression and this 
positive felt state could be affect goals that an individual working at a customer service 
post would be expected to hold (e.g., Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Hochschild, 
1983). Initially, in simulation of this scenario, the model shows particular use of felt-
affect regulation and minimal expression regulation (as there is no need to deviate away 
from authentic expressions). However, as depletion increases, the felt-affective state 
begins to shift away from the goal state. This begins to create a discrepancy between 
affect-expression and the expression goal state and so affect-expression regulation is 
increased, being - at least temporarily - a low effort task, somewhat immune to resource 
depletion. Once the model becomes sufficiently fatigued, goals can no longer be 
regulated towards (this is further considered in section 5.4.6). The key aspect of this 
chain of events is the switch from the model initially being felt-affect regulation-
focused to affect-expression regulation-focused. This has implications for the emotional 
labour literature because often correlations are reported between surface acting (affect-
expression regulation in the model) and feelings associated with depletion (e.g., 
Grandey, 2003; Martínez-Iñigo et al., 2007). However, the general assumption made in 
such studies that surface acting is a causal factor in depletion overshadows the 
potentially confounding factor highlighted by this simulation: while expression 
regulation may lead to depletion, depletion may promote use of expression regulation.  
Circadian Cycles and Sleep  
The three process model of alertness (Åkerstedt & Folkard, 1995; Åkerstedt et al., 
2004) has been selected as a representation of resource in the model. It captures the 
influence of the interactions of the circadian cycle and time spent awake on one’s 
alertness, which is used as a proxy for resource capacity in this model. The circadian 
function is represented by the sum of two sinusoidal waves: the first wave follows a 
regular circadian pattern of maximum alertness in the late afternoon and a minimum 
approximately 12 hours later in the early morning; the second, ultradian wave has a 12- 
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hour cycle and is included to model the early afternoon slump in alertness. The time 
spent awake function is represented by an exponential decay, which is reversed during 
sleep, representing the restorative effects of sleep on alertness. Prolonged periods of 
wakefulness lead to a diminished level of alertness that follows the circadian rhythm. 
Parameter values are drawn unmodified from the original paper (Åkerstedt et al., 2004). 
The three process model bounds the available resource through two limiting factors. 
Firstly, resource is only restored by sleep and once levels of alertness reach a limiting 
threshold, the sleep function is switched off. As such, the model will always awaken 
when fully rested and extended sleep cannot lead to an excessive store of resource. 
Secondly, the time spent awake function is modelled as an exponential decay: this 
function’s contribution to alertness cannot fall below the asymptotic value it tends 
towards. The decay and restoration of resource functions limit the range of available 
resource to values between 0 and 1. This offers a representation of percentage capacity 
to engage in affect regulation in the same means as the graded decline from the prior 
test (as shown in Figure 5.16). Figure 5.17 shows the current model with regulation 
circuits adapted to include the three process model (Åkerstedt et al., 2004). 
 
Figure 5.17 Complete regulation of affect circuit with a central resource controlling 
regulation activity 
Model represented in the Simulink environment, building upon Figure 5.13. Additional 
block used contain previously developed formulas or models specified using Simulink 
modelling: Resource block contains the Åkerstedt et al (2004) 3-process model, 
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specified in Appendix 1. Felt-Affect Regulation block and Affect-Expression 
Regulation block contain Formula 5.  Acronyms and abbreviations used in the figure are 
listed in Appendix 2. Information regarding affect and affect regulation flows through 
pathways marked with arrows.  
Representing the capacity to regulate affect as, in part, a function of circadian cycles 
offers a means of further integrating regular known fluctuations in affect with 
hypothesised variations in self-regulatory capacity. Studies repeatedly indicate felt-
affect has underlying circadian cycles, particularly if examined as positive mood, (e.g., 
Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), typically showing elevation throughout the 
morning, and then decline in the evening (e.g., Clark, Watson, & Leeka, 1989; Watson 
& Clark, 1994). Such cycles can be represented in the model, if a felt-affect goal is held 
as being more positive than the felt-affect home-base and self-regulatory resource is 
represented by the Åkerstedt et al. (2004) model.  
Previous tests in this chapter have represented time in arbitrary units (ticks) and have 
been sure to check that variations in parameters reflecting rate of affect change do not 
influence the overall trends in results. Parameter specification in the resource model, 
derived from the Åkerstedt et al. (2004) model, offers one time point passing in the 
model as a representation of one minute passing. A value of 0.02 for the parameter k is 
chosen, which allows for both the representation of circadian change in affect and rapid 
affective response to stimuli. In this section, felt-affect’s change as a function of the 
dynamic capacity for self-regulation is explored using a simulated sleep deprivation 
study. 
Franzen et al. (2008) report a significant decline in positive affect in individuals 
experiencing a single night’s sleep-deprivation in comparison to non sleep-deprived 
individuals. To model this result, experimental protocol of Franzen et al. (2008) was 
replicated where possible in simulation. Reflecting participant group sizes, 15 models 
were used as the control sample and 14 were subject to a simulated night’s sleep 
deprivation. Simulations lasted a total of two virtual days: for the first, all models had a 
sleeping period from 23:30 pm for eight hours; for the second, control models had the 
same sleeping period, while sleep deprivation models remained awake throughout the 
night. Individual differences were represented in models by varying parameters H, k2, 
Da, and Sa, and by introducing noise to the perceived felt-affect state (Variations 
reported in Appendix 3). Scores for felt-affect were recorded from all models by 
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averaging current felt-affect across eight hours in day two, starting at 4 pm; these were 
rescaled to match the scale used by Franzen et al. (2008); results are presented in Table 
5.3. The simulations show the same overall trend of a less positive affect state in the 
sleep-deprivation condition when compared to the non sleep-deprivation condition; 
simulation means and standard deviation approximate those of empirical data. 
Table 5.3 Comparison of empirical and model data for influence of sleep deprivation on 
felt-affect 
 Mean positive affect (10 – 50 Scale) 
 Non-SD group (n =15) SD Group (n = 14) 
Franzen et al. (2008) 25.6 ± 6.0 20.2 ± 7.2 
Simulation 29.3 ± 3.9 20.9 ± 4.6 
The prior simulation makes an assumption that affect-expression regulation is more 
depleting than felt-affect regulation. While specific rates of depletion through different 
affect regulation processes are not yet examined in the literature, affect-expression 
regulation is considered to be more depleting than felt-affect regulation (e.g., Richards 
& Gross, 1999, 2000). This is also seen in the emotional labour literature (e.g., Grandey, 
2003, Goldberg & Grandey, 2007; Martínez-Iñigo et al., 2007). The exploration of this 
general trend in results by the model could offer further insights into the depleting 
nature of affect regulation. Replication of this trend by the model could offer further 
indication of the model’s capacity to represent affect dynamics; collected data in the 
following chapter regarding the dynamics of affect regulation and resource depletion 
offer means to further test the model. 
5.4.6 Goal Adjustment 
When regulation towards a goal becomes too difficult, a change to the goal value may 
be appropriate (Powers, 1974). Higher levels of self-regulation in control theory are 
argued to be more stable than that of lower levels and more likely to change slowly 
(Carver & Scheier, 2001; Lord & Hanges, 1987; Power, 1974). In addition to this, 
Carver and Scheier (2001) argue that goal adjustment will occur once it becomes 
apparent that the current regulation of behaviour is insufficient to reach the held goal (or 
if it continually exceeds the held goal but for simplicity I will only focus on the former 
here). 
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Meta loops for both felt-affect and affect-expression goals are the final circuits to be 
added to the model. As little is known about the dynamics of affective goal adjustment, 
little differentiation can be made between either circuit so parameter values are 
considered equal in both. The meta loop compares the current affect goals against their 
respective current affect states. If there is a discrepancy and if it is apparent that 
regulation of the affect state is insufficient to reach the goal, the goal is adjusted towards 
the state. The structure of the complete model is shown in Figure 5.18. 
 
Figure 5.18 The complete model in Simulink 
Model represented in the Simulink environment, building upon Figure 5.17. Additional 
blocks used contain previously developed formulas or models specified using Simulink 
modelling: Perceived Felt Goal and Perceived Expression Goal blocks contain Figure 
4.8; Felt-Goal Regulation and Expression-Goal Regulation contain Formula 6. 
Acronyms and abbreviations used in the figure are listed in Appendix 2. Information 
regarding affect and affect regulation flows through pathways marked with arrows. 
The felt-affect goal circuit and affect-expression goal circuit are structurally identical. 
The actuators in each are copied from the lower circuits and the regulatory momentum 
parameter is kept as a consistent value in all actuators. Fixed constants that were the 
goal states used previously have now been modified to act as a fixed point about which 
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the movable goals vary. These may be considered as outputs from a third tier of control 
that changes at such a slow rate it is considered a constant for the duration of 
simulations. The Perceived Felt Goal (PFG) and Perceived Expression Goal (PEG) 
blocks each contain a leaky integrator, which uses the permanent goals as home-bases 
but output values are modified by regulation circuits. The first goal adjustment 
parameter, k4 the rate of goal adjustment, is found in both blocks. It is necessary to 
specify k4 as this value determines the relative rates of change for affect states and 
affect goals. A smaller value for k4 in comparison to the value of k is suggested by the 
literature (e.g., Powers, 1974). To the author’s knowledge there is no current study 
exploring such a prediction; data collection and subsequent model fitting to examine 
this prediction, is described in Chapter 6. 
In section 5.4.5, a linear decline in the self-regulatory capacity is proposed as a means 
of representing the influence of depletion of resource on the regulation towards held 
goals. As resource depletes, it is anticipated that the goal states will begin to shift 
towards the current affective states. To achieve this, it is necessary for the capacity to 
change held affective goals to increase with an increase in depletion, adjusting goals 
away from their depleting intensities to more achievable levels. 
It does not appear that dynamics of affect goal adjustment have been examined before in 
the affect regulation literature. Therefore, there is no known data to fit the rate of goal 
adjustment to. A starting estimation is made of the rate of goal adjustment to be one 
fifth of that of perceived felt-affect change. This rate allows for a steady but slow 
approach from the held goal towards current affect states, alongside a partial return 
towards the home-base for affect goals during rest. This value will be modified to fit the 
dynamics of goal adjustment in collected data. 
5.5 Summary 
Chapter 5 highlights key parameters in the model and their influence on affect dynamics 
through testing against known results and identified trends. In areas where this has not 
been possible due to limited empirical research, propositions and predictions have been 
offered based on the influence of parameters on the dynamics of the model. A 
comprehensive review of all parameter values against every other is not possible given 
the size of the model and the small scope of investigation. A structured scaffold of tests 
on small stand-alone affect regulation circuits has been presented, to reduce the number 
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of tests to that which is both manageable and still covers all aspects of the model’s 
representations of affect.  
The testing process has identified key parameters and constants within the model and, to 
some degree, specified plausible or necessary values for the operation of the model and 
representation of affective dynamics. Constants that are not further examined in the 
thesis are: k, the rate of felt-affect change; k3, the rate of affect-expression change; H, 
the home-base for felt-affect; and F, the strength of expressive-feedback. Parameter 
values that are further investigated, in comparisons of the model with collected diary 
data consist of: k2, regulatory momentum; k4, rate of affect goal adjustment; da, 
resource depletion due to felt-affect regulation; sa, resource depletion due to expression 
regulation; felt_goal, home-base for felt-affect goals; exp_goal, home-base for affect-
expression goals.  
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PART 2 
Chapter 6: Validation Against Diary Data 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 examined model dynamics in terms of known data from existing affect 
studies and from established theories of affect dynamics. Ranges of parameter values 
were examined for individual sections of the model and their influence on the course of 
affect, affect goals, and self-regulatory capacity were considered. In the course of 
testing the model, indications of suitable parameter values for modelling aspects of 
affect dynamics were derived. However, it so remains in the thesis to further test the 
model because some model sections, and predictions arising from these, do not 
currently have sufficient empirical data for making comparisons with. For example, 
discrepancy reduction in control theory indicates that higher tiers of control should be 
typically slower to change than lower tiers (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; Lord & 
Hanges, 1987; Powers, 1974); however, measurements specifically regarding the 
relative dynamics of affect and affect goals still remain to be gathered. Collecting such 
data allows for such aspects of the model to be tested and the validity of the model 
further assessed.  
This chapter reports on the collection of new empirical data used to validate the model 
and the subsequent process of validation. This process of validating the model against 
collected data further allows for strengths and limitations of the model to become 
apparent, parameters to be refined, or even restructuring of the model. This chapter is 
divided into three main sections: the first overviews the collection of new data, the 
second describes the process of parameter variation to fit the model to the data, the third 
reports a comparison of the model’s representation of felt-affect dynamics with human 
estimates of the same. 
6.2 Diary Data 
This thesis has detailed the development and construction of a computational model of 
affect and affect regulation dynamics. The model simulates dynamics across multiple 
days for felt-affect, affect-expression, felt-affect goals, affect-expression goals, and self-
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regulation capacity. As a result, it is necessary for the further testing of the model to 
collect appropriate data that reflects changes in each across such a period of time. Diary 
studies are considered an effective means of capturing the change in affect over 
extended periods of time (e.g., Bolger & Rafaeli, 2003; Fisher, 2000; Fuller et al., 2003) 
and could be a useful means of collecting data on related concepts, such as affect goal 
adjustment. 
Diary studies provide a strong suitable means of collecting many instances of the same 
few measures across multiple time points (e.g., Fuller et al., 2003), tracking responses 
over time. Many data points can therefore be produced even with small numbers of 
participants and analysis power comes from the number of diary entries made, rather 
than sample size. This data collection approach is ideal for generating data sets for 
testing the model, particularly as the aim for the model is to represent trends in affect 
within individuals, rather than between groups. Diary studies are particularly useful for 
exploring states where fluctuations across days or within the day are likely, such as 
affect (Fisher, 2000), again proving ideal for testing the current model, which can 
generate hundreds of data points across each simulated day. 
Participants 
A total of fourteen staff and students from the University of Sheffield volunteered to 
participate in this study. Individuals had applied to participate in an affect study on 
mood and music, unrelated to this thesis, after the cut-off for applications had closed 
and were asked to apply to participate in this study instead. Of the fourteen prospective 
participants, six were available during the course of recording in April 2010 and were 
not excluded during the screening procedure described below; a further participant 
withdrew participation during the study. Due to the sampling strategy and the intensive 
nature of the data collection, the sample size is small but suitable for the purpose. Five 
participants completed the study (three were female; mean age ± S.D.: 25.8 ±7.2 years); 
four were post-graduate students and one was a member of research staff. All 
participants had applied to the mood and music study with the understanding that they 
would receive £20 for participation; participants were paid in full on the return of the 
diary booklets at the completion of the study.  
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Procedure 
Prior to the study, each individual who had expressed interest in participating was given 
a pre-screening questionnaire. Informed consent of participation was obtained from 
those who met the screening criteria and were available for the duration of the study. 
Participants’ attention was particularly brought to the right to withdraw participation at 
any time and the anonymity of data, given the intensive nature of recording data that 
could be considered personal. 
Participants were each given three pen-and-paper diary booklets at the start of the study 
that contained instructions when and how to complete diary entries. Each booklet 
contained enough pages for data entry to last two days and participants were instructed 
that once a booklet was completed to continue on to the next, giving six continuous 
days of recording. Participants started the study the morning after receiving the 
booklets. The first diary booklet asked for recordings to be made at 3-hourly intervals 
from 9AM to 12 midnight; recordings were not taken if the participant remained awake 
between 12 midnight and 9AM the next day. The second diary booklet asked for 
recordings to be made at 1-hourly intervals, again from 9AM to 12 midnight and again 
not requiring entries after 12 midnight. The third booklet followed the first’s procedure. 
The diary recording schedule was more intensive in booklet two in comparison to 
booklets one and three because the recording period for booklet two coincided with a 
week-end, so it was anticipated that participants would have more available time to 
complete entries. An additional recording was made on waking each day, also 
requesting the participant to estimate the duration of sleep. If participants missed any 
entries, they were instructed to not retroactively complete entries but to continue with 
the diary as normal.  
Measures 
Examples of the pre-screening survey and the affect diary are found in Appendix 4. 
Pre-Study Screening Survey 
The pre-study screening survey consisted of two parts. The first part comprised two 
questions to determine participants’ suitability for the study. Participants were asked if 
they experience an erratic sleep pattern (such as that due to shift work) and if they 
experience or have experienced a diagnosed mood disorder. If a participant answered 
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yes to either question they were not included in the main diary study because the present 
focus for the model is the representation of typical affect dynamics. The second part 
comprised of a sample page of the diary to familiarise participants with the study and 
procedures for completing each entry. 
Diaries 
Felt-affect was recorded on the two dimensions of valence and arousal, put forwards as 
the standard means of representing core affect (Remington, Fabrigar, & Visser, 2000; 
Russell, 1989; 2003). In the paper diaries used, this comprised of a two-item scale of 
bipolar, 11-point measures of Gloomy to Happy and Sluggish to Energetic. A bipolar 
representation of such affective states has previously been indicated as a suitable means 
for representing affect (Eaton & Funder, 2001; Russell & Carroll, 1999) because it 
enables representation of both experience of affect and feeling neutral, without 
ambiguity in responses. Bipolar scales for felt-affect ranged from -5 (indicating feeling 
a negative state to a great extent) to +5 (indicating feeling a positive state to a great 
extent) with 0 representing feeling neutral. This two-item scale is repeated in this same 
form in each diary entry for reporting both felt-affect goals and affect-expression goals.  
In addition, the valence and arousal of affect events were recorded (using the same scale 
as above); the events’ times of onset and durations were also recorded. Individuals’ own 
affect-expressions were recorded using the same scale for valence and arousal; times of 
onset and durations of affect-expressions were also recorded. 
The final scale used in regular diary entries concerns one’s perceived self-regulatory 
fatigue. It was adapted from Clarkson et al.’s (2010) single item measure of self-
regulatory exhaustion to examine perceptions of how emotionally exhausted individuals 
feel. This is a unipolar measure with a range from 0, not drained at all, to 10, feeling 
drained a great extent.  
For the scales measuring felt-affect, felt-affect goals, affect-expression goals, and self-
regulatory exhaustion, participants were instructed to record their present states in each 
entry (e.g., How alert do you feel at this time?). For recordings of affect events and 
individuals’ own expressions, participants were instructed to recall occurrences since 
the last diary entry was scheduled. 
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At the start of each day, participants were also asked to record their time of waking, 
approximate time of sleeping and an estimation of minutes of sleep lost in the night. 
Analysis 
On average, participants completed a total of 41 entries of the maximum 56 regular 
entries. The most common reason for not completing an entry in the diary was that the 
scheduled entry fell outside of the participants’ waking hours. All of the six diary 
entries scheduled to be completed on waking were completed by each participant. 153 
of the regular diary entries (74%) included one recorded affective event, 24 (12%) 
included the recording of two events and there were just five instances (2%) of three or 
more affective events recorded. There were substantially fewer recordings of 
individuals’ own affect-expressions: just 58 of the regular diary entries (28%) included 
any recorded affect-expression. Because of the limited entries across the diaries, affect-
expression is not considered in subsequent sections of this chapter but will be addressed 
in the next diary study in Chapter 7.  
Circadian Analysis 
Circadian analysis in this study is used to determine the presence of underlying cyclical 
patterns in resource. Self-regulatory capacity has often been associated with a subjective 
feeling of alertness and periods of subjective fatigue are considered to coincide with 
periods of regulatory fatigue (e.g., Hagger, 2010; Hagger et al., 2010). It is proposed in 
this thesis that, given the association of self-regulatory capacity’s with both subjective 
fatigue and physical energy available to the brain (e.g., Gailliot, 2008; Gailliot et al., 
2007), self-regulatory capacity may show similar dynamics to those seen in fatigue. 
Indication of a circadian cycle of self-regulatory capacity would further justify the use 
of a circadian based model (Åkerstedt et al., 2004) to represent self-regulatory capacity 
as a component of the wider model of affect regulation dynamics. In this study, the 
measure of feeling emotionally drained was used as an indicator for the self-regulatory 
capacity of affect regulation. This is based on the assumption that a perceived sense of 
regulatory fatigue is a limiting factor in self-regulatory capacity (e.g., Clarkson et al., 
2010).  
To examine for the presence of a circadian cycle of self-regulatory capacity, each of the 
six day time-series for feelings of being emotionally drained are subject to a ‘Binfit’ 
analysis. Binfit is bespoke software that examines time-series data for cyclical patterns; 
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the time-series data as a whole is first divided into sections each the duration of the 
cycle examined (e.g., a 24-hour cycle divides the time-series data into sections lasting 
24 hours). Within each section, the time-series data is further sub-divided into equally 
spaced time ‘bins’, which recur with every cycle the time-series lasts; all data points 
within that time bin are clustered together. Bins are grouped by their label (e.g., the data 
points in the first bin in every daily cycle are collated) and differences in data points 
between bins examined. 
In this study, the circadian cycle for self-regulatory capacity is considered; Binfits are 
generated for feelings of being emotionally drained for cycles between 22 hours and 26 
hours in 0.2 hour intervals, offering a range that can be considered approximately daily 
cycles. Within these cycles, reported feelings of being emotionally drained are fit into 8 
equally spaced bins, given the intervals between diary recordings. The width of time 
bins therefore varies from 2.75 hours in the binfit for a 22 hour cycle to 3.25 hours in 
the binfit for a 26 hour cycle. Analysis of the collated data is performed using one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA with independent variable being bin label and dependent 
variable reported feelings of being emotionally drained. Table 6.1 reports the circadian 
period for each of the diaries that is associated with highest variance explained by the 
fitted cycle for feelings of being emotionally drained. 
Table 6.1 Periods for each diary recordings of feelings of being emotionally drained 
Diary No. Period (hrs) F Df Variance % p 
1 23.2 2.76 (7, 35) 35.56 0.02 
2 24.4 3.31 (6, 42) 32.07 0.0095 
3 23.0 3.03 (6, 50) 26.36 0.013 
4 23.4 4.61 (6, 38) 42.13 0.0016 
5 25.4 2.49 (6, 33) 39.38 0.0075 
These above results are used to inform the circadian component of the resource capacity 
block in each model simulation. With each diary, the period for the circadian 
component is specified according to the results above (see Section 6.3, sub-section 
Simulation Procedure). This parameter value is kept constant across all testing of the 
models, while fitting the variable parameters (Table 6.2) to the diary data. This 
circadian component alongside the sleeping and waking schedule for each individual 
forms the primary basis of the dynamics of the Åkerstedt et al. (2004) model of fatigue, 
which is used in this thesis as representation of self-regulatory capacity. 
143 
 
6.3 Validation of the Model 
The model’s capacity to represent the dynamics of affect, affect goals and self-
regulatory capacity is considered through the adjusting of parameters in the model and 
subsequent comparison of variables with the diary data. Chapter 5 overviews the 
strengths and limitations of fitting model parameters to available data; model results 
successfully reflecting collected data offers an initial step in testing its validity and 
diagnostics for further model development (Humphreys & Gurney, 2007; Rodgers and 
Rowe, 2002).  
Validation Design 
In the study described in section 6.2, five diaries of affect data were collected. To 
compare simulation results against diary data, five separate MARDy models are 
constructed to reflect each individual’s experiences during the study. The differentiation 
between the models to reflect each individual’s experience and parameter variation for 
fitting the models to the collected data is specified in the section Validation Procedure, 
below. These specifications are used to estimate the dynamics of felt-affect, felt-affect 
goals, self-regulatory capacity, and affect-expression goals. Validation against collected 
diary data is divided into three separate approaches. These may briefly be described as 
validating individual specificity, temporal specificity and relational representation.  
a. Individual specificity: A simulation of an individual’s data set can be tested by 
correlating the collected data and model results, with higher correlations 
indicating better matches. However, a high quality fit would not just be 
dependent on representing the individual’s data set. The model’s results should 
show a higher correlation with the intended individual’s data than with any other 
individual’s data. Also, diary data should have a higher correlation with the 
intended model than with any other model.  
b. Temporal specificity: Simulation of affect dynamics can be further assessed by 
examining dynamics within each data set. The model’s simulation of a specified 
section of an individual’s data would be expected to better correlate with that 
section over any other chosen section. Because affect data across time exhibits a 
serial dependency, it would be expected that as the temporal distance between 
the modelled data section and any other section of the diary data increases, the 
correlation strength decreases.  
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c. Relational Representation: Correlations are anticipated to exist in each 
individual’s diary data between conceptually related measures, such as felt-
affect and felt-affect goals. The direction and degree of these correlations should 
be reflected in the modelled results.  
In using parameter variation to fit model data to collected data there is the potential for 
over-fitting, particularly if the number of data points to be fit is low (e.g., Farrel & 
Lewandowsky, 2010b). Over-fitting is characterised by a strong representation of data 
that the model has been trained on but limited capacity to represent novel data, due to 
the model representing idiosyncrasies in the original data set. As a result, individual 
specificity is conducted ahead of temporal specificity because the individual specificity 
approach examines each individual’s diary data measures as a whole, rather than 
examining sections of the data. To examine potential of over-fitting the diaries in the 
individual specificity approach, the model is compared to a further diary set it has not 
been trained on; this is reported in Chapter 7. 
Validation Procedure 
This section reports the means used to obtain the closest representation of the diary data 
through parameter variation in the models. Each diary is paired with a unique MARDy 
model, which reflects differences between the diaries and so varies from each of the 
other models in four key ways; this is covered in the subsection Simulation Procedure 
below, but can be summarised as differences in sleeping schedules, self-regulatory 
capacity cycles, occurrence of affect events, and starting affect. The results from the 
five unique models for any given combination of tested parameters are termed 
simulation results; these simulation results are validated against the diary data. The 
closest representation of diaries by the simulation results is reported in section 6.3.1 and 
further explored in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. 
Parameter Variation 
The capacity for MARDy to represent diary data is determined through the process of 
parameter variation. In Chapter 5 the influence of various parameters on affect 
dynamics in the model was explored and, in some cases, suitable parameter ranges 
considered. Six of these parameters are further considered in this chapter and are listed, 
along with the ranges considered for investigation, in Table 6.2. Where possible, 
parameter ranges have been taken from the ranges used in Chapter 5 and are now re-
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examined in light of varying configurations of other parameters.  Four parameters in the 
model have been specified as constants in this chapter to limit the already broad testing 
approach. These constants are: rate of felt-affect change (k = 0.02), rate of affect-
expression change (k3 = 0.08), the home-base for felt-affect (H = 0.2), and expressive-
feedback strength (F = 0.2). Home-base is specified at a mildly positive state to 
generally maintain a slightly positive affect state as argued in theories of affect (e.g., 
Biswas-Diener et al., 2004), and expressive-feedback strength, specified in Chapter 5 to 
ensure the loop between felt-affect and affect-expression is sufficiently weak. 
Importantly, the parameter ranges covered include values which can contradict 
established theories of affect regulation. Expression regulation is considered to be more 
costly than felt-affect regulation (e.g., Holman, Martínez-Iñigo, & Totterdell, 2008; 
Hülsheger & Schewe, 2011; Richards & Gross, 1999); if the closest matching 
simulation requires affect-expression regulation to be less depleting than felt-affect 
regulation, it indicates the model or current theories need revision. In addition to this, 
the felt-affect goal home-base can be specified at its lowest value to match the felt-
affect home-base; if this is the case for the closest matching simulation, it would 
indicate that the model needs revision, given the differences seen in the diary data 
between typical goals and felt-affect. 
Six parameters are tested in this chapter, each across five different values. To better 
understand the influence of each of the parameters and the interactions with other 
parameters on affect dynamics, it is necessary to run a large number of simulations. To 
test all combinations of parameters, 15,265 (56) unique simulations are run. The 
variation of multiple parameters is a factorial problem, in which just doubling the 
number of values tested from five each to ten results in 1,000,000 (106) simulations. 
Table 6.2 Parameter variation for data fitting of multiple diaries 
Parameter Name Parameter Symbol Range of Values 
Felt-Affect Goal Home Felt_Goal 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1 
Affect-Expression Goal Home Exp_Goal 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1 
Felt-Affect Regulation Cost Da 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Affect-expression Regulation Cost Sa 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
Regulatory Momentum k2 0.0025 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Rate of Goal Adjustment  k4 0.0025 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.05 
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Simulation Procedure 
Within the simulations, each of the diaries is represented by a unique MARDy model, 
which differs from all other models in simulations by four means; the first two directly 
influence the modelled felt-affect state and the last two influence self-regulatory 
capacity. First, all the recorded affect events across the diaries are represented in their 
respective models as stimuli to the felt-affect block. The time of occurrence, duration, 
and affect intensity of affect events recorded in the diaries are modelled as transient 
disturbances, directly influencing the modelled felt-affect states. Second, all models are 
specified so that the initial felt-affect state reflects that recorded on waking in the first 
diary entries. 
Third, recorded waking times, sleeping times and any sleep interruptions are 
represented in the models. Individuals’ sleeping and waking times are used to instruct 
the central block determining self-regulatory capacity. Periods in which the models are 
considered ‘awake’ result in depletion of resource and ‘sleeping’ periods restore self-
regulatory capacity to the models. Fourth, the proposed circadian components to self-
regulatory capacity overviewed in Table 6.1 are specified in each of the models and 
phase adjusted to represent the cycles seen in current diaries. The three process model 
(Åkerstedt et al., 2004) experiences asynchrony between the 24-hour clock and the 
circadian cycle, if the circadian period is specified to anything other than 24 hours. As a 
result, the peaks and troughs in modelled alertness (or, as this thesis argues, self-
regulatory capacity) become either progressively advanced or delayed, depending on 
whether the circadian period falls shorter or longer than 24 hours, throughout the course 
of a single simulation. To correct for this, the phase is adjusted by moving the starting 
point in the modelled circadian cycle either forwards or backwards until it best 
represents the perceptions of self-regulatory exhaustion. 
The four specifications to distinguish the models from each other and reflect 
experiences reported in the diaries are kept constant across all simulations so that the 
effects of the individual’s daily life on affect, goals and self-regulatory capacity can be 
seen. In selecting a single set of parameters to best represent the diaries as a whole, the 
differences between models outlined in this section give each model its unique affect 
dynamics. To further explore individual differences between diaries, individual 
parameter profiles could be examined and models further tailored to represent 
individuals, although this is currently considered to be a future direction for the model. 
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Data Recording Procedure 
In Chapter 5, a theory of testing the model against known data is presented. Variables 
and parameters in the model can be estimated based on the results given by participants 
and the model results (such as its representation of felt-affect) can be compared against 
those recorded in the diary data. In effect, the model’s outcomes can be regarded as 
another data set equivalent to that of the diary data. However, some steps are necessary 
to ensure that appropriate comparisons are made: firstly, the model results are sampled 
at time-points equivalent to times diary entries were recorded; secondly, model results 
are rescaled to reflect the scales used in recording diary entries. 
Unless otherwise specified, all simulations in this thesis have a fixed temporal 
resolution of one minute, meaning that every tick or cycle of the model represents the 
passing of a minute in time. The model makes a continuous and graded change across 
time at a resolution far beyond which is recorded in the majority of the diary data. In 
some cases in the diaries, affect event duration, time of waking and estimates of sleep 
duration each have been recorded at a comparable scale of minutes but the majority of 
entries in the diary data are at temporal resolutions no finer than an hourly basis. In their 
raw forms, model results and diary data cannot be suitably be compared. Model results 
are therefore converted to match the structure of diary entries; as such, model 
simulations are treated as a series of results from virtual participants in the diary study. 
Model results are sampled and recorded at each time point in the simulations that 
correspond to diary entry times. Sampling consists of taking a small window of the 
model data (10 continuous points) at the appropriate time points (for example, time 
point 720 corresponds to 12 Noon on day 1 in the diary study) and averaging values 
sampled. This snapshot of a few time-points in the model may then be considered 
similar to that of the diary data on a temporal basis. These values are then recorded after 
being scaled and rounded to match the scales used in the diary study. Unlike the 
continuous range of values used in the model, the diary data entries are made on an 11 
point scale. Results from simulations that fall between any of these points are rounded 
to the nearest value, to reflect the participant responses available in diary entries. 
Before proceeding with comparing the various model fits with diary data, the diary data 
is examined to determine if it has sufficient number of data points to be used for the 
temporal specificity approach. In that test, the diary data is divided into three equal 
duration sections and then correlated to determine the predictive quality of each section 
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of the data against later sections. If, however, due to the division of the diary into 
sections there are insufficient data points in a particular section, this part of the diary is 
discounted from further analysis. Should two sections show an insufficient number of 
data points for a correlation to arise, a sufficient number of data points have been 
discarded for the diary data as a whole to no longer meet the threshold for individual 
specificity (20 data points) to guard against over-fitting. In this chapter, three measures 
do not meet the minimum number of data points through this method and so are not 
included in analysis for fitting the model to the diary data. These measures are felt-affect 
goals in Diary 5 and affect-expression goals in Diaries 2 and 5; all other measures are 
included in the analysis. 
Correlations between each individual’s diary data and model recordings are made for 
four different variables: felt-affect, felt-affect goals, affect-expression goals, and self-
regulatory. All correlations are converted to normally distributed measures using a 
Fisher transformation. In individual specificity, this enables the average correlation 
strength to be calculated between all models and diaries for all measures and so 
determines the closest average representation of the diaries by the models. In temporal 
specificity this enables the average correlation for each section of the models with each 
section of the diaries to be determined. All results are transformed back to correlation 
values before being reported in this chapter. Model results, representative of the 
simulations capacity to fit diary data, are presented against corresponding diary data in 
graphs for each of the measures in the individual specificity category. It is anticipated 
that the models will show variation in their capacity to fit their respective diary data 
sets; a representative model is chosen on the basis of being the median ranked 
correlation in the degree of fit between models and their respective diaries. 
6.3.1 Individual Specificity 
This test aims to identify the single parameter set which results in the highest average 
correlation between each model and its respective diary across the four dimensions of 
felt-affect, felt-affect goals, affect-expression goals and self-regulatory capacity. Models 
considered successful in representing the diary data are those which show a stronger 
correlation with its respective diary than with any other diary and show a stronger 
correlation with its respective diary than any other model does. Table 6.3 reports the 
parameter values used in generating the closest representation on average of the diary 
data in a simulation. 
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Table 6.3 Parameters giving closest representation across multiple diaries 
 Felt_Goal Exp_Goal Da Sa k2 k4 
Model Value 0.8 0.8 2 2 0.02 0.02 
There are four key points to consider regarding the parameters used. First, the felt-affect 
goal home-base is much higher than the felt-affect home-base (specified at 0.2) 
implying a general trend in regulation towards more positive affect states. Second, the 
affect-expression goal home-base is the same intensity as the felt-affect goal home-base, 
suggesting that the two goals may typically be close and implying an aim of authentic 
expression. Third, the cost associated with felt-affect regulation matches that of the 
affect-expression regulation, an outcome not anticipated in simulation. Finally, the rate 
of affect goal adjustment matches the specified rate of affect change (0.02); this is a 
surprising outcome because it is a parameter built in to the higher tier of the control 
model and affect goals were expected to engage in change at a slower rate than that of 
lower tiers.  
Felt-Affect 
Results for the correlations between felt-affect reported in the diaries with felt-affect 
from the respective models are shown in Table 6.4 and highlighted in bold font; all 
other correlations between diaries and models are shown in the same table in plain font. 
Results indicate a range of correlation fit quality across the diary data sets. Four out of 
the five model results for felt-affect significantly correlate with their respective diaries 
at the defined statistical significance of p < 0.002 after the Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons (25 comparisons). In addition to this, four of the five models 
represent their respective diaries closer than they do any others, with only Model 1 
representing other diaries closer than its counterpart. Finally, four of the five diaries are 
best represented by their respective models, with only Diary 3 being better represented 
by a model other than its counterpart 
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Table 6.4 Correlations for felt-affect between all diaries and models 
  Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 
Model 1 .54* -.18 .68** .63** -.28 
Model 2 .01 .43 -.40 -.27 -.21 
Model 3 .28 .13 .65** .42 -.15 
Model 4 .31 -.27 .29 .65** -.10 
Model 5 -.36 -.12 .10 -.20 .53* 
** = p < 0.0004, * = p < 0.002  
Table 6.4 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from .43 to .65; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 1 and Diary 1 are presented in Figure 6.1. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 6.4. The model data captures the changes at the start of Day 2, the end of 
Day 6 and changes throughout Day 5 seen in the diary data. 
 
Figure 6.1 Felt affect results for Model 1 and Diary 1 
Results for diary data are taken from the 35 diary recordings made in Diary 1; all 56 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
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Felt-Affect Goals 
Further strengths and limitations in the model’s capacity for representing diary data can 
be seen in correlations between the models and diaries for affect goal data (Table 6.5); 
correlations between diaries and their respective models are highlighted in bold font, 
while all other correlations between diaries and models are shown in the same table in 
plain font. Diary 5 was excluded from analysis based on the limited available data-
points to correlate with. No significant results are seen between diaries and models at 
the defined statistical significance of p < 0.0025 after the Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons (20 comparisons). However, three of the four models represent 
their respective diaries closer than they do any others, with only Model 3 representing 
another diary closer than its counterpart. In addition to this, three of the four diaries are 
best represented by their respective models, with only Diary 3 being better represented 
by a model other than its counterpart. 
Table 6.5 Correlations for felt-affect goals between all models and diaries 
  Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 
Model 1 .46 -.23 .40 -.05 -- 
Model 2 .19 .37 -.29 -.14 -- 
Model 3 .35 .00 .10 -.11 -- 
Model 4 .08 -.23 .11 .37 -- 
Model 5 -.40 -.03 .20 -.20 -- 
** = p < 0.0005, * = p < 0.0025  
Table 6.5 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from .10 to .46; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 2 and Diary 2 are presented in Figure 6.2. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 6.5. The model data captures the changes at the start of Day 5 and the end 
of Day 3 and Day 2 seen in the diary data. 
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Figure 6.2 Felt affect goal results for Model 2 and Diary 2 
Results for diary data are taken from the 43 diary recordings made in Diary 2; all 56 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
Affect-Expression Goals 
Correlations for affect-expression goals between diaries and their respective models are 
highlighted in bold font in Table 6.6; all other correlations between diaries and models 
are shown in the same table in plain font. Diaries 2 and 5 were excluded from analysis 
based on the limited available data-points to correlate with. Of the three remaining 
diaries, two show a significant correlation with their respective models at the defined 
statistical significance of p < 0.0042 after the Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons (12 comparisons). Alongside this, two of the three models represent their 
respective diaries closer than they do any others, with only Model 1 representing other 
diaries closer than its counterpart. Finally, all three diaries are best represented by their 
respective models. 
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Table 6.6 Correlation of affect-expression goals between all diaries and models 
  Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 
Model 1 .37 -- .38 .44 -- 
Model 2 -.01 -- -.32 -.22 -- 
Model 3 .20 -- .47** .32 -- 
Model 4 .18 -- .27 .66** -- 
Model 5 -- -- -- -- -- 
 ** = p < 0.0008, * = p < 0.0042 
Table 6.6 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from .37 to .66; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 3 and Diary 3 are presented in Figure 6.3. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 6.6. The model data captures the changes throughout Days 1 and 2 and the 
middle of Days 3 and 4. 
Figure 6.3 Felt affect goals results for Model 3 and Diary 3 
Results for diary data are taken from the 51 diary recordings made in Diary 3; all 56 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
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Self-Regulatory Capacity 
Finally, MARDy’s capacity for representing diary data can be seen in correlations 
between the models and diaries for self-regulatory capacity (Table 6.7); correlations 
between diaries and their respective models are highlighted in bold font, while all other 
correlations between diaries and models are shown in the same table in plain font. Two 
out of the five model results for self-regulatory capacity significantly correlate with 
their respective diaries at the defined statistical significance of p < 0.002 after the 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (25 comparisons). In addition to this, 
three of the five models represent their respective diaries closer than they do any others, 
with Model 1 and 4 each representing another diary closer than their counterparts. 
Finally, four of the five diaries are best represented by their respective models, with 
only Diary 1 being better represented by a model other than its counterpart. 
Table 6.7 Correlation of perception of feeling drained between all diaries and models 
  Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 
Model 1 .09 -.10 .62** -.23 -.35 
Model 2 -.21 .58** -.76** -.15 -.07 
Model 3 .26 -.12 .63** -.22 -.49 
Model 4 .02 -.24 .45* .19 -.01 
Model 5 -.53* .29 -.49** -.39 .47 
** = p < 0.0004, * = p < 0.002 
Table 6.7 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from .09 to .63; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 2 and Diary 2 are presented in Figure 6.4. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 6.7. The model data captures the changes throughout Days 1 and 5 and the 
end of Days 4 and 6. 
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Figure 6.4 Perceived self-regulatory resource capacity results for Model 2 and Diary 2 
Results for diary data are taken from the 43 diary recordings made in Diary 3; all 56 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
6.3.2 Temporal Specificity 
Parameter values for the model have been established by finding the best overall 
correlation for the model across the entirety of the six day duration of the diary studies. 
To further understand how well the model captures the dynamics of diary data, changes 
within each diary are examined. The prior tests represent a general fitting of the model 
to diary data and so may match long trends over the whole of the data sets. Reducing 
the window of data examined and comparing different sections of each data set allows 
for a closer examination of trends and changes within the data. 
To examine correlations within the diary data, the existing diary data is divided into 
three separate sections, each lasting two days. Correlations within the diaries indicate 
the consistency across time of the affect states in the diary data. High correlations would 
imply a cyclical pattern in the data with a period of two days; an absence of correlation 
could indicate a high dependency of affect state on affect events not likely to repeat 
with any regularity. As affect states are serial dependent, it would be expected that 
adjacent sections in the data would have a stronger correlation than more distal ones 
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(e.g., Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 1989). Mean correlations between each 
section of the diary data are taken across results from all diaries   
To determine MARDy’s capacity to represent a subsection of the diary data and 
correlations within the time-series results, the model data is divided into three separate 
sections equivalent to the diary sections described above. Correlations seen in each 
model indicate the consistency across time of the affect states in the model data. The 
mean correlations between each section of the model data are taken across results from 
all models just as they are for the diary data. Each section of the model data is further 
correlated with each section of the diary data, and mean correlations are reported. 
Felt-Affect 
On average there are 13.7 time points completed in each diary section. Table 6.8 
indicates that there is little potential of correlation within the diaries on average across 
the three sections. This is reflected in the similar pattern within the models on average 
across the three model sections. The table further points towards correlations between 
the models for sections A and C and their respective diary sections. These outcomes 
generally support the model as a successful representation of the diaries according to the 
criteria specified for temporal specificity. 
Table 6.8 Average correlations for felt-affect within diaries and models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B .25     
Diary Section C .06 -.09    
Model Section A .70 .33 .18   
Model Section B .10 .19 -.14 .01  
Model Section C -.25 .25 .66 -.08 -.23 
Felt-Affect Goals 
Results in Table 6.9 show a similar pattern to that seen in Table 6.8; the correlations 
shown are averages from four of the five diaries for felt-affect goals, with Diary 5 
omitted due to the limited number of data points. On average there are 14.2 time points 
completed in each diary section.  A small correlation between diary section A and B is 
indicated, while there is no indication of correlation apparent between the more 
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temporally distal sections A and C. However, this overall trend is not reflected 
substantially in the model results. The table does point towards correlations between the 
models for sections A and C and their respective diary sections. These outcomes 
partially support the model as a successful representation of the diaries according to the 
criteria specified for temporal specificity. 
Table 6.9 Average correlations for felt-affect goals within diaries and models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B .31     
Diary Section C .07 -.11    
Model Section A .70 .33 .22   
Model Section B .12 .23 -.18 .01  
Model Section C -.31 .30 .76 -.10 -.29 
Affect-Expression Goals 
The results in Table 6.10 for affect-expression goals show a contrasting pattern to 
results seen for felt-affect and felt-affect goals; the results shown are averages from 
three of the five diaries, with Diaries 2 and 5 omitted due to the limited number of data 
points. On average there are 13.9 time points completed in each diary section. A 
negative medium sized correlation between diary section A and B is indicated, while 
there is a small correlation apparent between the more temporally distal sections A and 
C. Moreover, this (somewhat surprising) overall trend is reflected closely in the model 
results; the further negative correlation between diary sections B and C is also reflected 
in the model data. The table further points towards correlations between the models for 
sections A, B and C and their respective diary sections. These outcomes generally 
support the model as a successful representation of the diaries according to the criteria 
specified for temporal specificity. 
158 
 
Table 6.10 Average correlations for affect-expression goals within diaries and models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B -.58     
Diary Section C .30 -.37    
Model Section A .68 -.57 .36   
Model Section B .01 .36 -.18 -.31  
Model Section C .12 -.51 .24 .29 -.49 
Self-Regulatory Capacity 
Finally, results for self-regulatory capacity show the anticipated trend for the time-series 
data (Table 6.11). On average there are 13.7 time points completed in each diary 
section. Within the diary data there is an indication of a strong correlation between 
sections A and B, which reduces to a medium strength correlation between the model 
temporally distal sections A and C. Alongside this, the correlation for sections B and C 
within the diary data appear to be of similar strength to that of section A and B. Model 
results reflect each of these outcomes, representing the overall trend seen in the diary 
results. Further to this, the table points towards correlations between the models for 
sections A, B and C and their respective diary sections. These outcomes generally 
support the model as a successful representation of the diaries according to the criteria 
specified for temporal specificity. 
Table 6.11 Average correlations for perceptions of feeling drained within diaries and 
models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B .71     
Diary Section C .40 .80    
Model Section A .84 -.77 .49   
Model Section B .65 .47 .81 .92  
Model Section C .66 .21 .93 .71 .98 
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6.3.3 Relational Representation 
The final approach for identifying the capacity for the model to represent diary data is 
the replication of relationships and trends between measures recorded. If two variables 
show a significant correlation within the diaries’ recorded data, a model that aims to 
simulate both of these variables well ought to also represent the existing correlations.  
Three comparisons between variables are made in this test for each of the diaries. These 
are: correlation of felt-affect and perceived self-regulatory capacity, correlation of felt-
affect goals and perceived self-regulatory capacity, and correlation of felt-affect and 
felt-affect goals. It would be anticipated from theory informing the model’s design that 
there would be a positive correlation between variables. Felt-affect is considered to be 
regulated towards positives states and influenced by one’s self-regulatory capacity 
(Muraven et al., 1998); a greater self-regulatory capacity is anticipated to be associated 
with a more positive affect state. In addition to this, positive affect goals are considered 
to be maintained until self-regulatory capacity is depleted, at which point it is 
anticipated that goals shift towards less intense, more manageable levels (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 2001; Powers, 1974); resource depletion is anticipated to be associated with 
less positive affect goals. Finally, these processes of goal adjustment and affect change 
are considered to happen concurrently and in the same direction, so are anticipated to 
show association. 
Table 6.12 overviews the correlations between core concepts described above for each 
of the diaries. Firstly, there are positive correlations between felt-affect and self-
regulatory capacity at the defined statistical significance of p < 0.01 after the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (5 comparisons) in four of the five diaries. Second, 
two of the four diaries examined show positive correlations between felt-affect goals 
and self-regulatory capacity; Diary 5 is again excluded from analysis due to limited data 
points for affect goals. Finally, two of the four diaries examined show positive 
correlations between felt-affect and felt-affect goals.  
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Table 6.12 Correlations of core concepts in each diary 
 Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 
Felt-affect & Regulatory Capacity .91** .61** .67** .14 .75** 
Felt-affect Goals & Regulatory Capacity .80* .66* .19 .01 -- 
Felt-affect & Felt-affect Goals .77** .65** .28 .40 -- 
** = p < 0.002, * = p < 0.01 
The results in Table 6.13 for the correlations between core concepts within the models 
show some similarities with the diary results seen in Table 6.12. Four of the five models 
show a positive correlation between felt-affect and self-regulatory capacity at the 
defined statistical significance of p < 0.01 after the Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons (5 comparisons); although, just three of these correspond to the positive 
correlations seen in the diary data. The two diaries that show a positive correlation 
between felt-affect goals and self-regulatory capacity are matched by positive 
correlations seen in their model counterparts; a further model also shows positive 
correlation, unlike its diary counterpart. Finally, all models show a strong positive 
correlation between felt-affect and felt-affect goals; while this includes two models that 
reflect the trends seen in the diary data, two models do not reflect their diary 
counterparts. 
Table 6.13 Correlations of core concepts in each model 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Felt-affect & Regulatory Capacity .61** .36* .41** .73** .33 
Felt-affect Goals & Regulatory Capacity .59** .44** .33 .69** -- 
Felt-affect & Felt-affect Goals .85** .95** .65** .90** -- 
** = p < 0.002, * = p < 0.01 
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6.4 Comparison with Human Predictions 
A further assessment can be made on the model’s utility to represent affect dynamics, 
by comparing the model results to estimates on affect dynamics by human raters.  
Twelve volunteers from an undergraduate psychology class were recruited to make 
estimates of affect dynamics seen in the current diary data. Ratings of felt-affect using 
the gloominess and happiness scale were made by all volunteers for each entry for the 
first two days of each diary; in total, each rater made 55 estimations of affect. In order 
for a comparison to be made with the models’ performance, diary raters were given 
supporting information to help guide their decisions. Information that the model uses to 
generate representations of affect dynamics were provided to raters; this consisted of: 
individuals’ sleeping times, duration and perceived intensity of affective events, and 
waking mood for the first day. In addition to this, raters were provided with goal mood 
at each data point and the diary owner’s general mood over the two weeks before 
starting the diary. Raters were instructed to use as much or as little of the available 
information that they considered relevant to aid in estimating individuals’ felt-affect. 
Raters were given Figure 6.2 as an example of completed ratings, along with a key 
describing each part of the figure; the black horizontal bars represent recorded affect 
events, grey open diamonds represent target mood, and larger greyed out blocks 
represent time spent sleeping, red X’s represent estimates of affect at each diary entry 
point. Raters were asked to complete further diary ratings for each of the five diaries by 
marking Xs as their estimates of felt-affect for each diary entry. 
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Figure 6.5 Example provided to raters of a completed affect change rating sheet. 
 One set of ratings was discarded as the individual had not estimated any affect change 
across time but rather kept estimates constant for each diary, thereby preventing any 
correlation from being made. The remaining ratings of affect change were correlated 
against their respective diary entries. The resulting correlations were converted to 
normalised scores using a Fisher transformation, to enable further comparison of raters’ 
relative performance at estimating affect. These scores, alongside the scores from the 
model were then subject to a Friedman test to determine if any of the raters, including 
the model, show a statistically different judgment from the group. 
Results indicate there is no significant difference in any rater’s judgements, including 
the model’s, in representing the diary data χ2(11) = 17.077, P = 0.106. Based on this test 
the model is not considered unsuitable for estimating individual’s affect change over 
time. Moreover, the results indicate that only two of the eleven raters performed, on 
average, better at rating affect dynamics than the model.  
6.5 Summary and Discussion 
Over the course of this chapter, a variety of tests have indicated the model’s capacity for 
representing diary data for the dynamics of felt-affect, affect goals, and self-regulatory 
capacity.  
In general, the individual specificity approach indicated encouraging results for the 
model. In total, there were eight significant correlations between models and their 
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respective diaries of the 17 comparisons made, using the conservative Bonferroni 
correction for determining a threshold for significance. In addition to this, the models 
show highest degree of correlation with their respective diaries ahead of any other 
diaries 12 times out of the 17 comparisons made. Finally, the diaries show highest 
degree of correlation with their respective models ahead of any other models 15 times 
out of the 17 comparisons made. A recurring limitation in the models’ capacity to 
represent the diary data is seen in the representations of felt-affect goals and the few 
positive signs of models matching the diary data there, while the other variables show 
more consistent positive results. The strongest representation of the diary data seen is 
for felt-affect.  
Further supporting evidence for the model’s capacity to represent the diary data is seen 
in the temporal specificity approach. Generally correlations seen in the diary data are 
reflected by correlations in the models. This is particularly apparent in both the results 
for affect-expression goals and self-regulatory capacity; while these show different 
overall patterns in the correlation directions and strengths in the diary data, they are 
each reflected in the model data. Alongside this, the models consistently show strong 
positive correlations with diaries, when the data for each is subdivided into the three 
sections; these are particularly apparent in the correlations for sections A and C between 
models and diaries.  
The third means of the validation process for the model was the representation of 
correlations between variables in the diary data. In all cases in which a significant 
correlation was found in the diary data, the direction was positive, as anticipated; this 
overall direction in trends was represented in the model data. The diary data shows eight 
significant correlations between core variables across the diaries; of these eight 
significant correlations, seven are repeated in the model data. However, an additional 
three significant correlations are seen in the model data, which are not found in the diary 
data. The strongest correlations in the model variables are seen between felt-affect and 
felt-affect goals, exceeding those seen in the diary data. This could indicate that felt-
affect dynamics and felt-affect goal dynamics are too closely related in the model, 
which may arise from using a linear influence of depletion on regulatory momentum for 
both affect and affect goals, although this remains to be investigated. Issues with 
representing linear correlations may even be arising from the diary data rather than the 
model data, given the presence of measurement error in self-report scales and the 
possibility of non-linear relationships between variables. 
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Overall, the parameters used to generate the closest representation of the diary data by 
the model offer a suitable starting point for further model development. If the generated 
affect dynamics can be considered an estimate made by the model, results also indicate 
a capacity to estimate affect dynamics closer than most intuitive estimates by 
individuals. Further validation of the model is considered in Chapter 7, examining the 
capacity of the model to represent a novel data set, which it has not been trained on. 
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Chapter 7: Model Validation Against a Second Data Set 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the collection of further diary data and the continued process of 
model validation. Validation in this chapter is based on the comparison of parameter 
values developed from the first study against this second diary study and so builds upon 
the results from Chapter 6. The representation of previously collected diary data by the 
model has been demonstrated in the last chapter across a number of different measures 
and means of comparison. This representation arises from the variation of model 
parameters to shape the profiles of felt-affect, affect goals and self-regulatory capacity 
to best match across the diaries. This chapter tests the model’s capacity to represent a 
new set of diaries to aid in determining the model’s value in representing affect 
regulation processes.  
This diary study serves a dual purpose: firstly, as a validation tool for the results from 
the previous chapter. Data fitting the original diary set gives an optimal parameter set 
for the model to use. These parameter values can ultimately be considered as predictions 
(i.e. the model has made the prediction that people generally hold a higher affect goal 
than their current affect state). These predictions can be tested against a new data set 
independent of the first. If the model’s parameters fit this new set well, it can be 
considered that there is value in both the predictions made and the structure and design 
of the model. 
In addition to this, a second diary study offers the opportunity to examine other aspects 
of affect regulation that the first does not adequately cover. Across the board, 
participants in the first study only made a small number of recordings for affect-
expressions, which could not be used for model validation. The design of the new diary 
study presented in this chapter places a greater emphasis on expressive states and gives 
expression related questions more prominence in the diaries themselves. In addition, 
participants in the current study are all teaching staff and are anticipated to be more 
attentive to their expressive state due to the demands of the profession, such as display 
rules (e.g, Näring, Briët, & Brouwers, 2006), than the student sample used in the prior 
study, who may not have such expectancies placed upon them. 
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7.2 Diary Data 
This chapter continues the process described in Chapter 6 of collecting data that capture 
variation across time in affect, affect goals and self-regulatory capacity. This section 
outlines collection of suitable time-series data for further validating the current model of 
affect regulation dynamics. 
Participants 
A total of seven volunteers were recruited to the study via an advertisement placed at 
their shared workplace at a local primary school. All members of the study were 
teaching staff for children of age groups 3-11, being either full time teachers or teaching 
assistants. Of the seven prospective participants, all were available during the course of 
recording in July 2011 and not excluded during pre-study screening; one participant 
withdrew participation during the study. Six participants completed the study (one male; 
mean age ± S.D.: 41.6 ± 14.9 years); three were teachers and three were teaching 
assistants. Each participant was paid £20 at the close of the study for taking part in the 
research. 
Procedure 
Prior to the study, informed consent was obtained after the procedures for the study had 
been explained, and pre-screening questionnaires were completed that indicated 
volunteers were suitable for participation. Participants were informed that they were 
under no obligation to continue with the study, should they wish to leave. Participants 
were further informed data is kept anonymous and confidential, given the intensive 
nature of recording data that could be considered personal and potentially about a 
shared work environment. 
The study covered six consecutive days, started on a Thursday, and took place during 
July 2011. Each participant was given two diary booklets the day before the 
commenced that contained instructions when and how to complete diary entries. Each 
booklet contained enough pages for data entry to last three days and participants were 
instructed that once a booklet was completed to continue on to the next, giving six 
continuous days of recording. The books were modelled on the previous study’s design, 
although some changes to the layout and questions were made (described in subsection 
Measures, below). Participants were instructed to complete a section of the diary every 
167 
 
two hours on the even hour during the waking day. Each diary entry took up to five 
minutes to complete. An additional recording was made on waking each day, also 
requesting the participant to estimate the duration of sleep. If participants missed any 
entries, they were instructed to not retrospectively complete entries but to continue with 
the diary as normal.  
Measures 
An example of the affect diary used in this study is found in Appendix 5. 
Pre-study screening survey 
The pre-study screening from the first study was reused without alteration for this 
current study. Participants were asked if they experience an erratic sleep pattern and if 
they experience or have experienced a diagnosed mood disorder. As with the previous 
study, if a participant answered yes to either question they were not included in the 
main diary study. Participants were also given a modified sample page of the diary to 
familiarise themselves with the study. 
Diaries 
This study used many of the measures used in the previous diary study and, where 
possible, measures have been left unchanged. As described earlier, an emphasis was 
placed on affect-expression and efforts were made to present the measures for affect-
expression in a more accessible and prominent form. Each of the measures used in the 
regular diary entries and the additional measures used in the diary entry at the start of 
the day are listed below. For this study, diary entries were scheduled for every two 
hours between 8am and 12 midnight each day; this was a change from the recording 
schedule used in the previous study, which had been described as a factor for 
participants missing diary entries. 
Felt-affect was recorded on the two dimensions of valence and arousal, put forwards as 
the standard means of representing core affect (Remington et al., 2000; Russell, 1989; 
2003). In the paper diaries used, this comprised of a two-item scale of bipolar, 11-point 
measures of Gloomy to Happy and Sluggish to Energetic. The scales for felt-affect 
ranged from -5 (indicating feeling a negative state to a great extent) to +5 (indicating 
feeling a positive state to a great extent) with 0 representing feeling neutral. This two-
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item scale is repeated in this same form in each diary entry for reporting felt-affect 
goals. 
Affect-expression was also recorded from a scale of -5 to +5, and was referred to in 
terms of more positive and more negative expressions rather than specified affect states. 
The measure for affect-expression also included an additional option for no recalled 
expression to disambiguate between an active attempt at maintaining a neutral 
expressed state and perceiving an absence of expression. Goal affect-expression was 
recorded on another numerical scale, using the same structure as that for affect-
expression, with the exception of the absence of an option for no affect-expression. 
The measure for recording felt-affect events was kept unchanged from the first diary 
study. The timing, duration, affect intensity on the prior -5 to +5 scale, and a brief 
description of affect events were all recorded. Participants were instructed to recall any 
affective events of significance to them that occurred over the past two hours. 
The measures for perceptions of being physically, mentally or emotionally drained were 
also kept unchanged from the first diary study. Each of these measures ranged on an 
eleven point scale from 0 (not feeling drained at all) to 10 (feeling drained a great deal). 
For each measure of feeling drained, participants were instructed to record their current 
perceived state. 
For the scales measuring felt-affect, felt-affect goals, affect-expression goals, and self-
regulatory capacity, individuals were instructed to record their present states (e.g., How 
alert do you feel at this time). For recordings of affect events and expressions, 
individuals were instructed to recall moments since the last diary entry was scheduled. 
The recordings made on waking were left unchanged from the previous diary study, in 
which participants recorded their estimated time of sleeping, time of waking, and 
estimated the duration of minutes of lost sleep. 
Analysis 
On average participants completed a total of 46 entries of the maximum 54 regular 
entries. All of the six diary entries scheduled to be completed on waking were 
completed by each participant. Over half of the regular diary entries included one 
recorded affective event (180 events, 55% of entries), 28 entries included the recording 
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of two affective events and there were just four instances of three affective events 
recoded. 
The most common reason for not completing an entry in the diary was the scheduled 
entry fell outside of participants’ waking hours, with participants typically going to 
sleep before the last entry at 12am on weekdays and waking up after the first entry at 
8am on weekends. One participant forgot to complete a diary entry at the scheduled 
time and so completed that section of the diary an hour later, making sure to note the 
time it was completed. For the remainder of the day, she proceeded to complete the 
diary every two hours after that entry so recorded her affect on the odd hour rather than 
the even hour, each time making sure to note the time the diary entry was made. 
Subsequent analysis in this chapter and comparisons with model data take account for 
the seven diary entries affected. Across the study, four participants marked the scale for 
affect-expression to indicate that they were not aware of having displayed any affect-
expression state in at least one diary entry and so made estimations of their affect-
expression state. Participant 1 indicated this on seven instances, participant 3 indicated 
this three times and participants 2 and 4, indicated this just once. Analysis in this 
chapter examines the fit of model data with the estimated ratings included.  
Circadian Analysis 
As done in the analysis of the previous diary data, self-regulatory capacity is examined 
to determine if a circadian cycle is present in participants’ recorded data. Procedure for 
analysis of the data is preserved from the previous chapter and a Binfit analysis is run. 
As with the previous analysis, the circadian cycles examined range from 22 to 26 hours 
in increments of 0.2 hours. Within these cycles, reported feelings of being emotionally 
drained are fit into 12 equally spaced bins, given the two hourly intervals between diary 
recordings. Time bins width therefore varies from 1.83 hours in the binfit for a 22 hour 
cycle to 2.17 hours in the binfit for a 26 hour cycle. Analysis of the collated data is 
performed using one-way repeated measures ANOVA with independent variable being 
bin label and dependent variable reported feelings of being emotionally drained. Table 
7.1 reports the circadian period for each of the diaries that is associated with highest 
variance explained by the fitted cycle for feelings of being emotionally drained. 
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Table 7.1 Periods for each diary recordings of feelings of being emotionally drained 
Diary No. Period (hrs) F Df Variance % p 
1 25.8 2.83 (11, 46) 40.40 0.007 
2 25.8 3.60 (11, 32) 55.32 0.0025 
3 23.6 2.47 (8, 36) 53.15 0.0001 
4 24.4 5.85 (8, 41) 35.42 0.03 
5 23.2 3.68 (9, 41) 44.05 0.002 
6 25.0 2.98 (10, 42) 40.69 0.0065 
The results in Table 7.1 are used to inform the circadian component of the resource 
capacity block in each model simulation. With each diary the period for the circadian 
component is specified according to the results above. This parameter value is kept 
constant across all testing of the models, while fitting the variable parameters (Table 
7.2) to the diary data. This circadian component alongside the sleeping and waking 
schedule recorded by each participant forms the primary basis of the dynamics of the 
Åkerstedt et al. (2004) model of fatigue, which is used as representation of self-
regulatory capacity in this thesis. 
7.3 Validation of the Model 
The aim of this chapter is to determine the capacity of the model to represent a novel 
diary data set. Chapter 6 describes in detail the process of validating the model against a 
single data set; this section overviews the process used to validate the model against a 
second data set. 
Validation Design 
To compare simulation results against the novel data set six new models are constructed 
to reflect each individual’s experiences during the study. To achieve this, values from 
each diary on affective events transpired, sleeping patterns, and circadian cycle of 
resource are input as constants into the models; each model, therefore, reflects the 
experiences of a single individual. These values, alongside parameters specified under 
the section validation procedure, below, are used by the model to estimate the dynamics 
of felt-affect, felt-affect goals, self-regulatory capacity, affect-expression, and affect-
expression goals. 
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The three tests applied to the model described in section 6.3 are repeated for this set of 
diaries and models; these tests are briefly summarised here. For individual specificity, 
each diary is compared against its corresponding model; correlations between each 
diary and its respective model are expected to be greater than that model for any other 
diary and that diary for any other model. For temporal specificity, sections of diary data 
are compared to their equivalent sections of the model data, which are expected to 
correlate better than any other parts within the diary or modelled data. Correlations that 
occur within the diary data between one section and another are expected to be 
preserved by the simulation. For representation of data trends, correlations between 
variables within the diary data are expected to be replicated by their equivalent variables 
in the models. 
Validation Procedure 
In the previous chapter, data-fitting simulations were run so that parameters could be 
determined, which result in models on average best representing data from the diaries. 
In this chapter, the process is repeated with the same parameter ranges (Table 7.2) and 
the parameter set determined in Chapter 6 as the best representation of the diary data is 
considered in terms of its capacity to represent the novel diary data set. 
Table 7.2 Parameters varied for data fitting of multiple diaries 
Parameter Name Parameter Symbol Range of Values 
Felt-Affect Goal Home Felt_Goal 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1 
Affect-Expression Goal Home Exp_Goal 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1 
Felt-Affect Regulation Cost Da 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Affect-Expression Regulation Cost Sa 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
Regulatory Momentum k2 0.0025 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Rate of Goal Adjustment  k4 0.0025 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Simulation Procedure 
The simulation procedure is preserved from validation against the original diary data 
set. Within the simulations, each of the diaries is again represented by a unique model, 
which differs from all other models in simulations by the four means of: experiencing 
unique affective events, the initial felt-affect state on the first day, sleeping and waking 
schedule, and the proposed circadian component to self-regulatory capacity. The four 
specifications to distinguish the models from each other and reflect experiences reported 
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in the diaries are kept constant across all simulations so that the effects of the 
individual’s daily life on affect, goals and self-regulatory capacity can be seen. In 
selecting a single set of parameters to best represent the diaries as a whole, the 
differences between models outlined in this section give each model its unique affect 
dynamics.  
Data Recording Procedure 
The method for recording model data at specific intervals to reflect that of the data 
recording times in the diary data is preserved from the previous model validation 
process. Alongside this, affect states recorded in the model are scaled and rounded to 
reflect the range of values that could be recorded in each of the affect measures, as 
described in the previous chapter. Before proceeding with comparing the various model 
fits with diary data, the diary data is examined to determine if each variable has 
sufficient number of data points to be used for validation. Using the process outlined in 
Chapter 6 it is indicated that two measures are to be excluded from further analysis; 
these are felt-affect goals in Diary 3 and affect-expression goals in Diary 3; all other 
measures are included in the analysis. 
7.3.1 Individual Specificity 
Given the limited sample size of both studies and the contrasting nature of those who 
have participated in each study, namely that of students in the first and teaching staff in 
the second, it is anticipated that an exact match of the parameters across the two studies 
is unlikely. Similarities and differences for each study are considered. For reference, the 
parameter values of the first study are shown in Table 7.3.  
Table 7.3 Parameters used as a best representation of diary data in study 1 
 Felt_Goal Exp_Goal Da Sa k2 k4 
Model Value 0.8 0.8 1 2 0.02 0.02 
Results from the current simulation indicate that the parameter values given by the best 
representation of diary data in the previous study do not form a comparably strong fit 
with the current diary data. Of the 15265 (56) simulations run this parameter set ranks 
just outside the top 10% of simulation fits (ranked 1676). The strongest fitting model 
shows different parameter values across the board (Table 7.4), although this difference 
could potentially arise due to the limited number of parameter values possible to 
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examine in the tests and could both be indicating further parameter values for 
investigation. 
Table 7.4 Parameters used as a best representation of diary data in study 2 
 Felt_Goal Exp_Goal Da Sa k2 k4 
Model Value 0.6 0.6 4 8 0.05 0.05 
An explanation for the differences seen, particularly that of the difference in the value 
for the affect-expression goal, and cost of regulation could come from the participant 
samples used. The demands of affect regulation within the teaching profession are well 
reported (Burke & Greenglass, 1995; Näring et al., 2006) and are likely to contras with 
those of university students.  
To consider the potential for extensive differences in the affective environments that the 
two participant groups were drawn from a further parameter set is considered for 
representation of the teachers’ diary data. Three of the parameters are fixed from the 
previous study, these being: felt-affect goal-home state, regulatory momentum and rate 
of goal adjustment. The remaining parameters were varied to potentially better consider 
the differences in working environment and emotional labour demands between 
participant groups. Table 7.5 indicates the best fitting parameter set for the second diary 
data set given the prior constraints. This parameter set ranks just outside the top 1% of 
simulation fits (ranked 209) and is further exploded in this chapter. 
Table 7.5 Parameters used as representation of diary data in study 2 
 Felt_Goal Exp_Goal Da Sa k3 k4 
Model Value 0.8 0.6 5 6 0.02 0.02 
As with the process of Individual specificity in Chapter 6 (section 6.3.1), this section 
serves to compare the degree of correlation between each diary and its modelled 
counterpart against all other diaries and models. Indication of a model that fits the data 
is seen by a stronger positive correlation between a model and the diary it represents 
than any other model with that particular diary. In addition to this, the model should 
also show a stronger positive correlation with the diary it represents over any other 
diary. Further considerations include the existence of any correlations between the 
diaries and respective similarities between the models designed to represent them. 
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Felt-Affect 
The first correlation matrix presented is that of the correlations between the felt-affect 
state recorded in the diaries and the corresponding felt-affect state as an output from the 
models (Table 7.6). Correlations between each model and its respective diary are 
highlighted in bold; all other correlations are in plain font. Just two out of the six model 
results for felt-affect significantly correlate with their respective diaries at the defined 
statistical significance of p < 0.0014 after the Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons (36 comparisons). However, five of the six models represent their 
respective diaries closer than they do any others, with only Model 4 representing other 
diaries closer than its counterpart. Finally, five of the six diaries are best represented by 
their respective models, with only Diary 4 being better represented by a model other 
than its counterpart. 
Table 7.6 Correlations for felt-affect between all diaries and models 
 Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 Diary 6 
Model 1 .69** .08 .08 -.08 -.02 .03 
Model 2 -.03 .46 -.03 .09 -.16 -.10 
Model 3 .21 .03 .49* -.11 .07 -.14 
Model 4 .05 -.52* -.07 .16 .16 .29 
Model 5 .01 -.09 -.04 .25 .33 .10 
Model 6 -.10 .18 .01 .26 -.22 .30 
** = p < 0.0003, * = p < 0.0014 
Table 7.6 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from .16 to .69; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 2 and Diary 2 are presented in Figure 7.1. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 7.6. The model data captures the changes at the end of Days 1, 2 and 4 and 
the middle of Day 3 seen in the diary data. 
175 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Felt affect results for Model 2 and Diary 2 
Results for diary data are taken from the 38 diary recordings made in Diary 2; all 54 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
Felt-Affect Goals 
Correlations between diaries and models for felt-affect goals are shown in Table 7.7; 
correlations between diaries and their respective models highlighted in bold font, while 
all other correlations between diaries and models are shown in the same table in plain 
font. Diary 3 is excluded from analysis based on the limited available data points for 
correlation; a dummy column for the excluded diary data is included in the correlation 
matrix to keep the visual appearance of the correlation matrices consistent. Results in 
Table 7.7 show a mixture of outcomes, supporting and challenging the models’ capacity 
for representing this diary data set. Only two out of the five model results for felt-affect 
goals significantly correlate with their respective diaries at the defined statistical 
significance of p < 0.0017 after the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (30 
comparisons). Alongside this, three of the five models represent their respective diaries 
closer than they do any others, with Models 4 and 6 representing other diaries closer 
than their counterparts. Finally, four of the five diaries are best represented by their 
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respective models, with only Diary 6 being better represented by a model other than its 
counterpart. 
Table 7.7 Correlations for felt-affect goals between all diaries and models 
 Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 Diary 6 
Model 1 .58** -.29 .. -.14 -.01 .04 
Model 2 -.10 .36 .. -.32 -.08 -.24 
Model 3 .18 -.09 .. -.04 .04 -.06 
Model 4 .45* -.40 .. .23 .01 .56* 
Model 5 .15 -.20 .. .00 .55* .00 
Model 6 -.14 .14 .. -.21 -.06 .07 
** = p < 0.0003, * = p < 0.0017 
Table 7.7 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from .07 to .58; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 2 and Diary 2 are presented in Figure 7.2. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 7.7. The model data captures the changes throughout Day 3 and the end of 
Day 4 seen in the diary data. 
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Figure 7.2 Felt affect goal results for Model 2 and Diary 2 
Results for diary data are taken from the 38 diary recordings made in Diary 2; all 54 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
Self-Regulatory Capacity 
Further representations of the diary data can be seen in correlations between the models 
and diaries for self-regulatory capacity (Table 7.8); correlations between diaries and 
their respective models are highlighted in bold font, while all other correlations between 
diaries and models are shown in the same table in plain font. Two out of the six model 
results for self-regulatory capacity significantly correlate with their respective diaries at 
the defined statistical significance of p < 0.0014 after the Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons (36 comparisons). In addition to this, four of the six models 
represent their respective diaries closer than they do any others, with Models 2 and 5 
representing another diary closer than their counterparts. Finally, three of the six diaries 
are best represented by their respective models, with Diaries 2, 4 and 5 being better 
represented by a model other than their counterparts. 
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Table 7.8 Correlations for feeling emotionally drained between all diaries and models 
 Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 Diary 6 
Model 1 .50** -.06 .03 .27 .33 .56** 
Model 2 .22 -.04 .13 .31 .15 .54** 
Model 3 -.15 -.18 .43 .04 -.46* -.05 
Model 4 .17 -.05 -.13 .31 .11 .35 
Model 5 .18 .06 -.29 .35 .22 .33 
Model 6 .49** -.08 .07 .15 .47* .65** 
** = p < 0.0003, * = p < 0.0014 
Table 7.8 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from -.04 to .65; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 3 and Diary 3 are presented in Figure 7.3. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 7.8. The model data captures the changes in the middle of Days 1, 2, 3 and 
6 seen in the diary data. 
 
Figure 7.3 Perceived self-regulatory resource capacity results for Model 3 and Diary 3 
Results for diary data are taken from the 46 diary recordings made in Diary 3; all 54 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
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Affect-Expression 
The use of a second diary set has given the opportunity to examine the model’s capacity 
to represent changes across time for affect-expression. Table 7.9 overviews the 
correlations between models and their respective diaries (shown in bold font) and 
correlations between models and all other diaries (shown in plain font). Results show 
limited support for the models’ representation of diary data. One of the model results for 
self-regulatory capacity significantly correlate with their respective diaries at the 
defined statistical significance of p < 0.0014 after the Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons (36 comparisons). Two of the six models represent their respective diaries 
closer than they do any others and finally, three of the six diaries are best represented by 
their respective models. 
Table 7.9 Correlations for affect-expression between all diaries and models 
 Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 Diary 6 
Model 1 .56** .00 -.09 -.04 -.06 .02 
Model 2 -.07 .47 -.22 .00 .18 -.25 
Model 3 .27 -.15 .26 .03 -.12 .08 
Model 4 .20 -.50 .16 .09 -.08 .32 
Model 5 -.04 .00 .24 .26 .10 -.06 
Model 6 .01 -.06 .10 .65** -.06 .15 
** = p < 0.0003, * = p < 0.0014 
Table 7.9 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from .09 to .56; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 3 and Diary 3 are presented in Figure 7.4. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 7.9. The model data captures the changes seen in Day 5; model data is 
mostly unchanging throughout simulation indicating a potential limitation in fitting the 
general model across multiple data sets.  
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Figure 7.4 Affect-Expression results for Model 3 and Diary 3 
Results for diary data are taken from the 46 diary recordings made in Diary 3; all 54 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
Affect-Expression Goals 
The last correlation matrix presented is that of affect-expression goals (Table 7.10); 
correlations between diaries and their respective models are highlighted in bold font, 
while all other correlations between diaries and models are shown in the same table in 
plain font. As with the table for felt-affect goals (Table 7.7), Diary 3 was excluded from 
the analysis because of the limited number of data points for analysis in the series; a 
dummy column for the excluded diary data is, again, included. Results indicate that two 
of the five models significantly correlate with their respective diaries at the defined 
statistical significance of p < 0.0017 after the Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons (30 comparisons). Further to this, four of the five models represent their 
respective diaries closer than they do any others, with Models 4 representing another 
diary closer than its counterpart. Finally, three of the five diaries are best represented by 
their respective models, with Diaries 4 and 6 being better represented by a model other 
than their counterparts. 
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Table 7.10 Correlations for affect-expression goals between all diaries and models 
 Diary 1 Diary 2 Diary 3 Diary 4 Diary 5 Diary 6 
Model 1 .56** -.02 -- -.09 -.14 -.13 
Model 2 -.14 .46 -- -.01 .07 -.51** 
Model 3 .05 -.15 -- -.01 -.07 -.08 
Model 4 .27 -.45 -- .01 -.01 .59** 
Model 5 .06 -.10 -- .20 .47* -.07 
Model 6 .01 -.10 -- .11 .05 .29 
** = p < 0.0003, * = p < 0.0017 
Table 7.10 reports correlation strengths for model fits against their respective diary data 
ranging from .01 to .56; to offer a representation of the models’ fit to diary data, results 
for felt affect for both Model 2 and Diary 2 are presented in Figure 7.5. This data fit is 
chosen as it is the median strength correlation between model data and its matched diary 
data in Table 7.10. The model data captures the changes throughout Day 3 and the end 
of Day 4 seen in the diary data. 
 
Figure 7.5 Affect-Expression goal results for Model 2 and Diary 2 
Results for diary data are taken from the 38 diary recordings made in Diary 2; all 54 
modelled results are shown. Discontinuities in the model data indicate start and end of 
daily data recording schedules. 
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7.3.2 Temporal Specificity 
Continuing the repetition of the previous chapter’s validation process of the model 
against diary data, trends within the diaries and models are again examined. As before, 
both the diary data and the model data are divided into three sections. The sections 
within each diary are correlated with each other; this process is repeated for each of the 
models. Also, model data sections are correlated against their respective diary data 
sections. Mean correlations between each section of the diary data are taken across 
results from all diaries; this process is again repeated for the models. On average there 
are 15 time points completed in each diary section for all measures. 
Felt-Affect  
Table 7.11 indicates that there is little correlation within the diaries on average across 
the three sections. This is reflected in the similar pattern within the models on average 
across the three model sections, although overall correlations sizes appear slightly 
larger. The table further points towards correlations between the model and respective 
diary section, particularly section B. These outcomes partially support the model as a 
successful representation of the diaries according to the criteria specified for temporal 
specificity. 
Table 7.11 Average correlations for felt-affect within diaries and models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B -.06     
Diary Section C .14 .01    
Model Section A .33 .23 .22   
Model Section B .06 .63 -.01 .11  
Model Section C .06 .11 .39 .31 .24 
Felt-Affect Goals 
Results in Table 7.12 show a similar pattern to that seen in Table 7.11; the correlations 
shown are averages from five of the six diaries for felt-affect goals, with Diary 3 
omitted due to the limited number of data points. There is little indication of correlation 
within the diaries on average across the three sections, although section A and C do 
appear to show a stronger correlation than that of the more temporally closer sections. 
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This outcome is not seen within the model correlations. The table does point towards 
correlations between the model and respective diary sections, particularly section B. 
These outcomes partially support the model as a successful representation of the diaries 
according to the criteria specified for temporal specificity. 
Table 7.12 Average correlations for felt-affect goals within diaries and models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B -.11     
Diary Section C .32 -.15    
Model Section A .37 .17 .09   
Model Section B -.18 .66 -.04 .28  
Model Section C .09 .04 .41 .27 .29 
Regulatory Resource 
Table 7.13 indicates that there is little correlation within the diaries on average across 
the three sections. This is not reflected in a similar pattern within the models on average 
across the three model sections, in which correlations appear substantially larger. 
Results further indicate moderate correlations between the model and respective diary 
section, although correlations of similar strength between diaries and models are seen 
across sections. These outcomes offer limited support the model as a successful 
representation of the diaries according to the criteria specified for temporal specificity. 
Table 7.13 Average correlations for feeling drained within diaries and models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B .19     
Diary Section C -.08 -.03    
Model Section A .14 .38 .21   
Model Section B .23 .49 .39 .88  
Model Section C .33 .48 .31 .73 .89 
Affect-Expression  
Results in Table 7.14 closely resemble those of the results in Table 7.12. There is little 
indication of correlation within the diaries on average across the three sections, although 
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section A and C do appear to show a stronger correlation than that of the more 
temporally closer sections. This outcome is not seen within the model correlations, 
which appear to show stronger correlations between sections, although the strongest 
correlation seen does reflect that in the diary data. The table does point towards 
correlations between the model and respective diary sections, particularly section C. 
These outcomes partially support the model as a successful representation of the diaries 
according to the criteria specified for temporal specificity. 
Table 7.14 Average correlations for affect-expression within diaries and models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B -.10     
Diary Section C .21 -.01    
Model Section A .24 .07 .20   
Model Section B .06 .36 -.23 .23  
Model Section C .24 .05 .43 .39 .24 
Affect-Expression Goals  
The correlations shown in Table 7.15 are averages from five of the six diaries for affect-
expression goals, with Diary 3 omitted due to the limited number of data points. The 
results within the diaries appear to show a conventional decrease in the correlation 
strength between sections as the temporal distance increases. However, this outcome is 
not seen within the model correlations. The table does point towards correlations 
between the model and respective diary sections, particularly sections A and C. These 
outcomes partially support the model as a successful representation of the diaries 
according to the criteria specified for temporal specificity. 
Table 7.15 Average correlations for affect-expression goals within diaries and models 
 
Diary 
Section A 
Diary 
Section B 
Diary 
Section C 
Model 
Section A 
Model 
Section B 
Diary Section B .24     
Diary Section C .17 .19    
Model Section A .51 .33 .26   
Model Section B .07 .32 -.12 .24  
Model Section C .52 .10 .50 .52 .34 
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7.3.3 Relational Representation 
The final approach for identifying the capacity for the model to represent the diary is the 
replication of correlations between variables recorded. If two variables show a 
significant correlation within the diaries’ recorded data, a model that aims to simulate 
both of these variables well ought to also represent the existing correlations.  
Three comparisons between variables are made in this test for each of the diaries.  Three 
of these are drawn from the testing conducted in Chapter 6; these correlations are: felt-
affect and perceived self-regulatory capacity, felt-affect goals and perceived self-
regulatory capacity, and felt-affect and felt-affect goals. An additional three are 
considered in this chapter, given the availability of affect-expression data; these 
correlations are: felt-affect and affect-expression, affect-expression and affect-
expression goals, and felt-affect goals and affect-expression goals. It is anticipated that 
there is a positive correlation between felt-affect and affect-expression, given the known 
coherency between the two states (e.g., Mauss et al., 2005). Although this may not 
necessarily be the case as affect-expression could be regulated away from current felt-
affect in order to meet display rule requirements (e.g., Grandey, 2000) and instead show 
positive correlation with affect expression goals.  
Table 7.16 overviews the correlations between core concepts described above for each 
of the diaries. Firstly, just one diary shows correlation between felt-affect and self-
regulatory capacity at the defined statistical significance of p < 0.008 after the 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (6 comparisons). Second, no diaries 
show correlation between felt-affect goals and self-regulatory capacity; Diary 5 is again 
excluded from analysis due to limited data points for affect goals. Third, four of the five 
diaries examined show positive strong correlations between felt-affect and felt-affect 
goals. Fourth, all six diaries show strong correlations between felt-affect and affect-
expression. Fifth, four of the five diaries examined show correlation between affect-
expression and affect-expression goals. Finally, four of the five diaries examined show 
strong positive correlations between felt-affect goals and affect-expression goals.   
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Table 7.16 Correlations of core concepts in each diary 
 Diary1 Diary2 Diary3 Diary4 Diary5 Diary6 
Felt-Affect & Regulatory 
Capacity 
.32 .17 .68** .31 -.35 .37 
Felt-Affect Goals & 
Regulatory Capacity 
.17 .01 -- -.06 -.32 .32 
Felt-Affect & Felt-Affect 
Goals 
.71** .73** -- .03 .95** .60** 
Felt-Affect & Affect-
Expression 
.84** .70** .82** .93** .92** .77** 
Affect-Expression & Affect-
Expression Goals 
.69** .60** -- .40 .84** .54** 
Felt-Affect Goals & Affect-
Expression Goals 
.73** .68** -- .21 .85** .91** 
** = p < 0.0016, * = p < 0.008 
The results in Table 7.17 for the correlations between core concepts within the models 
show some similarities with the diary results seen in Table 7.16. First, just one of the 
models shows a positive correlation between felt-affect and self-regulatory capacity at 
the defined statistical significance of p < 0.01 after the Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons (5 comparisons); although, this does not correspond to the 
positive correlation seen in the diary data. Second, unlike the diary data, two models 
show a positive correlation between felt-affect goals and self-regulatory capacity. Third, 
all models show a correlation between felt-affect and felt-affect goals, reflecting that 
seen in the diary data, although one model does show correlation while its diary 
counterpart does not. Fourth, felt-affect and affect-expression show correlation across 
all models, representing the trend seen in the diary data. Fifth, all models show 
correlations between affect-expression and affect-expression goals, although one model 
does show correlation while its diary counterpart does not. Finally, all models show 
correlations between felt-affect goals and affect-expression goals, although one model 
does show correlation while its diary counterpart does not. 
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Table 7.17 Correlations of core concepts in each model 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
Felt-Affect & Resource 
Capacity 
.11 -.19 .26 .66* .27 .20 
Felt-Affect Goals & 
Resource Capacity 
.13 -.06 -- .68** .45** .26 
Felt-Affect & Felt-Affect 
Goals 
.94** .92** -- .90** .40* .78** 
Felt-Affect & Affect-
Expression 
.72** .74** .54** .74** .90** .60** 
Affect-Expression & 
Affect-Expression Goals 
.97** 1.00** -- 1.00** .42** .81** 
Felt-Affect Goals & Affect-
Expression Goals 
.68** .76** -- .77** .69** .61** 
** = p < 0.0016, * = p < 0.008 
7.4 Summary and Discussion 
Over the course of this chapter, a number of tests have shown the degrees to which the 
model can represent the novel diary data. One of the key issues in this chapter is the 
differences in capacity for the model to represent the diary data across different 
parameter sets. Results indicate that the initial parameter set used in Chapter 6 was not 
the best fit for this current chapter’s results, although this is perhaps unsurprising, given 
the substantial differences between the participant groups. Variation of a restricted 
number of parameters, accounting for the differences between the participant groups, 
substantially improved the overall fit of the model in this chapter, even though the 
parameters fixed were not tailored to fit the current data set. Further room for 
investigation could come from the collection of data from a similar workplace 
population to that of the teachers in this study. It would be anticipated that the 
parameter set for a fit of the model for this population would more closely resemble that 
of the current parameter set over that of the previous chapter’s.  
Differences between the two participant groups can be seen if the correlations between 
variables recorded in the diaries are considered. In the first study, felt-affect is seen to 
strongly correlate with self-regulatory capacity in four of the five diaries, while only one 
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diary in the current study shows a correlation between the two variables. Further 
differences between the participant groups are seen for correlations between felt-affect 
goals and self-regulatory capacity, and also felt-affect and felt-affect goals. These 
differences may arise from the affect-expression demands associated with teaching 
(Näring et al., 2006) and could offer a partial account as to why the model trained on the 
first data set showed less capacity to represent affect dynamics for the second data set.  
In general, the individual specificity approach indicated limited support for the model. 
In comparison to the eight out of 17 correlations found significant in the first study, just 
nine of 28 were significant in this study, using the conservative Bonferroni correction 
for determining a threshold for significance. Alongside this, the models show highest 
degree of correlation with their respective diaries ahead of any other diaries 18 times out 
of the 28 comparisons made. Finally, the diaries show highest degree of correlation with 
their respective models ahead of any other models 18 times out of the 28 comparisons 
made. A recurring limitation in the models’ capacity to represent the diary data is seen 
in the representations of affect-expression and the few positive signs of models 
matching the diary data there, while the other variables show more positive results. 
Affect-expression is the only variable tested in this chapter which is not considered in 
the previous chapter. 
Some supporting evidence for the model’s capacity to represent the diary data is seen in 
the temporal specificity approach. There appears to be a partial reflection of the 
correlations strengths between sections within the diaries by the correlations between 
sections within the models. This is particularly apparent in results for affect-expression 
goals. Alongside this, the models regularly show medium strength positive correlations 
with diaries, when the data for each is subdivided into the three sections.  
The third means of the validation process for the model was the representation of 
correlations between variables in the diary data. In all cases in which a significant 
correlation was found in the diary data, the direction was positive, as anticipated; this 
overall direction in trends was represented in the model data. The diary data shows 19 
significant correlations between core variables across the diaries; of these 19 significant 
correlations, 18 are repeated in the model data. However, an additional six significant 
correlations are seen in the model data, which are not found in the diary data. The strong 
correlations between affect and affect goals for both felt-affect and affect-expression 
exceed that seen in the diary data. This further reinforces the suggestion in the previous 
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chapter that felt-affect dynamics and felt-affect goal dynamics are too closely related in 
the model. Further developments of the model could introduce different influences of 
depletion on regulation for the lower and higher tiers so that they may show a greater 
independence in dynamics. 
Overall, the results in this chapter indicate that some of the success seen in the previous 
chapter may be attributed to the fitting of a particular set of data from one sample, rather 
than the development of a parameter set suitable across a range of samples. While 
testing of the model has extended across a wide range of parameters and parameter 
values, the factorial increase in tests required to examine parameter ranges at narrower 
intervals or alternative parameter variations (such as differences between regulatory 
momentum for affect-expression and felt-affect) currently limits capacity to do so. 
Future directions for the testing of this model would include the testing of further 
participant groups experiencing similar affective demands to those currently examined. 
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Chapter 8: Modelling Affect Regulation in Dyads 
This chapter outlines the process of expanding the model beyond the representation of a 
single individual to that of agents in a network. In this chapter, the simplest network, 
that of a dyad, is constructed and within it, simulations of plausible interactions are 
investigated. Alongside this, representations of dyadic interaction in the current 
literature are examined and contrasted with the process that unfolds in model 
simulations of dyadic interactions.  
8.1 Affect in a Dyad 
Affect experience and affect regulation are not just limited, intrapersonal processes; 
affect is also considered a social phenomenon, in which, the affective experiences of 
individuals can shape and be shaped by those of others (e.g., Parkinson, Fischer, & 
Manstead, 2005). The sharing of affect through social expressions and communication 
(e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999), the recounting of experiences (e.g., Rimé, 2007), or even 
just being in the presence of others (e.g., Friedman & Riggio, 1981), is a common 
human experience. Individuals can seek to directly influence how others are feeling 
(Niven, Totterdell, & Holman, 2009) and can be unconsciously affected by other’s 
expressions (Hatfield et al., 1994). A person’s affect state may impact on people’s 
feelings across dyadic relationships (e.g., Joiner, 1994) and across broad networks 
(Totterdell, Wall, Holman, Diamond, & Epitropaki, 2004), including networks spanning 
hundreds of individuals (e.g., Fowler & Christakis, 2008). This chapter examines the 
transmission of affect across a dyad. 
Affect is known to converge between individuals who spend time together (e.g., 
Hatfield et al., 1994). Groups are considered to, at times, exhibit a shared mood across 
individuals working together (e.g., Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Totterdell, Kellet, 
Teucmann, & Briner, 1998) and shared positive mood has been demonstrated to foster a 
range of positive outcomes such as cooperation (Barsade, 2002) and invested effort (Sy, 
Côté, & Saavedra, 2005). The process by which affective states can appear to spread 
from one individual to another in social circumstances is regarded as that of affective 
convergence. It has been elicited in experimental conditions (e.g., Howard & Gengler, 
2001; Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990; Neumann & Strack, 2000) and 
observed across a broad range of close dyadic relationships such as married couples 
(Hicks & Diamond, 2008), dating couples (Katz, Beach, & Joiner, 1999; Levenson & 
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Ruef, 1994), and roommates (e.g., Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Gonzaga, Campos, 
& Bradbury, 2007; Howes, Hokanson, & Loewenstein, 1985; Joiner, 1994). In this 
chapter, affective convergence is examined primarily from the position of primitive 
contagion and a basic appraisal of expressions, although it is acknowledged that affect 
convergence can arise through other means, such as shared affective events (Thompson 
& Fine, 1999) and interpersonal affect regulation (Niven et al., 2009).  
Although there are many studies in the literature examining affect regulation in a dyad, 
there are two problematic aspects of how dyadic interaction is represented. Firstly, in 
traditional, static models of affect, dyadic interaction is often considered in terms of an 
active agent engaging in affect regulation and a passive target, receiving affect-
expression from the agent (e.g., Grandey, 2000). Secondly, attempts to better reflect two 
active individuals with their own affect regulation processes has characterised affect 
experience as alternating between individuals (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008), rather than 
being continuous in both.  These issues are further explored below as problems termed 
agent-target designation and back-and-forth exchange. It is necessary to examine these 
issues and present an understanding of the dynamics in a dyadic interaction that 
accounts for these, in order to develop a functioning MARDy simulation of a dyad. 
Unlike static models, dynamic simulation offers means for representing two active 
agents in a dyad engaged in concurrent affective experiences. 
8.1.1 Agent-Target Designation 
In the traditional understanding of affect regulation in dyadic interaction, it is often 
considered that one individual has affect regulation aims and one person is the recipient 
of the affect regulation process (e.g., Côté, 2005). For the active member of the dyad, 
these regulation aims may be intrapersonal or interpersonal. For instance, a customer 
service agent may seek to regulate his or her own feelings to present a positive and 
enthusiastic outward impression in order to meet display rule standards; alternatively, 
he or she may seek to calm and reassure an irate customer in order to minimise any 
disturbance to others. In either case, discussion regarding the dyadic interaction places 
emphasis on one member of a dyad engaging in affect regulation, normally termed the 
Agent. The agent is an individual who is recognised as playing an active role in the 
affect regulation process; whereas, the counterpart, normally termed the Target, is seen 
as a relatively passive member of the affect regulation process. Recent arguments seek 
to expand this understanding of the agent-target relationship to acknowledge that the 
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target also plays an active role in the affect regulation process (Niven, Totterdell, 
Holman, & Cameron, in press). 
More broadly, an agent-target relationship may become ill-defined in a dynamically 
changing dyadic relationship. An agent is characterised in the emotional labour 
literature as an individual who undertakes affect regulation towards a held goal: either 
regulation of their own affect or the affect of others (e.g., Grandey, 2000, 2003; Niven 
et al., 2009). However, if the perspective of the Target is considered, it would be 
evident that the target can also hold affective and broader goals. The customer in the 
earlier example may be expressing irritation as a means of seeking compensation or 
sympathy or possibly attempting to regulate their own frustration through the process of 
venting. In either case, the individual nominally referred to as the Target is engaging in 
active affective regulation processes in the dyad, activities that would be regarded as an 
Agent’s behaviour. From this, it is evident that both members of the dyad can be 
regarded as active agents, shaping their own and each other’s affective states.  
This issue extends beyond that of just simply being one of terminology; overlooking the 
active role that both parties play in affect regulation in a dyad limits the scope for 
examining how affect may change over time. In a dyadic interaction, the assumption 
made that one member is a passive recipient of affect regulation and so not wholly 
studied results in potentially substantial gaps in understanding the dyad. It becomes 
necessary to approach the investigation of affect regulation in a dyad with the 
understanding that both individuals involved hold their own dynamically changing 
affect goals, which would impact on the course of affect exchange. In section 8.2, the 
design of an active affect regulation dyad is outlined with the principle that both 
members of the dyad are active affect regulating agents.   
8.1.2 Back-and-Forth Exchange 
Affect regulation in a dyad has been well described in terms of emotion cycles by Hareli 
and Rafaeli (2008) and similarly represented in what Côté (2005) terms an affect cycle. 
Hareli and Rafaeli (2008) argue that, alongside affect contagion, an agent’s affect can 
change through the inferential processing of another’s affective expression. They give 
the example of a cycle of emotions involving the expression of anger by Person A, 
which in turn elicits an expression of fear by Person B that then gives the response of 
embarrassment by Person A, with the cycle closing by Person B responding with relief. 
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This process is presented as a back-and-forth exchange of affective expressions, in 
which individuals perceive an expression of the other and then generate their own 
expression in response. The key implication is that, at any given point in a cycle, it is 
just one individual that is considered as processing and then expressing affect; the 
model remains silent on what affective processes the other individual is engaging in 
during this time. This presentation of a sequential nature of exchange in emotions omits 
the consideration that both agents have a continual and dynamically changing affective 
state (e.g., Russell 2003). Rather than using the representation that implies affect is 
passed back and forth from one agent to the other, it may be more useful to consider 
affect in a dyad as two parallel changing states which can impact on each other through 
affective expression. 
This issue relates back to the first in that there is an added complexity in examining 
affect in a dyad rather than in an individual. This simplification in considering only one 
individual in a dyad as an active agent at any time does bring some clarity in describing 
affect cycles (e.g., Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008) and reduces the affective processes so that 
affect changes may be examined with traditional statistical models. However, it does 
mean that much of the affective dynamics of two individuals, each with their own on-
going affect regulation and their own held affect goals, is not thoroughly examined. 
Reciprocal affect exchange in a dyad is necessarily a two way process, which forms a 
closed loop of each person engaging in affect-expression with the other. Complexities in 
affect dynamics may arise from this, which may not be considered if the more 
traditional perspectives for examining affect in a dyad (such as those described in this 
section) are used.  
This chapter offers a means of representing both individuals in a dyad as active agents 
that seek to engage in affect regulation towards individual- held goals as a replacement 
for the more widely used ‘active agent’ and ‘passive target’ representation. It further 
offers representation of affect as a continually changing process in both agents, moving 
beyond the limited representation of affect being considered in only one individual at a 
time. To achieve this, the computational model developed in this thesis so far is 
considered as a representation of a single agent, which seeks to regulate affect towards 
known held goals. The development and expansion of the model to function within a 
dyadic framework is described in the following section. 
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8.2 Designing a MARDy Based Dyad 
8.2.1 Overview 
In Chapters 4 through to 7, the design of MARDy has been focused largely on the 
simulation of an individual. While there has also been the inclusion of influences 
external to the model of an individual that can shape the individual’s affective and 
related states, these have so far been represented as just external impulses to the system. 
For simplicity in designing in the model, these have been considered as an affective 
event that just ‘happens’ and impacts on the dynamics of the system. The model cannot 
change the valence of these events, only how it reacts and “feels” in light of the 
situation and the event will continue on regardless. In some cases, this may be an 
appropriate characterisation of a situation: a film’s sad plot will not change and become 
more light-hearted, if we express sadness; heavy traffic will not disperse just so that our 
frustration can be eased; and no matter how angry we become with a computer, its 
performance will not improve to appease us. However, there are many more situations 
in which affective expression can directly or indirectly change affective situations, such 
as interpersonal interaction. 
As described in section 8.1, affect is often characterised as serving a social function 
with the purpose of shaping the social environment through impacting on others’ 
behaviours, thoughts, and even affective states (e.g., Parkinson, 1996; Sy et al., 2005; 
Van Kleef, 2009). This characterisation of affect differs substantially from the simple 
‘external events’ design used in the model because an individual’s affect-expressions 
could influence the intensity, duration and onset of affective events that the individual 
perceives. The simulations in this chapter have been constructed to examine the 
influence of affect-expressions by agents in a dyad on the intensities of experienced 
affect of each agent. The development of a dyad in which affect is communicated 
between agents therefore allows for an agent’s outputs (its affective expression) to be 
used to influence the intensity of inputs it receives (the affective events it experiences). 
This process is one described in the perceptual control theory literature (e.g., Powers, 
1974) in which actions on the external world are used to control inputs in order to 
reduce their discrepancies with personal goals. 
The development of a dynamic computational simulation of dyad offers a means of 
representing the active and dynamic processes involved in shaping affective states of 
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both individuals. Simulations of independent, active agents such as those outlined later 
in this chapter can meet the challenges outlined in section 8.1 when attempting to 
understand affect dynamics in a dyad. Figure 8.1 offers a drawn representation of the 
continuous and concurrent use of affect regulation of two agents in a dyad. 
 
Figure 8.1 Closed loop formed by each agent’s expressions influencing the other’s 
affective states 
This representation of affect-expression ultimately shaping the affective input received, 
through influencing the other agent’s own states contrasts with Gross’s (1998a) and 
later (e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007) representations of affect regulation. Gross 
(1998a) describes the changing of affective events to regulate one’s affect as situation 
modification and places this early in the linear chain of affect regulation strategies for 
an affective episode. However, within the model design, this process could be on-going 
through an affective episode and even concurrent with both cognitive change (felt-affect 
regulation in the model) and response modulation (affect-expression regulation in the 
model). Moreover, situation modification may arise from later regulatory processes used 
by Agent 1 because these may shape Agent 2’s expressive state, modifying the affective 
situation Agent 1 faces. Given the evolving nature of regulation during dyadic 
interactions and potential for overlap in strategy use, Gross’ (1998a) division of the 
process model into distinct emotional episodes in order to delineate ‘earlier’ regulation 
strategies that may occur after ‘later’ regulation strategies seems somewhat arbitrary. 
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8.2.2 Implementing a MARDy Dyad 
In order to create simulations of the process shown in Figure 8.1, it is useful to consider 
the MARDy simulation from a more holistic perspective. Alongside this, an additional 
component needs to be added to the MARDy simulation. 
Firstly, for examining the model in a dyadic network design it is of greater interest to 
view the model as a whole unit rather than a collection of regulatory mechanisms. The 
completed model of an individual (Figure 4.9) is grouped as a single system, with a 
singular input point (to receive affect-expressions) and output point (expression of 
affect) for other MARDy units to interact with. This grouped system makes up each 
individual agent and the internal operations (i.e. the higher and lower level control loops 
and the central resource) are functionally no different from those in the original, stand-
alone model used in simulations in earlier chapters. This naming of the complete unit as 
an Agent refers both to the commonly-used name for an active figure in an affect 
regulation context and as recognition that this is the first step towards an agent based 
model of independent units interacting across a network. 
Secondly, an additional block in the simulation is necessary to control the interactions 
between multiple MARDy agents. This additional block exists between each agent’s 
output of affective expression and the affective input of another agent in the simulation; 
it is independent of agent models and does not alter operations within agents. This block 
controls the timing, frequency, and duration of the periods in which two agents are in 
contact with each other and so able to influence each other’s affective states. Affect-
expression is considered in the model as a continuous changing state and so the 
expressed output of each agent is always active, while both agents are in the awake 
state. Without this additional meeting block limiting the times that agents contact each 
other, each agent would be continuously engaging in affect-expression towards the other 
so the meeting block determines when the agents can receive each other’s outputs and 
when they cannot. A schematic of the whole dyadic system is shown in Figure 8.2. 
The model block that determines meeting times is a simple gate that opens and closes at 
predetermined times. These times are specified before running a simulation, using the 
same entry procedure in Matlab as the means for determining the agents’ sleeping and 
waking times. While the sleeping and waking times for each agent can be set 
independently, the meeting times for both models are required to match in order to form 
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a closed loop as a dyad. In addition to this, there exists a validation check before the 
stimulation begins to ensure that meeting times for the dyad do not overlap with either 
agent being asleep.  
 
Figure 8.2 Schematic of two complete MARDy simulations connected through a model 
component that determines meeting times 
Affect expression from each agent is a continuous output; its influence as an input to the 
other agent is determined by an intermediate block in Simulink acting as a ‘gate’ that 
allows affect expression to pass through at pre-determined time points for pre-
determined durations. Dashed blocks represent affect events eternal to the dyad that 
may influence agents’ felt states. 
 
In this design, affect-expression in the dyad serves as the primary input to each agent, 
which acts in the felt-affect control loop as the destabilising influence, impacting on the 
felt-affect state (see section 3.2 for a description of a control loop’s component parts). In 
previous chapters, this destabilising influence has been assigned as the widely 
encompassing term affective events, which typically incorporates affective expressions 
from others; from here on in this chapter, affective events is used to describe any 
affective input to the model that does not involve expressions in the dyad.  
Affect-expression from one agent as an affective input to the other directly acts as an 
influence on the recipient’s felt-affect state. A positive expression from one agent serves 
to improve the affective state of the other, while a negative expression serves to worsen 
the partner’s affect. This process is a substantial simplification of affect exchange, 
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especially compared to the range of possible responses to specific affective expressions 
(e.g., Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). However, to include a range of 
possible responses to the affective expression of the other in a dyad would require the 
inclusion of a complex affect appraisal system that interprets others’ expressions in 
terms of broader social goals. For example, in a competitive sports game an expression 
of anger from an individual due to poor performance may elicit happiness in another 
agent that stands to benefit from this. The broad range of possible evaluations to each 
expression cannot be successfully captured, even in a wide ranging model, such as the 
one in this thesis, and so a simpler representation of responses is chosen.  
Affective expressions, alongside influencing the felt-affect state directly (e.g., Hareli & 
Rafaelli, 2008), can indirectly influence the felt-affect state through influencing the 
affect-expression state. As described earlier, affect contagion is regarded to include the 
process of expression mimicry (Hatfield et al., 1994), indicating a convergence of two 
people’s affect-expression states. In order to achieve this in the simulation, the 
difference between the affect-expression state as an input to each agent and the agent’s 
current affect-expression state is calculated. This difference is then fed directly to the 
affect-expression block (Figure 4.5) so that the current affect-expression begins to 
converge with the other agent’s expression. Over time these two expressed states from 
each agent would fully converge in the absence of any successful deliberate 
intrapersonal expression regulation. The felt-affect state is in turn influenced by this 
convergence of expression through the feedback link from expression to the felt-affect 
state representing expressive feedback, such as that described by Hatfield et al. (1994). 
This dyad-model design is not intended to examine deliberate interpersonal affect 
regulation. Deliberate interpersonal affect regulation is characterised as intentional 
actions or expressions with the goal of changing another individual’s feelings or 
expressions (Niven et al., 2009). While an agent, as it stands, can regulate his or her 
own expressions towards a held goal, this does not occur within the broader framework 
of using that action to meet wider goals of changing another agent’s felt-affect state. For 
this to be possible, each agent would need redesigning to include more goal states, such 
as a goal for what it wants the other agent to feel, and means for achieving these goals, 
such as selection mechanisms to switch focus from intrapersonal regulation to 
interpersonal regulation. For this reason of the required added complexity necessary to 
introduce deliberate interpersonal regulation, it is not considered in the model at present. 
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8.3 Simulating Dyadic Interaction 
In order to test some of the expected outcomes of two agents interacting, it is necessary 
to both test a dyadic design of the model and to make comparisons with that of 
independent agents, existing alone. This contrasts the influence of affect-expression on 
agent’s felt-affect states in the dyad with agents that do not receive such affective input. 
Further to this, isolated agents’ affective expressions do not shape the affective 
environment (i.e. the affect states of other agents) as agents would in a dyad design. The 
outcome of any constructed scenario in a model of dyadic interaction does not alone 
highlight how the dyad has influenced an agent’s affective states. A simulation of an 
individual agent can serve as a control condition for the dyad condition: if parameter 
values are kept consistent between the two conditions, the influence of the dyad on an 
agent’s affective states can be determined. 
In this chapter, three broad scenarios are simulated to show the range of influences a 
dyadic network can have on an agent’s affective states. These scenarios have been 
selected to reflect broad classes of affect influence in a dyad. Firstly, two normative 
agents, with parameters derived from Chapters 6 and 7, are arranged as a dyad to 
determine the influence of the dyad arrangement on regulation towards shared typically 
positive affect goals. Second, the effects of dysfunctional affect regulation in the dyad 
are examined and contrasted with both isolated agents and the results from the first test. 
This scenario focuses on representing one agent in the dyad as experiencing symptoms 
of mild to moderate depression, with the aim of recreating aspects of affect convergence 
seen in Joiner (1994). The last scenario looks at interactions typified in the work 
psychology literature: presentation of inauthentic affect-expressions (surface acting) and 
their influence on a) customer/client interaction quality and b) the felt-affect state of the 
employee.  
To create each scenario, a number of parameters require specification beforehand, such 
as the goal for felt-affect states, and the home-bases for felt-affect in each agent. Each 
parameter specification and the ranges used for them are outlined in this section. Ranges 
of values are used for all other parameters not specifically determined in the scenario 
creation. This allows for an overall range of plausible predicted behaviour of the models 
rather than an overly specified proscriptive outcome of the simulation. This further 
offers a broader representation of the outcomes of the model and reduces the potential 
of reporting artefacts of specific parameter configurations as definitive results for each 
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agent. The values and ranges used for all of the parameters used throughout the 
simulations are detailed in Appendix 6; key parameters, specified to form each scenario 
design are mentioned in each section in this chapter.  
For each scenario, the simulations are run 100 times with random values in a fixed 
range for all parameters to offer an example of the expected outcomes of dyadic 
interaction. The influences of affective events, outside the dyadic interaction, for each 
agent are represented by random values input to the felt-affect block, a procedure used 
by Oravecz et al. (2009) to represent the ups and downs of daily life. Dyadic interaction 
occurs between the models for a period lasting from 11am until 2pm and then again 
from 5pm to 8pm simulation time each day. In the model’s representation of regultory 
resource, these times coincide with higher and lower levels of self-regulatory capacity 
so influences of resource on affect convergence can be explored. The maximum and 
minimum outcomes over a period of 6 simulated days are presented as simulation 
results; this simulation duration matches that of the data fitting period from Chapters 6 
and 7. Agents are differentiated by the terms Agent 1 and Agent 2. 
8.3.1 Scenario 1: Supportive Interaction 
The first dyad scenario is a simple connection of two normative agents. Results from 
Chapter 7 indicate that, almost without exception, individuals report having a goal 
affective state that is equal than or more positive than their current felt-affective state. In 
most cases, this exists as a high positive valence affect goal. To reflect this, for the 
purposes of this scenario, each agent is considered to regulate their affective states 
towards a high positive felt-affect goal and a congruent positive affect-expression goal 
so that their expressed state is likely to be a genuine representation of their felt-affect 
state. Two agents in a dyad may be considered as a representation of a typical 
romantically attached couple, two housemates, or mutual friends who share time with 
each other.  
It is anticipated that this design will result in more positive affect experienced within the 
dyad in comparison with agents on their own. In empirical studies, it is indicated that 
positive affect can be shared through positive affect communication within the dyad 
(e.g., Rimé, 2009; Rimé, Mesquitab, Bocaa, & Philippot, 1991). Further to this, Hicks 
and Diamond (2008) highlight that, in romantically attached couples, one person 
recounting their most positive experience of the day to the partner would result in both 
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individuals experiencing greater positive affect. Positive expression from each agent 
will encourage positive affect in the other, likely to ensure that reciprocal expression is, 
again, positive. 
Proposition 1.1: Agents holding equivalent positive affect goals in a dyad will both 
experience greater positive affect than they would alone. 
It is expected that each agent’s positive affect-expression would result in their 
counterpart’s felt-affect state being brought closer to the held positive felt-affect goals. 
Additional outcomes of this apparent support in reaching a held goal would be a 
reduction in regulatory efforts expended to meet goals and an overall greater 
conservation of self-regulatory capacity throughout the day. These processes could be 
considered to reflect results found by Fitzsimons and Finkel (2011) in which thoughts of 
a partner’s assistance in reaching a variety of self-regulatory goals diminished their own 
regulatory efforts towards these goals. Support from a partner in reaching affect goals 
may diminish the necessary effort expended in reaching these.  
Proposition 1.2: Agents holding equivalent goals in a dyad will be less depleted in 
reaching the goal together than either will alone.  
Building on P1.1 and P1.2, it is anticipated that the arrangement of agents in this 
supportive dyad will influence the states of affect goals. With the predicted greater self-
regulatory capacity, affect goals are more likely to be met and so less likely to be altered 
to more amenable levels. Further to this, if affect goals are likely to change, the affect 
states they will tend towards are anticipated to be close to the state intensities.  
Proposition 1.3: Agents holding equivalent goals in a dyad will maintain these closer to 
the goal ‘home-base’ and show less variation in affect goal intensities than isolated 
agents. 
In order to examine the propositions arising from this scenario, it is necessary to specify 
some agent parameters. Firstly, as previously described, both agents have positive felt-
affect goals and so are set to hold a positive felt-affect goal of +5 on the simulation’s 
affect scale from +5 to -5. Affect-expression goals are specified as +5, congruent with 
the felt-affect goals. In addition to this, the agents’ home-base for affect is set at a 
slightly positive value of 1 to ensure that across the simulation the agents would 
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generally experience a positive felt-affect state. Further parameter values, and ranges for 
each of these, are outlined in Appendix 6. 
8.3.2 Scenario 2: Depressed Agent 
The second dyad scenario is a representation of affect contagion seen in studies 
examining depression. Research on the affect states of college roommates indicates that 
if one member of the dyad shows persistent signs of mild depression, then the other 
member of the dyad may show an increase in negative affect. This outcome of a 
contagious negative mood reportedly increases over a period of months (Howes et al., 
1985) and occurs early on in the dyad formation (Joiner, 1994). It is expected that 
representing symptoms of depression in Agent 2 (Depressed Agent) through the 
manipulation of parameters for affect regulation mechanisms can be sufficient in 
inducing depressive symptoms in Agent 1 (Non-Depressed Agent). It is not only 
expected that felt-affect will become more negative in the Non-depressed Agent, but 
also that felt-affect goals will be lowered and also regulatory fatigue will be greater in 
comparison with a control agent simulation. 
Proposition 2.1: The Non-Depressed Agent will display similar depressive symptoms to 
that of Depressed Agent, without the presence of underlying affect regulation 
dysfunction. 
The expected influence on the Non-Depressed Agent might be mitigated under certain 
circumstances. As described in section 8.2, parameter values for a wide array of the 
parameters used are not fixed across simulations but vary a small degree (Appendix 6). 
Parameter variations for the Non-Depressed Agent which improve upon the capacity to 
change affect (such as a greater regulatory momentum) or a more general positive 
disposition (such as a more positive home-base), may limit the influence of Non-
Depressed Agent. As a result, the Non-Depressed Agent might not always show affect 
convergence in this scenario. 
Proposition 2.2: The Non-Depressed Agent may show ‘immunity’ to contagion of 
depressive symptoms, under specific parameter configurations enhancing positive 
affect, resource conservation, and/or regulatory momentum. 
Parameter specifications for the Non-Depressed Agent are kept from Agent 1 in the first 
scenario. Three parameter values are altered in the Depressed Agent to create the 
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depressive symptoms of a stable and enduring negative felt-affect state and a feeling of 
depletion. First, the home-base for the Depressed Agent is specified at -3 on the ±5 
scale used, resulting in a tendency for mild to moderate negative affect. Second, a gain 
of 0.5 is placed just before the felt-affect block (Figure 4.2.), which weakens the 
influence of affective input to change the felt-affect state from both felt-affect regulation 
and expression from the Non-Depressed Agent. Third, a similar gain is placed at the 
equivalent point in the affect-expression regulation loop. The inclusion of the gains 
restricts the degree of change to the affective states over time and can be considered 
analogous to the proposed affective inertia associated with depression (e.g., Kuppens et 
al., 2010). It is expected that as a product of the restricted capacity for affect regulation, 
the depressed agent will both experience goal adjustment towards a more manageable 
affective goal (as such, possibly wanting to feel less negative rather than an unattainable 
positive affect goal) and experience high regulatory fatigue through persistent 
unsuccessful efforts at improving felt-affect. 
8.3.3 Scenario 3: Surface Acting 
The third scenario looks at the effects of inauthentic expression by an agent in the dyad. 
This is considered in terms of a person engaging in surface acting at work to express a 
more positive affective state than their genuinely experienced affect (Hochschild, 1983). 
This process of surface acting is considered to be fatiguing (e.g., Goldberg & Grandey, 
2007), and of limited success in shaping the other agent’s feelings (e.g., Grandey, 
2003).  For this scenario, Agent 1 is considered as an Employee working in customer 
service and Agent 2 is considered the Customer. The scenario is divided into two sub-
tests: the Customer’s felt-affect state is manipulated so that it experiences positive affect 
in the first test and negative affect in the second, representing a happy or unhappy 
Customer, respectively. The deleterious effects of the Employee using surface acting on 
both the Employee’s self-regulatory capacity and the quality of interaction between 
agents are expected to be modified by the affective states of the Customer. Positive 
affect states of the Customer are anticipated to improve felt-affect of the Employee, 
limiting dissonance and potentially self-regulatory fatigue; whereas negative affect 
states of the Customer are anticipated to worsen felt-affect of the Employee, increasing 
dissonance and potentially self-regulatory fatigue. This is analogous to Côté’s (2005) 
mechanism of interpersonal feedback. 
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Proposition 3.1: Dissonance between felt-affect and affect-expression in the Employee 
will be reduced, if the Customer’s felt-affect reflects the Employee’s affect-expressions. 
Proposition 3.2: Dissonance between felt-affect and affect-expression in the Employee 
will be enhanced, if the Customer’s felt-affect contrasts the Employee’s affect-
expressions. 
Proposition 3.3: Regulatory resource depletion in the Employee will be reduced, if the 
Customer’s felt-affect reflects the Employee’s affect-expressions. 
Proposition 3.4: Regulatory resource depletion in the Employee will be enhanced, if the 
Customer’s felt-affect contrasts the Employee’s affect-expressions. 
In order to simulate an individual engaging in surface acting towards a positive state, 
the Employee agent must create a discrepancy between felt-affect and affect-expression 
(such as Grandey’s, 2003, example of a hotel clerk who displays sympathy but feels 
irritation towards a customer). To simulate an individual who displays a positive 
expression but feels otherwise, the held goal for the Employee’s affect-expression is 
retained at 5, while the typically positive affect home-base and felt-affect goal for the 
Employee are reduced from 1 and 5 to -1 and 2 respectively. This maintains the 
Employee’s felt-affect state at approximately neutral levels and could represent an 
employee who is not pursuing a company’s display rules through deep acting.  
For the first dyadic interaction test, the Customer’s parameters are kept from Agent 2 in 
Scenario 1; the agent regulates towards high intensity positive affect goals. In the 
second test, the Customer’s parameters for affect home-base, felt-affect goal and affect-
expression goal are set to -2, -1 and -1, respectively; this is considered to represent a 
mildly negative affect state for the Customer. Results from these two tests are further 
compared against a control state of the Agents in isolation from each other.  
8.4 Results 
Results are gathered from both agents through the process of artificial diary data 
collection, outlined in chapter 7. Recordings are taken from the agents across a range of 
different variables: current felt-affect, current affect-expression, current felt-affect goal 
state, and current self-regulatory capacity. These recordings are taken every two hours 
in the simulation timeframe while agents are in the ‘awake’ state. Results are collected 
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over a period of seven simulated days with the first day’s results discarded as that day is 
used to specify the agents’ desired starting states so the last six days of simulation are 
reported.  
For each agent, in both their dyad design, in which affect is transferred, and in their 
control design, in which no affect can be transferred between agents, the range of results 
are reported. The highest and lowest average outcomes are taken from the 100 
simulations used for each scenario, in which key parameter values were randomly 
altered in a small fixed range around the values used to give the best fit of data in 
chapter 7. This outlines the overall range of recorded states across all simulations, 
offering a general representation of plausible projected state intensities. In terms of felt-
affect, affect-expression, and felt-affect goals, range consists of the most positive 
valence recording on average over the six days and the most negative (or least positive) 
valence recording averaged across the six days. In terms of self-regulatory capacity, the 
highest and lowest average self-regulatory capacity over the period of six days are 
reported. Results are scored on a scale of +5 to -5 for affect reports and on a scale of 0 
to 10 for self-regulatory capacity, to mimic the scales used in the diary studies.  
Results are presented by scenario; comparisons are made between the outcomes of the 
simulations of the agents affect regulatory behaviour in an isolated control design and 
the dyad design. Further to this, comparisons can be made from the outcomes of one 
scenario with the outcomes of the same agent in a similar scenario. 
8.4.1 Results 1: Supportive Interaction 
In this scenario, both agents are seeking to regulate their felt-affect towards a held 
positive goal, initially set at +5 on the ±5 scales used. It was predicted (P1.1) that the 
positive affect by each agent displayed during time spent together would serve to 
collectively increase the intensity of positive affect in comparison with agents alone. 
Results in Figure 8.3 indicate that both agents experience on average an overall higher 
felt-affective state when part of a dyad when compared to regulating towards the held 
goals alone. Figure 8.3 displays results in the convention used for the remainder of this 
chapter, unless otherwise specified: Agents as isolated individuals (Control) are on the 
left side and Agents as the dyad network (Dyad) are on the right; Agent 1 is represented 
in the upper graphs and Agent 2 in the lower graphs. 
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Figure 8.3 Ranges of felt-affective states for Agents 1 (top) and 2 (bottom), both as 
isolated models (left) and together in a dyad design (right). 
A further predicted consequence (P1.2) of dyadic interaction in which both agents share 
mutual positive goals was the reduced effort required to regulate affect. It was 
anticipated that the mutual positive expression would assist both agents in reaching a 
high positive affect goal whereas agents alone would not have this available support. 
Results in Figure 8.4 indicate that depletion is slightly reduced throughout the day for 
both agents if they are connected in a dyad in comparison to regulating without contact 
with the other. This supports the expected outcome that regulation is less effortful with 
a supportive partner and suggests that this leads to a conservation of resource (see 
Hobfoll, 1989) rather than an actual boost to resource capacity (supporting strength-
model theories, e.g., Muraven et al., 2006). As such, individuals are less likely to 
experience depletion when with a partner and perhaps likely to associate their partner 
with resource conservation, echoing the results found by Fitzsimons and Finkel (2011). 
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Figure 8.4 Ranges of self-regulatory capacity for Agents 1 (top) and 2 (bottom), both as 
isolated models (left) and together in a dyad design (right) 
The final proposition (P1.3) considered the positive influence of the dyad would have 
on maintaining affect goals at high intensities. Given that agents in a dyad show less 
depletion in regulating towards affect goals (Figure 8.4), it is plausible that affect goals 
are less likely to deviate away from the affect goal home-base in a dyad. Figure 8.5 
shows that the dynamics of affect goals in the dyad design are slightly more complex 
than this prediction of stability about a high initial intensity. While the results generally 
indicate that affect goals are held at a higher intensity in agents in a dyad than they are 
in either agent in isolation, they do not necessarily show greater stability. Maximum 
estimates in both the control and dyad design show stability at high affect goal 
intensities, with goals in the dyad design being slightly more positive. However, the 
lowest estimates show greater variability in affect goals, with affect goals in the dyad 
design appearing to centre on a more positive affect state than those in the control. 
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Figure 8.5 Ranges of felt-affective goal states for Agents 1 (top) and 2 (bottom), both as 
isolated models (left) and together in a dyad design (right) 
8.4.2 Results 2: Depressed Agent 
In the second scenario it was predicted that negative affect would transfer from the 
Depressed Agent to the Non-Depressed Agent (P2.1), in line with established results 
(e.g., Joiner, 1994). Figure 8.6 indicates that in a comparison between the non-
depressed agent existing alone and existing as part of a dyad, the influence of a 
depressed agent can cause a decrease in positive affect to the extent that, at times, both 
agents experience negative affect. The moderately negative affect state of the Depressed 
Agent is reflected in lower bound estimates of felt-affect states of the Non-Depressed 
Agent. However, Figure 8.6 indicates that not every trial results in the Non-Depressed 
Agent’s affect shifting to a negative state; some parameter configurations ‘immunise’ 
Agent 1 from substantial affect convergence, as was predicted (P2.2). Inspection of the 
parameter space indicates that felt-affect home-base and regulatory momentum are 
particularly high in ‘immune’ agents, while depletion cost of felt-affect regulation is 
particularly low. This is further discussed in section 8.5. 
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Figure 8.6 Ranges of felt-affective states for Non-Depressed Agent (top) and Depressed 
Agent (bottom), both as isolated models (left) and together in a dyad design (right) 
The second key influence seen in the ‘depressed agent’ dyadic interaction is the change 
in self-regulatory capacity in the non-depressed agent. Figure 8.7 indicates that 
depletion increases in the Non-Depressed Agent, if it is paired in a dyad with a 
Depressed Agent, further supporting propositions made (P2.1). Results further show 
that this occurs across all simulations run. Parameter configurations which enabled 
‘immunity’ from affect convergence do not also enable ‘immunity’ of contagion of 
depletion, which does not support the proposition made (P2.2). These results point 
towards a mechanism for the apparent immunity to affect convergence: the Non-
Depressed Agent may be expending more effort in engaging in regulation to conserve 
positive affect, depleting self-regulatory capacity. 
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Figure 8.7 Ranges of self-regulatory capacity for Non-Depressed Agent (top) and 
Depressed Agent (bottom), both as isolated models (left) and together in a dyad design 
(right) 
A further outcome of the simulations is the change to the Non-Depressed Agent’s affect 
goal states when in the dyad design in comparison with the control design. As seen in 
both the diary data and predictions from the literature (e.g., Lord & Hanges, 1987), 
affect goals tend towards current affect states in individuals that are depleted. This 
process is evident in the Depressed Agent’s goal states under both conditions (Figure 
8.8), which substantially differ from the value of the felt-affect goal home-base (+5). 
The Non-Depressed Agent shows slightly less positive felt-affect goals, in the dyad 
condition in comparison to the control condition, which can be regarded as some 
support for proposition P2.1. Support for this proposition is further seen in the 
resemblance of the Non-Depressed Agent’s felt-affect goals in the dyad condition with 
the Depressed Agent’s felt-affect goals (Figure 8.8), particularly for the minimum 
estimates made. 
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Figure 8.8 Ranges of felt-affect goal states for Non-Depressed Agent (top) and 
Depressed Agent (bottom), both as isolated models (left) and together in a dyad design 
(right) 
Lastly, convergence is seen in the dyad in terms of affect-expression (Figure 8.9). As 
with felt-affect, the Non-Depressed Agent shows a great variety in the degree of 
convergence, suggesting that certain parameter values and thus aspects of self-
regulation can limit the likelihood of being influenced by other’s affective and 
expressive states. Although this is not explicitly referred to in propositions, the pattern 
of results in figure 8.9 does reflect those seen earlier in this section. 
Alongside this, there is some evidence of convergence in the Depressed Agent towards 
the more positive expressive states of the Non-Depressed Agent, even though although 
the depressed agent shows a dampened response to affective input. The parameters for 
the Depressed Agent restrict the capacity for regulatory efforts of both felt-affect 
regulation and affect-expression regulation. While the Depressed Agent has (initially) 
positive affect-expression goals, it does not have the means to successfully reach them; 
similarly, the felt-affective state does not change to such a degree and so cannot be 
solely driving the changes to the expressed state. Therefore, the overall positive changes 
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in expression throughout the simulation largely appear to come from the process 
representing emotional contagion.  
 
Figure 8.9 Ranges of affect-expression states for Non-Depressed Agent (top) and 
Depressed Agent (bottom), both as isolated models (left) and together in a dyad design 
(right) 
8.4.3 Results 3: Surface Acting 
The final scenario aims to represent an affect regulation process typically used by 
customer service agents when engaging with customers, which is surface acting. This 
scenario examines the influences that the Customer’s (Agent 2) affective states may 
have upon the dissonance experienced by the Employee (Agent 1), which is presenting a 
more positive affective display than it feels (i.e., surface acting). To examine this, two 
dyads were used, in which the affective states of the Customer were manipulated: one 
with positive affect and one negative affect. Results indicate that the Employee shows 
affect-expressions substantially closer to its original affect goal home-base (+5), when 
in contact with a positive affect the Customer, in comparison to both a control agent and 
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in a dyad with a negative affect Customer (Figure 8.10). Like the two agents in Scenario 
1 (section 8.4.1), both agents appear to support each other in working towards their 
positive goals, resulting in more positive affect-expressions by the Employee. In 
contrast, when the Employee interacts with the Customer that aims to express a 
somewhat negative state, there is no support available to use to work towards the more 
positive state. 
 
Figure 8.10 Ranges of affect-expression for the Employee as an isolated model (top), 
interaction with a positive affect Customer (bottom-left) and interaction with a negative 
affect Customer (bottom-right) 
Further to this, the Employee’s felt-affect is seen to become more positive, when in 
contact with a positive affect Customer, even though the Employee’s felt-affect goal is 
specified at a marginally positive state. In contrast, felt-affect for the Employee in both 
the control simulations and in the dyad with a negative affect Customer shows 
maintenance of affect about a mildly positive state only. Figure 8.11 shows the felt-
affect states for the Employee across all three tests.  
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Felt-affect and affect-expression can be considered together to give an indication of the 
dissonance between states experienced by the Employee, while engaging in surface 
acting. The proposed influence of a positive affect Customer, which has affect states 
reflecting the Employee’s expression goals, in reducing the Employee’s dissonance 
(P3.1) is only marginally present. While felt-affect in the Employee shifts towards the 
affect-expression goal, affect-expression also shifts to more positive states, preserving 
some dissonance. Alongside this, the proposed influence of a negative affect Customer, 
which has affect states contrasting the Employee’s expression goals, in increasing the 
Employee’s dissonance (P3.2) is not present. Explanations for these findings and their 
relation to emotional labour theory are considered in section 8.5. 
 
Figure 8.11 Ranges of felt-affect for the Employee as an isolated model (top), 
interaction with a positive affect Customer (bottom-left) and interaction with a negative 
affect Customer (bottom-right) 
Results indicate that The Customer’s affective states do have an influence on the 
depletion of self-regulatory capacity in the Employee. Figure 8.12 shows a slight 
increase in self-regulatory capacity in the Employee, if the Agent is paired with a 
positive affect Customer, in comparison to both a pairing with a negative affect 
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Customer or as an isolated Agent. This supports an earlier proposition (P3.3) that 
resource depletion may be mitigated by interaction with an Agent with affect states 
congruent with expression goals. However, Figure 8.12 does not show that interaction 
with a negative affect Customer does further deplete the Employee, in comparison with 
the Employee acting in isolation. As a result, this does not offer support for proposition 
P3.4, which suggests that resource depletion may be enhanced by interaction with an 
Agent with affect states contrasting with expression goals. These simulation results are 
further discussed in section 8.5. 
 
Figure 8.12 Ranges of perceived regulatory resource capacity for the Employee as an 
isolated model (top), interaction with a positive affect Customer (bottom-left) and 
interaction with a negative affect Customer (bottom-right) 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter offers representation of affect dynamics in dyadic interactions through 
computational simulation, which can overcome issues faced by more traditional 
investigation methods. Examining affect in a dyad from the perspective of one p as an 
active agent and one as a passive target (e.g., Côté, 2005) faces limitations in 
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representing individuals as capable of being active in controlling their own affect and 
affect goals. Also, representing affect change in a dyad through static associations in 
traditional models (e.g., Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008) faces limitations in capturing the 
dynamics of both individuals concurrently. The use of computational simulation allows 
for both dyad members to be represented as complex individuals, concurrently pursuing 
their own affect goals, shaping the affect dynamics of themselves and their counterpart. 
The simulations in this chapter offer support for the MARDy model as an effective 
representation of agents in a dyad, especially considering that the model has not been 
previously tested or fitted to data (Chapters 5 to 7) with dyadic interaction in mind. For 
the most part, propositions offered for affect dynamics in a dyad are matched by the 
simulations, which can further offer representations of plausible mechanisms for the 
affect dynamics seen. Propositions matched by the simulations are reviewed here and 
explanations are offered for cases in which propositions were not matched. 
In the first scenario, the simulations indicate that two agents working towards mutually 
held positive affect goals experience more positive affect, less depletion, and maintain 
higher affect goals, than if either regulates towards these goals alone. These findings 
closely resemble propositions made and indicate the model’s potential for representing 
affect dynamics in a dyad. The simulations suggest regulatory outsourcing, in which 
both agents co-regulating towards a held goal can reach it, even if they were unable to 
on their own and, in doing so, reduce the overall regulatory demands on themselves.  
The second scenario sought to represent affect convergence between two agents, one of 
which experienced symptoms of depression, simulating previous research of Joiner 
(1994). The results indicated the simulated symptoms of depression identified in Agent 
2 (negative affect and depletion) can be ‘caught’ by the Employee. Moreover, these 
symptoms occur within the Employee, even without any underlying change to its 
parameter values corresponding to those responsible for inducing the depressive 
symptoms in The Customer. As a caveat to P2.1, it was argued that not every simulation 
run in the second scenario would result in affect convergence and the experience of 
depressive symptoms in the Employee. Given the parameter ranges used to generate an 
array of outcomes across 100 trials, it was anticipated that some configurations would 
enable sufficient positive affect regulation to be ‘immune’ from depressive symptom 
contagion. Results indicated that a more positive felt-affect home-base, greater 
regulatory momentum, and a lower cost for felt-affect regulation than average each 
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contributed to the Employee’s immunity from depressive symptom contagion. 
Identification of psychological analogues in individuals could offer means of limiting 
processes of depressive contagion in situations such as that studied by Joiner (1994). It 
should, however, be noted, that such ‘immune’ agents were not also immunised from 
associated costs to their self-regulatory capacity, indicating that positive affect was 
maintained in such agents via regulatory efforts.  
In the third scenario, results are mixed in terms of the simulations adhering to 
propositions offered. Interaction with the positive affect Customer does result in the 
Employee’s affect becoming more positive; however, this process does not substantially 
result in a discrepancy reduction between felt-affect and affect-expression, contrary to 
the proposed outcome. This is because affect-expression also becomes more positive, in 
comparison to an isolated Employee. However, results indicate that depletion does 
decrease as proposed in P3.3, despite the discrepancy being maintained across 
conditions. This is considered to be a result of the more positive felt-affect state, which 
reaches the felt-affect goal state, limits the upward regulation necessary and reduces 
resource depletion. Despite the affect-expression state also increasing, results from 
Chapter 5 indicate that it is not the raw score of the affect-expression goal that influence 
cost but rather the discrepancy between felt-affect and affect-expression, leaving 
resource depletion unaffected in this regard. 
Further results in the third scenario indicate that the negative affect Customer does not 
substantially impede the Employee’s expression regulation or make the Employee’s 
felt-affect state more negative, in comparison to the isolation condition. The results 
from this test may be due to a floor effect, in which the Employee engaging in affect-
expression regulation that induces a large discrepancy between felt-affect and affect-
expression is already maximally depleting. As a result, no further detrimental influences 
can be seen, in comparisons between to the dyad and isolation condition. While this test 
was not specifically designed to comment on the emotional labour experiments reported 
in Goldberg and Grandey (2007), it does offer an explanation for why they found a lack 
of interaction effects between use of surface acting and customer mood on employee 
experience of emotional fatigue. Results from their study indicated that a scenario 
involving an angry customer was not more detrimental to employee fatigue than one 
involving a calm customer; the current simulated scenario suggests that use of surface 
acting alone is sufficiently depleting to wash out any effects seen due to customer 
mood. The simulation results indicate that if an agent would habitually use expression 
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regulation as a primary means of affect regulation, they are unlikely to see any 
substantial positive outcomes unless the other agent is already engaging in affect 
regulation towards a similar goal. This may be further influenced by individuals 
reacting negatively to surface acting in others, which can be perceived as being 
inauthentic (e.g., Martínez-Iñigo et al., 2007), although such effects extend beyond the 
current remit of the dyad model. 
In summary, this chapter offers comment on existing means of conceptualising dyadic 
interaction and alternative means to further examine the affect dynamics within a dyad. 
Development of the model from representation of a single individual to that of multiple 
agents allows for novel predictions to be made regarding affect dynamics, which may 
not arise from use of static representations of affect in a dyad. 
Chapter 9: General Discussion 
9.1 Thesis Overview 
In this thesis, I set out to examine the dynamics of affect regulation as a function of 
changes in self-regulatory capacity and dynamic goal states for affect. Affect regulation 
is regarded as a process for enacting change to affect states, such as heightening or 
dampening the intensity of an affective experience, and extending or reducing an affect 
experience’s duration (Gross, 1999; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). Affect regulation 
can be broadly considered as consisting of two main processes: the regulation of 
feelings and the regulation of expressions. Gross (1998a) divides his model of affect 
regulation into approximations of these two categories, terming them antecedent 
focused regulation, processes which serve to moderate affect events and one’s feelings, 
and response focused regulation, processes which serve to just moderate one’s 
expressions. A similar distinction is made in the emotional labour literature, in which 
employees are expected to meet affective requirements at the workplace as part of their 
job, such as maintaining a calm and cheerful appearance when dealing with customers. 
Traditionally, research has examined emotional labour as comprising of two key 
processes: deep acting, regulating one’s feelings, and surface acting, regulating one’s 
expressions (Grandey, 2000; Hochschild, 1983; Totterdell & Holman, 2003). Despite 
the distinction made, these processes are considered to influence each other over time 
through the forward link from felt-affect shaping affect-expression (e.g., Mauss & 
Robinson, 2009), through the feedback link from affect-expression to felt-affect (e.g., 
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Hatfield et al., 1994) and through their shared influence on one’s capacity for engaging 
in affect regulation. 
Affect regulation is a process that falls within the more general topic of self-regulation, 
which also encompasses the topics of regulation of behaviour and regulation of 
cognition. Commonalities seen across the subsets for regulation are the attention to 
one’s states, be those feelings, actions or thoughts, the comparison with goal states, 
namely what one wants or ought to feel, act or think, and then changes undertaken to 
ensure that differences between the current and goal states are reduced (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 2001; Powers, 1974). One of the key, applied aspects self-regulation theories  
is the attempt to understand why individuals may often fail to engage in changes to their 
feelings, actions or thoughts even if they know that their current states do not meet their 
goals (e.g., Alberts et al., 2011; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister 
2000). The strength-model of self-regulation posits that attempts at regulation drain 
from a limited shared self-regulatory resource, which fuels the process of self-regulation 
(Muraven & Baumeister 2000). Diminished self-regulatory capacity and failure of self-
regulation may arise from a depletion of self-regulatory resource and subsequent 
attempts to conserve that which remains (Muraven et al., 2006). Deliberate or controlled 
processes of affect regulation are considered to both require the presence of this shared 
resource and to deplete it (e.g., Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven et al., 1998). A limited 
resource capacity for affect regulation therefore presents restrictions on one’s capacity 
to continuously meet affect goals: one cannot always feel or express what one aims to. 
As a result, it requires examination to understand how individuals allocate resource and 
pursue affect goals in ways which might ensure a balance so that, over time, affect goals 
can be met within the restrictions placed on self-regulatory capacity through the process 
of resource conservation. The broad aim of this thesis is the investigation of these how 
these processes of affect goal pursuit and resource allocation unfold over time, in order 
to offer new insights into the dynamics of affect regulation. 
In Part 1 of this thesis, Chapters 2 to 5, I examined the literature regarding the dynamics 
of affect regulation, self-regulatory capacity and goal adjustment and then explored 
means of representing these in a computational model. The literature review, in Chapter 
2, covered four identifiable aspects of affect regulation dynamics, related in a single 
overarching model: felt-affect regulation, affect-expression regulation, limited self-
regulatory capacity, and affect regulation goals. I then sought to identify a framework 
and method for which to explore the conceptual model derived from the literature 
220 
 
review, in Chapter 3. A control theory framework was chosen to suitably represent the 
ubiquitous presence of closed-loop processes described in the literature review and a 
computational modelling method was outlined, which could capture dynamics described 
in the literature review and represent underlying interactions between the distinct 
processes of affect regulation. In Chapter 4, I subsequently outlined and constructed an 
operational model of affect regulation dynamics based on principles described in 
Chapter 3 so that the informally described processes and interactions in the model 
outlined in Chapter 2 were specified. At the close of Chapter 4, a computational model 
and a list of parameters used in the model to represent aspects of affect regulation were 
presented, alongside ranges for these parameters in which the model would prove 
functional. In Chapter 5, I presented a variety of tests on the model’s behaviour and 
examined these against known data. This served to identify limits on the ranges of 
parameters so that the model may represent known affect regulation dynamics and 
ultimately make predictions for this area of research.  
The first part of the thesis offered a new means of examining affect regulation dynamics 
as a part of the growing field of computational simulations of affect. Existing 
computational simulations of affect and affect regulation were considered and the need 
for a new overarching model of affect, self-regulatory capacity and affect goals was put 
forward. The outcomes, questions and aims from the literature review all pointed 
towards a need for an understanding of the dynamic processes associated with affect 
regulation and that this was not met by current computational simulations of affect. The 
proposed model in this section and method of investigation offered new insights to 
aspects of affect regulation, which require further investigation.  
In Part 2 of the thesis, Chapters 6 to 8, I sought to evaluate the model’s capacity for 
representing and making predictions regarding the ‘real world’ dynamics of affect, 
affect goals and self-regulatory capacity. In Chapter 6, I conducted a study in which five 
students recorded their felt-affect state, their affect goals, perceived self-regulatory 
capacity and felt-affective events over the period of six days. Variables in the model, 
such as simulated affective events and sleeping patterns, were adjusted to reflect each of 
the five participants’ experiences and then parameters in the model were fit to best 
capture the affective dynamics observed across the diaries as a whole. These parameter 
values recorded were then used as a reference point for a second round of data fitting, in 
Chapter 7. In this chapter, I conducted a second, similar study in which six teachers 
recorded the same measures as used in the previous study, alongside their affect-
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expression states and affect-expression goals. Again, variable values were adjusted to 
reflect the experience of the participants in this study and parameters were varied for the 
new data series. The capacity for variants of the model from Chapter 6 to reflect the 
diary data in Chapter 7 was regarded as an indication for the model’s validation and as a 
starting point for future model development. Lastly, in this section, in Chapter 8 I 
explored predictions made from simulations of two models’ affect regulation dynamics, 
constructed so that they interacted as a dyad. Three scenarios were devised to examine 
changes in affect, affect goals, and resource capacity and test predictions derived from 
the design of the models and from existing theories for affect convergence, such as 
affect contagion. The outcomes of these simulations, in Chapter 8, were compared 
against control simulations, in which a single model had been implemented. The 
differences between the two simulation outcomes were considered in terms of current 
theory regarding controlled affect regulation and affect contagion. 
The second part of this thesis offered a means for examining the model’s capacity for 
representing the affect regulation dynamics seen in the real world. Strength of fit 
between the model data and collected diary data offered an initial step in the process of 
developing a model that can determine trends and reflect changes in people’s regulation 
of affect. Further to this, the model forecasts affect to a closer degree than most 
individual’s predictions could. At the end of the second part of the thesis, novel 
predictions regarding affect regulation were offered, in addition to arguments made for 
the importance of understanding affect regulation as a continuous and dynamic process, 
mirroring that of the considerations made in the beginning of the first section of the 
thesis.  
This current chapter explores the predictions made by the model and the outcomes of 
the validation processes to draw some conclusions about the dynamic and interrelated 
nature of multiple aspects of affect regulation, self-regulatory capacity, and affect goals. 
To achieve this, the main predictions and findings from testing the model are 
summarised. The following themes are considered: predictions regarding self-regulatory 
resource depletion dynamics, predictions regarding affect regulation strategy choice 
dynamics, and predictions regarding the dynamics of affect regulation in a dyad. The 
findings across these themes are then discussed with regard to existing theories and 
models of affect. The methodological approach and current model’s contributions to the 
research area are considered. Limitations of the model are then considered and avenues 
for further developments of the model, which may address these, are offered. Future 
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research directions, based on the predictions made by the model’s design and its 
behaviour during simulation, are suggested, wider and practical implications of this 
research are outlined, and conclusions are drawn. 
9.2 Summary of Model Predictions and Findings 
To begin this section, the model constructed as part of this thesis is reviewed and the 
parameters derived from its testing and the predictions which arise from its operation 
are summarised. These predictions, alongside the findings from the model simulations 
and parameter specifications, are then considered in terms of current affect regulation 
theory.  
In the course of this thesis, I have developed, implemented and tested a computational 
model of affect regulation dynamics, which examines the interrelated processes of felt-
affect regulation, affect-expression regulation, and the regulation of their respective goal 
states as a process for resource conservation (Figure 9.1). The model can be considered 
in terms of its five main component parts, which each represent a different aspect of 
affect regulation examined in the literature review. The components constituting 
different processes in affect regulation in the model are arranged to form a two-tiered 
structure. The lower tier of the model comprises of the processes of affect regulation, 
while the higher tier comprises of the processes of affect goal regulation. This chosen 
design is derived from the control theory literature (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; 
Powers, 1974) that presents a structure for goal driven behaviour, in which lower tier 
goals are pursued in order to facilitate the pursuit of higher tier goals. Goals held at 
lower tiers are considered to be more concrete concepts changing over a short term; in 
contrast, higher goals are considered more abstract concepts that are more stable over 
time. 
Alongside the distinction made by regulation processes into two tiers, affect regulation 
in the model is considered as two processes of felt-affect regulation and affect-
expression regulation. This allows for the model to represent different states for felt and 
affect-expression and for the examination of the effects and dynamics of two related 
regulation processes interacting. Similarly, affect goals are divided by this distinction: 
the model can hold separate, changeable goals for the processes of felt-affect regulation 
and affect-expression regulation. This allows for the model to represent different 
degrees of conflict between two held affect goals and for the examination of the effects 
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on affect that this could produce. The two sides of the model are primarily linked 
through the reciprocal influence of the two regulation processes in the lower tier. Just as 
the felt-affect state moves towards a stable point of valence termed the home-base 
(unless regulation efforts are sufficient to push it towards a goal state), affect-expression 
moves towards the moving point of valence that is the current experienced felt-affect 
state (unless regulation efforts push it towards a distinct goal state).  
Each of the four component parts of the model described above are further linked 
through their shared dependence and influence on the central component representing 
self-regulatory capacity. In this model, resource is considered to be depleted through use 
of affect regulation, with affect goals more distal from the home-base requiring a greater 
degree of regulatory effort and so self-regulatory resource to reach. Self-regulatory 
resource is considered central to the processes of both affect regulation and affect goal 
regulation on felt-affect (left side of Figure 9.1) and affect-expression (right side of 
Figure 9.1) sides of the model. Resource fuels the capacity for the processes of felt-
affect and affect-expression regulation, while depleted resource signals that goals 
require regulation in order to limit further resource depletion. Modelled self-regulatory 
capacity varies throughout the day as a combined function of circadian processes, time 
since sleep, and depletion from exertion of regulatory efforts. Self-regulatory capacity is 
restored to the model through regular and sufficient periods of sleep.  
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Figure 9.1 Schematic of the complete model of affect regulation dynamics 
Representations of felt-affect regulation, affect-expression regulation, self-regulatory 
capacity (resource), felt goal regulation, and expression goal regulation are shown as 
two competing primary and secondary control loops. Solid boxes denote intra-
individual processes; dashed boxes denote environmental or inter-individual processes; 
arrows denote proposed direct effects from one process to another. 
The development of a computational simulation requires the specification of parameter 
values representing aspects of affect regulation processes. While in a simple, drawn 
sketch of a model, two concepts may be indicated to have a causal relationship, 
influence between them, or other indicated connection (such as reappraisal occurring 
earlier in the course of affect regulation than expression suppression in Gross’ 1998a 
process model of affect regulation), this is not necessarily expanded upon and specified. 
In contrast, a computational simulation necessarily requires precise specification of the 
nature of the relationships between concepts in the form of parameter values (Epstein, 
2008). The final parameter ranges for the model, based on the fitting of collected diary 
data in Chapters 6 and 7 are given in Table 9.1, alongside a description in terms of 
affect regulation. Parameters shown in italics were varied in the process of fitting the 
data collected from the two diary studies; parameters in plain font were derived from 
investigations in Chapter 5 and subsequently kept constant. 
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Table 9.1 Details of the final parameter ranges and the values specified in the model 
Parameter 
Name 
Description Symbol 
Plausible 
Range of 
Values 
Value(s) 
used for data 
fit 
Felt-Affect 
Change Rate 
The rate at which felt-affect 
changes over time. 
k 
0.001 to 
0.1 
0.02 
Regulatory  
Momentum 
The rate at which a detected 
discrepancy between affect 
and affect goals increases 
regulation efforts. 
k2 
0.0025 to 
0.05 
0.02 
Affect-
Expression 
Change Rate 
The rate at which affect-
expression changes over 
time. 
k3 
0.004 to 
0.4 
0.08 
Affect Goal 
Adjustment Rate  
The rate at which affect 
goals adjust over time. k4 
0.0025 to 
0.05 
0.02 
Feedback  
Link 
The strength of influence 
affect-expression has on 
felt-affect 
F 0 to 0.2 0.2 
Felt-Affect 
Home-Base 
Felt-affect resting point in 
absence of affect events or 
regulation. 
H 0 to 0.4 0.2 
Felt-Affect Goal 
Home-Base 
Felt-affect goal resting point 
in absence of regulation. 
Felt_goal 0.2 to 1.0 0.8 
Felt-Affect 
Regulation Cost 
Depletion of resource due 
to felt-affect regulation. Da 1 to 5 
Study one: 2 
Study two: 5 
Affect-
Expression 
Home-Base 
Affect-expression goal 
resting point in absence of 
regulation. 
Exp_goal 0.2 to 1.0 
Study one: 0.8 
Study two: 0.6 
Expression 
Regulation Cost 
Depletion of resource due 
to affect-expression 
regulation. 
Sa 2 to 10  
Study one: 2 
Study two: 6 
The process of testing the model in this thesis and deriving the parameter values has 
been achieved through three stages. The first stage, reported in Chapter 5, examined the 
model in terms of known data and existing studies. In the course of the chapter, the 
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simpler constituent parts of model were examined in relation to narrow studies 
exploring more base phenomena before expanding testing to the whole model itself 
against wider reaching studies. The results of these tests led to a series of parameter 
ranges and specified parameter values, which shape the model’s behaviour and constrict 
the ranges of its output values. Following on from this, in Chapters 6 and 7, the second 
stage for testing the model first comprised of collecting diary data in two studies of 
affect change and then varying parameters to fit the model to the data collected. Initial 
parameter values were determined through a best fit of the results from the first study 
and then validated through comparison of its capacity to fit the results from the second 
study. The results of this data fitting process refine the parameter values to that of more 
specific propositions than those offered initially through the first stage of testing, 
offering support to initial predictions made in the first stage of testing. Finally, in 
Chapter 8, the parameters derived from the previous stages of testing were implemented 
in two models arranged as agents in a dyad so that the model could be examined in 
relation to theories of affect contagion and offer further propositions to be tested in the 
future. Key predictions offered by the model as a part of the process of its testing are 
listed below: 
• Affect-expression regulation depletes self-regulatory capacity at a marginally 
greater rate than felt-affect regulation. 
This prediction may be explored through the standard two-task paradigm for 
self-control studies (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998). In their meta-analysis, Hagger et 
al. (2010) report that there is a differentiation in depletion tasks effectiveness in 
depleting individuals. Two affect regulation strategies, such as reappraisal and 
suppression may then be contrasted in their effectiveness in inducing depletion 
and impairing performance in subsequent self-control tasks. Suppression of 
affect expression is anticipated to be more depleting than reappraisal. 
• Affect goals show a shift in valence towards the current affect states during 
periods of high depletion at rates substantially faster than previously considered. 
Although the current thesis indicates that affect goals change with depletion over 
an extended period of time, these findings can be expanded upon. Results are 
based on diary data of between hourly and three hourly intervals and could be 
enhanced with more intensive recording protocols (e.g., every 15 minutes, 
Oravecz et al., 2009). Induced fatigue through sleep deprivation studies could 
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further enable understanding of affect goal change during periods of exhaustion 
and potentially indicate that, like impaired affect regulation (Franzen et al., 
2008; Scott et al., 2006), affect goal regulation (i.e. maintenance of consistent, 
typically held affect goals)  is adversely affected. 
• Affect regulatory strategy selection is influenced by an individual’s perceived 
self-regulatory capacity – depleted resource prompts the increased use of affect-
expression regulation. 
Again, the influence of depletion may be explored through the two-task 
paradigm for self-regulation. Depleted individuals in the second task would be 
anticipated to be more likely to use suppression strategies over strategies such as 
reappraisal. Should self-reporting of strategies prove problematic, such as 
individuals being better able to recall certain strategies over others, functional 
imaging may potentially be useful in differentiating strategies used (e.g. Goldin, 
McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008). 
• Felt-affect regulation and affect-expression regulation co-occur; the concurrent 
use of strategies affords closer fits of modelled results to collected data. 
Affect regulation tasks typically focus on exploring one regulation strategy at a time 
(Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012); often, these strategies will be compared against 
another. However, concurrent use of affect regulation strategies is not examined 
experimentally (Webb et al., 2012). To test model predictions that difference regulation 
strategies can be, and are, used concurrently requires development of tasks in which 
participants are required to hold to contrasting goals for affect regulation. 
Demonstration of simultaneous use of multiple strategies may be achieved by requiring 
participants to regulate expression in order to display one emotion (such as excitement 
or enthusiasm) while regulating feelings in order to experience another (such as 
calmness). Self-report measures are unlikely to be suitable for examining this prediction 
so observer ratings of expression and physiological measures such as heart rate 
variability (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006) may be used to measure affect-expression and 
felt-affect states. 
• The degree of conflict between felt-affect goals and affect-expression goals 
predicts the rate of depletion of self-regulatory resource, the convergence of felt 
and expression goals over time, and valence of felt-affect. 
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This may be explored through adaptation of Goldberg & Grandey’s (2007) call 
centre simulation study. Rather than comparing a display goal for individuals to 
regulate towards against naturalistic expression, a variety of display goal 
intensities may be used. Participants acting in a customer service role could 
report perceptions of emotional exhaustion across the study and their perceived 
affective states, indicating whether convergence occurs throughout the study. 
Alternatively participant’s affect state may be manipulated ahead of the 
customer service task design, again manipulating the discrepancy required 
between felt and expressed affect.  
• Conflict between felt-affect goals and/or affect-expression goals across 
individuals interacting in a dyad results in a greater rate of depletion of self-
regulatory capacity, and the convergence of affect goal states. 
Chapter 8 offers simulations of dyad interaction and predictions of affect 
dynamics that arise in dyads in which individuals share affective goals and have 
contrasting affective goals. Experimental studies in which individuals are paired 
in emotive conversations (e.g., Carrere & Gottman, 1999) with others who hold 
similar or contrasting affect goals could offer a means to test the predictions 
offered. Dyads in which individuals hold contrasting affect goals would be 
anticipated to show greater emotional exhaustion after interaction in comparison 
to those with similar affect goals; self-reports of individuals affect goals through 
duration of paired interactions. Alternatively, longer-term studies may take 
advantage of created dyadic interaction using similar sampling practices as 
Joiner (1994); diary studies of roommate interactions may show convergence of 
affective goals and reports of greater emotional exhaustion in individuals in 
dyads with contrasting affect goals in comparison to those in dyads with 
congruent affect goals. 
These predictions are now grouped according to common themes and are examined in 
terms of their place within, and contribution to, current theory. The first theme, 
examining self-regulatory capacity change over time as a mechanism for affect change, 
is outlined in section 9.2.1. After this, in section 9.2.2, the representation of affect 
regulation as an unfolding and changing process and the predictions that arose from this 
are considered. Finally, in section 9.2.3, predictions arising from the development of the 
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model as agents in a dyad and the resulting contrast with current views on the 
representation of agents are discussed. 
9.2.1 Predictions Regarding Self-Regulatory Capacity 
For the purpose of this developed model, self-regulation of affect was largely 
considered from the perspective of the strength-model of self-control (Baumeister et al., 
2007). A limited resource for regulation of affect was used as a mechanism for fuelling 
the processes of affect regulation to work towards specific held affect goals. Regulatory 
efforts depleted this resource and rest, in the form of sleep, restored it. While there is an 
extensive literature on the nature of self-regulatory capacity as being limited (e.g., 
Hagger et al., 2010), there is little available in terms of the dynamics underlying self-
regulatory capacity change or the mechanics of long term restoration of resource 
(Gailliot, 2008; Hagger, 2010). The model of self-regulatory capacity contained within 
the complete model of affect regulation dynamics afforded opportunity to make and test 
predictions regarding self-regulatory dynamics in terms of affect regulation. 
Firstly, the model affords a means to test a specific prediction regarding the regulatory 
costs associated with effortful processes of felt-affect regulation and affect-expression 
regulation. In the emotional labour literature the process of affect-expression regulation 
is considered to be more closely associated with feeling emotionally drained than that of 
the process of felt-affect regulation (Holman et al., 2008, Grandey, 2003; Goldberg & 
Grandey, 2007; Martínez-Iñigo et al., 2007). In emotional labour terms, surface acting is 
routinely found to be more closely associated with feeling emotionally drained than 
deep acting is. There may be a number of underlying reasons for this, one of which will 
be examined in section 9.2.2, but for now just the relative costs of each regulatory 
process are considered. 
A strength of the computational simulation approach is the necessity to outline 
underlying assumptions in a theory and to then specify how these are represented 
(Epstein, 2008). In the model, the relationship between affect regulation processes and 
feeling emotionally drained was first outlined as a causal one: both felt-affect regulation 
and affect-expression regulation deplete the capacity to manage affect (the limited self-
regulatory resource). This causal relationship, while not explicitly shown in current 
results, is formative in structural model design, in which causal influence is assumed. 
Parameter ranges were specified to test the predictions outlined in the preceding 
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paragraph regarding the relative cost of affect-expression regulation and whether it is a 
more depleting exercise than felt-affect regulation (Da, Sa, Table 9.1).  
Results from fitting model parameters to the diary data indicate that closer 
representations of the diary data occur if affect-expression regulation is marginally more 
costly than felt-affect regulation. This extends beyond the testing in Chapter 5, which 
only indicates that concurrent regulation of affect-expression and felt-affect could be 
more effortful than either alone. The parameter configuration from representing diary 
data indicates that the association between affect-expression regulation and perceptions 
of depletion is not just the influence of concurrent regulation but that the affect-
expression regulation process is itself more resource intensive than felt-affect 
regulation. This proposition does raise issues regarding individuals’ choice of regulatory 
processes because it presents affect-expression regulation as being more costly and, 
potentially, less adaptive than felt-affect regulation. The implications of this are 
discussed in section 9.4.3. 
Secondly, the model highlights one area of self-regulation that is underrepresented in 
the strength-model of self-control, which is goal-setting. Depletion of resource in the 
strength-model is associated with the reduction in persistence towards held goals and 
the conservation of remaining resource (e.g., Muraven et al., 2006). In terms of resource 
conservation, the model in this thesis predicts that alongside a reduction in efforts put 
towards reaching an affect goal or maintenance of affect at an affect goal, an individual 
may also aim to bring goals to a more achievable and less draining level. This concept 
of changing goals draws from the alternative view of self-regulation that is motivational 
intensity theory. A goal perceived to be sufficiently difficult will not be pursued unless 
there is a satisfactory incentive to do so (e.g., Alberts et al., 2011). This approach for 
goal pursuit is considered in the informal model by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) 
as a means of selecting which goal is pursued at each level.  For the purposes of this 
thesis’ model, the aspect of motivation intensity theory examined is the perceived effort 
required to regulate towards affect goals.  
In the control theory literature, it is argued that while control is engaged to regulate a 
particular state towards a goal, goal states themselves are regulated (e.g. Powers, 1974). 
This process is argued to result in the goal changing very slowly in comparison to the 
regulated state (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001). Over time, goals that consistently exist 
out of reach of regulatory efforts would be expected to gradually shift towards a more 
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achievable state, whereas goals which are frequently reached through regulation are 
unlikely to show any substantial change.  
The above proposition was examined in the process of fitting the model parameters to 
the diary data in Chapters 7 and 8. In both studies, the best fit of the model data to that 
of the diary data required affect goal adjustment rate (k4, Table 9.1) to be specified at a 
comparable rate to that of the fixed parameter value for affect change rate (k, Table 9.1). 
This means that during the times of resource depletion at which affect goals were most 
strongly regulated towards the current affect states, goal adjustment would occur at 
approximately the same speed as affect change would. This prediction argues that, 
contrary to Carver and Scheier’s (2001) assertions, individuals could rapidly change an 
untenably high goal to one which is more achievable, exhibiting flexible control 
towards dynamic goals. Furthermore, the high valence goals the model specifies for 
felt-affect do not automatically imply a persistent overarching aim in the model for high 
valence affect. Contrary to assumptions made based on hedonic theories of affect (e.g., 
Larsen, 2000), the model does not always seek to ‘feel’ good; rather, in many cases, 
when experiencing negative affect sufficient goal adjustment occurs so that the model 
sets a goal of feeling neutral or less negative. 
Further to this, the model offers a specific prediction regarding affect goal-change, 
which contrasts with a proposition by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003). It is proposed 
in their model that a specific, narrow range for an affect goal would restrict variability 
in affect states in comparison to a wider range for an affect goal. It is further proposed 
that this maintenance of affect at this narrow range would lead to greater emotional 
exhaustion because of the greater degree of control required. However, in contrast to 
this, the current model indicates that, over time, a broader range for an affect goal (as 
represented by a capability to regulate the affect goal level) could lead to a reduced 
variability in affect, when compared to a narrow range for an affect goal (as represented 
by a restriction on regulating the affect goal level), providing that this goal is 
sufficiently distant from the home-base. This is due to the increase in regulatory fatigue 
associated with reaching higher affect goals and as a result a diminished capability in 
reaching these held goals. A variable affect goal would, of course, result in some 
variability in affect but potentially within a narrower band due to the reduced 
occurrence of depletion. This prediction highlights a significant strength of a dynamic 
model over a descriptive and unspecified model. While a descriptive model such as 
Diefendorff and Gosserand’s (2003) design relies on assumption and at times even an 
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intuitive understanding of how phenomena examined might change over time, a 
dynamic model such the one in this thesis affords the ability to specify and test 
predictions made. 
9.2.2 Predictions Regarding Affect Regulation Dynamics 
In the course of testing this thesis’ model, a number of specific predictions regarding the 
nature of affect dynamics and the dynamics of undertaking affect regulation have been 
produced. This has allowed for propositions to be made at the level of individual model 
components, such as the nature of the home-base that affect tends towards, and at high 
levels of the model’s working, integrating multiple aspects of the model to examine 
emergent trends, such as the change over time in affect regulation strategy choice. This 
section examines three of these predictions made by the model. It further considers their 
implications for current affect regulation theories, including the implications of these 
predictions being derived from a dynamic perspective of affect regulation. 
Firstly, the integration of related aspects of affect regulation, self-regulatory capacity 
and affect regulation goals in this computational model point towards specific 
predictions and propositions of affect regulation strategy selection. An important 
prediction made by the model is the circumstances required for the model to engage in 
transition from one dominant affect regulatory strategy to another and the process by 
which this occurs. If the goals for felt-affect and affect-expression are congruent then, 
as self-regulatory resource depletes, the model indicates a switch from the use of 
regulation of primarily felt-affect to that of the regulation of affect-expression. 
At higher levels of self-regulatory resource, capacity for felt-affect regulation would be 
sufficient in its control to maintain felt-affect at the goal state and affect-expression at a 
congruent goal state. This is due to the coupling between felt-affect and affect-
expression: unless affect-expression is regulated towards its own distinct goal, affect-
expression tends towards its moving home-base of felt-affect, a process which is 
regarded as necessary for a means of representing authentic expression. However, once 
self-regulatory resource depletes and there is insufficient capacity to maintain felt-affect 
at the goal level, a discrepancy would begin to form between affect-expression and its 
goal as its home-base of felt-affect drifts away from the expression goal state. This 
discrepancy engages affect-expression regulation as a required means of controlling the 
affect-expression state: felt-affect regulation is no longer enough to maintain control of 
233 
 
expression and use of affect-expression regulation increases to maintain affect-
expression control. As a result, there exists a transition in the model from felt-affect 
regulation being the primary means of controlling both felt-affect and affect-expression 
to that of an increase in affect-expression regulation as resource depletes.  
This prediction regarding strategy change poses an apparent contradiction with another 
made in the previous section, which outlined that the model indicates that expression 
regulation is more costly, in terms of self-regulatory resource, than felt-affect 
regulation. It would not be expected that this strategy would then come in to use when 
self-regulatory resource is low and attempts to conserve remaining resource ought to be 
made. Nevertheless, this switch between dominant regulatory strategies from felt-affect 
regulation to affect-expression regulation is an observed outcome in the model, seen 
when felt-affect and affect-expression goals are congruent. Paradoxically, diminished 
resource appears to prompt the use of a more costly regulation strategy (see section 
9.2.1). A caveat for this prediction is the current model assigns equal value to the 
pursuit of felt-affect and affect-expression goals. Alternative models, such as the 
informal model by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003), which vary the motivation to 
pursue particular goals might show different regulation selection dynamics. 
This prediction presents important considerations for current affect regulation research. 
While the previous section highlights that affect-expression regulation is associated 
with a greater feeling of being emotionally drained, this is universally assumed to be an 
indication of the depleting nature of affect-expression regulation and its higher costs 
compared with felt-affect regulation (e.g., Richards & Gross 2000). The specific 
prediction in this section does not challenge that assumption, and indeed is a product of 
a model that forwards such a position; however, it does suggest that there exists an 
additional pathway in the relationship between affect-expression regulation and 
emotional exhaustion. Not only does use of affect-expression regulation lead to 
outcomes of feeling emotionally drained, feeling emotionally drained leads to use of 
affect-expression regulation strategies. This may present a confound or complication for 
studies that simply present an association between affect-expression regulation and 
feeling emotionally drained. This prediction by the model poses implications for field 
studies of affect regulation and for experimental studies alike (see section 9.4.3). 
Secondly, the model puts forward a directly contrasting approach to understanding 
affect regulation episodes to that of the dominant approach in affect regulation research, 
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the process model (Gross, 1998a, 1999, 2001). In the process model, affect regulatory 
strategies are described as being distinct, sequential and linear. Regulation strategies are 
considered to have their specific place in time during an emotion regulation episode and 
are not thought to generally show overlap in their use (Gross & Thompson, 2007). In 
contrast to this inflexible, procedural approach, the model constructed in this thesis 
presents affect regulation strategies as flexible, with the potential to overlap and 
influence each other. Moreover, this approach as an investigation of the proposed 
dynamics of affect regulation highlights that regulation strategies can show continuous 
operation across what Gross (1998a) terms affective episodes (complete cycles from 
affect experiences’ beginning to end until the next begins). This seamless transition of 
affect regulation use from one point in time to the next potentially indicates that 
attempts to categorise and define individual episodes of affect are somewhat arbitrary. 
A strength of the control theory framework is its representation of graded change, 
allowing for conceptualisation of overlapping processes while in transition from one to 
another, or balancing the allocation of resource to the execution of multiple processes 
(e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1986). Use of this framework enables the examination of 
modern theories of affect existing as a continuous, changing state (Russell, 2003) and 
affect regulation as a similarly changing process (Kuppens et al., 2010; Oravecz et al., 
2009). The model developed in this thesis follows such a tradition and, as a 
consequence, is successful in representing the dynamics of affect in terms of both felt-
affect and affect-expression seen in collected diary data (Chapters 6 & 7).  
In the two diary studies, the model’s quality of fit with the data was assessed through 
three means and within these assessments subject to three criteria before being 
considered an appropriate fit of the data. The data collected in Chapter 7, of which both 
felt-affect and affect-expression states were recorded, afforded for the dual processes of 
felt-affect regulation and affect-expression regulation to be examined in the model. 
Across a majority of correlations examined, the model met the criteria specified for a 
successful representation of affect regulation dynamics. These criteria were: a) the 
presence of a significant correlation between model results and the represented 
individual’s diary data, b) the correlation between the model and the diary was greater 
than correlations between the model and any other diary, and c) the correlation between 
the model and the diary was greater than correlations between the diary and any other 
model. The parameter values for the model meeting these criteria (Table 9.1) indicated 
that the model engages in regulation towards distinct goal intensities for felt-affect and 
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affect-expression, which necessitated the use of two concurrent regulatory strategies in 
the model. This outcome reinforces the argument that individuals may not just be 
capable of using concurrent regulation strategies but that they also seem to engage with 
regulation in this way this when necessary. For example, individuals might choose to 
regulate affect-expression in order to display a negative emotion, while still engaging in 
felt-affect regulation strategies to maintain a positive felt state. 
Thirdly, the model challenges assumptions made by other dynamic representations of 
affect regulation. The diffusion model of affect (DynAffect) outlined by Oravecz et al. 
(2009) and Kuppens et al. (2010) suggests that affect can be represented as variable 
fluctuating values about a single attractor point of affect state, termed the home-base. 
This echoes theoretical accounts of affect, such as the representations of affect change 
in terms of homeostatic control (e.g., Larsen, 2000; Larsen & Prizmic, 2004) and as a 
model itself, is drawn from aspects of the self-regulation literature (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 1990; Chow et al., 2005). Arguments made by the DynAffect model, such as 
the presence of an attractor point for affect have inspired aspects of the model designed 
in this thesis, and terms such as home-base have been adopted. However, it is the nature 
of the home-base described by Oravecz et al. (2009) that is contested by this current 
thesis’ model. 
For the purposes of clarity in writing, only the felt-affect state is considered in this 
argument because the DynAffect model (Kuppens et al., 2010; Oravecz et al., 2009) 
does not represent affect-expression. The DynAffect model proposes that a single 
attractor state exists, which affect regulation works towards and affect, as a result, tends 
towards (Oravecz et al., 2009). However, in the process of reducing affect change to this 
simple representation, a necessary complexity in affect change is lost through the 
unification of affect regulation and the general trend of affect change to a single point. 
The current model’s proposed representation of affect regulation and general trend of 
affect change is of two distinct attractor points: the stable home-base, situated at a 
marginally positive valence, and the variable affect goal state, generally situated at a 
more positive valence. This dual attractor point design can represent specific trends seen 
in the affect literature that are not reflected in the DynAffect model, particularly the 
association of sleep deprivation with the impairment of affect regulation and positive 
affect maintenance (e.g., Franzen et al., 2008; Scott et al., 2006; Tempesta et al., 2010). 
Unlike the DynAffect model, the current model offers account for such trends; 
regulation towards a positive held goal becomes limited with regulatory fatigue during 
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sleep deprivation in the model and so at theses times felt-affect can drift away from the 
positive held goal towards less positive affect states. 
One implication from this current thesis’ proposal is that the home-base that affect tends 
towards, against positive regulation processes, is lower than Oravecz et al. (2009) 
suggest. Their model of affect tending towards a central point might accurately 
represent at a surface level the observed recordings of affect as it moves approximately 
about two points either side but the current model offers this representation and further 
offers explanation and integration with theory as to the underlying process involved. 
One of the many reasons offered by Epstein (2008) for using computational models is 
their potential for indication that apparently simple phenomena are in fact more 
complex. The approach taken by the current thesis’ model offers accounts of affect 
regulation processes beyond that of just descriptions of data seen (e.g., Oravecz et al., 
2009) and instead accounts for data in terms of wider theory. 
9.2.3 Predictions Regarding Affect Regulation in a Dyad 
While the model was primarily designed, constructed, and tested around the 
representation of affect regulation in an individual, the model as representation of 
agents in a dyad was one of the more fruitful areas of investigation for prediction 
generation. Known phenomena, such as affect contagion (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Neuman 
& Strack, 2000; Totterdell et al., 2004) were represented in simulations in Chapter 8, 
alongside the generation of predictions regarding other phenomena such as goal 
contagion and contagion of self-regulatory capacity. More broadly, the necessity for 
understanding affect as a continual and dynamic process in social interaction was put 
forward and current issues with representing affect regulation in dyads were considered. 
This section discusses predictions for affect regulation processes arising from 
simulating two interacting, dynamic, affect regulation agents. 
The first prediction offered by the simulation of the models as a dyad concerns the 
influence one agent’s affect goal states can have on the other and argues that goal 
contagion could occur between persons. More specifically, the model predicts that 
agents with shared affect goals (e.g., both agents have a goal for high positive valence 
felt-affect) can result in maintenance of these high affect goals, rather than the observed 
change in goal states to typically lower levels in simulations of just a single agent. In 
addition to this, conflicting affect goals result in a convergence of goals between agents. 
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This process was found to be mediated through the convergent affect experienced by 
agents. As each agent attempts to regulate their own felt-affect, while in the presence of 
an individual expressing an opposing affect state, affect states between agents begin to 
converge (as argued would occur by the affect contagion literature, e.g., Barsade, 2002). 
This convergence of affect determines the valence that affect goals will be regulated 
towards during periods of depletion to conserve energy and so affect states trending 
towards each other will inevitably result in affect goals trending towards each other in 
the model. The finding is further supported through the simulation of a dyad in which 
one individual is represented as experiencing depression. The limited capacity for 
engaging in affect regulation and enduring negative felt states serve to draw the non-
depressed partner in the dyad’s felt state towards a more negative state (e.g., Joiner, 
1994) and also the non-depressed partner’s affect goals towards a lower valence. 
This investigation with the model as a dyad offers a unique contribution to the 
understanding of both affect regulation and to the processes of contagion between 
individuals because the research of contagion of affect goals is still underrepresented in 
the literature. In prior studies of goal contagion, affect change has only been considered 
as a consequence of goals changing (e.g., Chartrand, Dalton, & Cheng, 2008), whereas 
these simulations examine the potential for affect change to influence goal adjustment. 
Further consideration of this proposed occurrence of goal contagion could be taken up 
by the emotional labour literature. In the reciprocal regulation of affect while in a dyad, 
each agent’s affective states and affect goals influence the other’s. The model 
demonstrates that a cycle may be entered of unsuccessful affect regulation by an 
‘employee’ agent, if it solely serves to engage in surface acting regulation strategies. If 
both employee and customer agents hold positive affect goals, interaction is predicted to 
remain positive, while surface acting. However, if a customer agent holds less positive 
or negative affect goals these can influence the employee agent to experience similarly 
negative affect states and limit the employee agent’s capacity to successfully present 
positive affect, forming cyclical patterns of negative affect-expression between agents. 
These simulations point to contextual dependence on the relative success of surface 
acting as a regulation strategy, indicating that it might not necessarily be associated 
with poorer dyadic interaction.  
However, there are wider considerations for such interactions not addressed by the 
model, such as the perception of authenticity in affect-expression, influencing agents’ 
response (e.g., Grandey, Fisk, Matilla, Jansen, & Sideman, 2005). In the emotional 
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labour literature, surface acting is positively associated with both inauthentic expression 
and emotional exhaustion, in contrast to deep acting, which is not (e.g., Martínez-Iñigo 
et al., 2007). A customer could hold negative affect-expression goals as a result of 
perceiving a customer-service agent’s expressions to be inauthentic (e.g., hostility in 
response to perceived inauthenticity), which could contribute to the negative effects of 
the customer-service agent using surface acting (i.e. emotional exhaustion). In contrast, 
a customer-service agent using deep acting does not show inauthentic expression and 
fatigue effects could be limited through positive social feedback (e.g., Côté, 2005). The 
protective or deleterious effects of social interaction might offer explanation why 
differences between associated costs of affect-expression regulation and felt-affect 
regulation are seen in the emotional labour literature and yet show similar costs in 
simulations. Such effects could be explored in development of dyad simulations to 
include perceptions of authenticity in others’ expressions. 
The model further offers a series of predictions regarding the influence an agent’s affect 
states can have on the other’s self-regulatory capacity and argues that contagion of self-
regulatory fatigue could occur between persons. In the first scenario tested, in which 
both agents share positive affect goals, it was found that both agents showed a reduced 
degree of resource depletion. A positive cycle is seen in which affect-expression from 
each agent supports the process of affect regulation towards the held affect goal by the 
other, reducing the demand on each agent and degree to which resource depletes. This 
process reflects Côté’s (2005) model of social feedback.  
Self-regulatory capacity is further seen to be influenced by an agent’s partner in the 
dyad in the presence of conflicting affect goals across individuals. Affect-expression 
from each individual, which draws the other’s felt state away from their respective held 
affect goals, promotes the further use of regulation in the other agent. Conflict between 
the agents gradually resolves through the continual depletion of self-regulatory capacity 
and the shift of affect goals towards the other’s in the attempt to limit resource 
depletion. Contagion of depletion is seen in a similar scenario to that of the conflicting 
goals in the simulation of a depressed individual in a dyad. An outcome of the 
representation of the continual negative input to the depressed agent coupled with a 
restricted capacity for affect regulation is substantial depletion. Affect regulation 
appears to generate a change in the non-depressed agent’s resource, given the extra 
regulatory effort required in working towards affect goals as felt-affect tends towards 
that of the depressed agent. 
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Again, this investigation with the model as a dyad offers a novel contribution to the 
understanding of both affect regulation and to the processes of contagion between 
individuals because the research of contagion of self-regulatory capacity is only a recent 
consideration in the literature (e.g., VanDellen & Hoyle, 2010). Recent studies report 
conflicting accounts of contagion of regulatory fatigue (e.g., Ackerman, Goldstein, 
Shapiro, & Bargh, 2009) and improvement of self-regulatory capacity through 
contagion (e.g., VanDellen & Hoyle, 2010). This model offers an account for a specific 
instance of regulatory fatigue in one individual influencing another due to processes of 
contagion. Affect regulation between individuals in workplace environments has been 
reported to induce depletion in others observing this take place (Totterdell, Hershcovis, 
Niven, Reich, & Stride, 2012), indicating that contagion of self-regulatory fatigue may 
extend to wider networks. 
9.3 Limitations  
9.3.1 Limitations of the Model 
The approach taken of computational modelling for examining affect regulation 
dynamics offers many unique means of examining and explaining mechanisms 
underlying relationships within affect regulation. However, the approach does have 
limitations that impact upon the degree to which outcomes of the model can be 
considered alongside existing means of understanding affect regulation. This model 
sought to draw together a range of related concepts regarding affect regulation and, as a 
result, required a high number of parameters to represent these processes and their 
interactions. In terms of testing and specifying parameters, a large number of parameters 
to be tested present complications for developing clear and specific predictions (e.g., 
Roberts & Pashler, 2000). This is particularly evident in models such as this one, which 
exhibit a high degree of recurrent relationships, such as the depletion of self-regulatory 
resource by affect regulation processes and also their dependence on the presence of 
resource (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998). As a result of the non-linear structure of the 
model, changes to a parameter value in one area of the model could influence the 
behaviours of the model at other areas and such a result might not be anticipated. This 
means that controlled parameter changes require intensive investigation across the 
model to determine the overall influence of parameter specification in the model 
dynamics. This model presents recurrent relationships across two different levels, the 
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first being each individual control loop and the second being the relationships between 
each of the control loops. 
The development of non-linear process within the model is an unavoidable consequence 
of examining affect regulation as conceptualised in the current theories founded upon 
control theory principles. Control theory as a framework rejects the simple feed-forward 
process from stimulus to response, emphasising that feedback from response to stimulus 
in order to shape perceptions of the stimulus is an essential component of behaviour 
(Powers, 1974). Moreover, there are non-linear aspects in the theory contributing to the 
development of the model. While not often presented explicitly in the strength-model, 
there is a recurrent relationship between regulation that depletes resource and a reliance 
on resource for successful regulation. More broadly, the strength-model argues for a 
further recurrent relationship in the training of self-regulatory capacity over time: 
building strength and resistance to regulatory fatigue requires the regular use of self-
regulation and occurrence of fatigue (Muraven, 2010). Recurrent loops, such as those 
described, may necessarily require a more complex recurrent model to capture trends 
and offer explanations. 
An additional effect of a large number of parameters in the model is the dramatic 
increase in the number of tests required for the effects of parameter variations. As 
mentioned earlier, the influence of a change in parameter may be seen across values in 
the model dependent on other parameters, also subject to change. As a result, a 
comprehensive investigation in the nature of how each parameter change can influence 
all others becomes a prohibitively time consuming task. To reduce the time taken in 
testing parameter variation, a two stage process was used in testing and validating the 
model. First, components of the model that can be considered in isolation as a 
functional unit were tested using the restricted parameter bases this produces. From this, 
six key influential parameters were identified as having a substantial influence on model 
behaviour and a clearly identifiable analogue in the emotion regulation literature. This 
allowed for a limited range of parameters to be examined and used as a means for fitting 
data gathered from the diary studies 
Despite the large number of parameters specified and prior assumptions made explicit in 
this model, there are still assumptions regarding the nature of affect regulation left 
implicit. Indeed, the very choice in including representation of some phenomena as 
parameter values and not others is itself reliant on implicit assumptions (Ragan, 2010). 
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The use of computational models as a tool for examining expansive research areas, such 
as affect regulation, necessarily requires a simplification and reduction of the real world 
(Bosse et al., 2010), and a balance is to be struck in working towards a more complete 
representation while preserving simplicity in the model’s design (Carley, 1999).  As a 
result of this aim to reduce the model to a simple representation of the processes 
involved in affect regulation, areas considered by other computational models, such as 
affect appraisal (Gratch & Marsella, 2004), are not implemented in this model.  
9.3.2 Limitations of the Diary Studies 
Five aspects of the model’s outputs were used as the measures for data collection in the 
diary studies. These were: felt-affect, affect-expression, perceived self-regulatory 
capacity, felt-affect goals, and affect-expression goals. These were chosen because they 
meet the criteria of representing each of the component parts of the model and because 
they were simple ‘real world’ measures, which could be collected through self-report. 
However, the collected data from the first diary study indicated that the means used to 
measure affect-expression, on an event sampling basis, did not yield sufficient data 
points to be of use in the data fitting procedure. This posed a challenge for the 
validation approach taken for the model because a revised representation of affect-
expression was required, in order to be able to collect enough recordings of affect-
expression for data fitting in the second study. To achieve this, affect-expression was 
recorded in the same manner as the other measures, on a time sampling basis. This 
necessitated the description of affect-expression as a continuous and changing process, 
similar to felt-affect, rather than a process that co-occurs with affective events.   
As a result, a trade-off was made between the retrieval of more accurate but incomplete 
affect-expression results, to a more complete results set of general, affect expressive 
tone. A more general representation in the recordings for affect-expression could lead to 
issues regarding how individuals consider their expressed state. When considering 
affect-expression in general terms in the course of each diary entry, it may be plausible 
that individuals are likely to make a recording similar to that of their felt-affect state due 
to memory or cognitive biases such as a perception that they generally are a person who 
shows genuine or authentic expression of how they feel. 
Alongside the issue regarding affect-expression recordings, there exists the limited 
potential for examining regulatory fatigue over time in a diary study. A measure of 
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fatigue using a self-report scale would necessarily be recording subjective experience of 
regulatory fatigue, which may differ from self-regulatory resource fatigue. However, 
given the constraints placed upon the study due to the nature of requiring frequent 
repeated recordings, more objective means of measuring regulatory capacity are not 
suitable, particularly those which require persistence at tasks over an extended period of 
time or may be improved through practice (e.g., Muraven 2010). While subjective 
regulatory fatigue may be considered a less reliable measure because of the limitations 
of self-report, there is evidence to suggest that the perceptions of fatigue, alongside 
fatigue itself, influence self-regulatory capacity (Clarkson et al., 2010; Job et al., 2010). 
Further to this, the results from the diary studies indicate that perceptions of regulatory 
fatigue show just a moderate correlation with that of one’s perceived alertness, which 
may also refer to subjective fatigue, suggesting a degree of distinction between the 
concepts.  
9.3.3 Limitations of Using the Diary Studies as a Validation Tool 
The primary limitation of using data fitting as a tool for validating a computational 
model is outlined by Roberts and Pashler (2000). They argue that the ‘goodness of fit’ 
between a model and a data set is not a sufficient means of presenting the quality of a 
model. Alongside any fit of data should be outlined the flexibility of the model, the 
variability of the data, and likelihood of other outcomes. Ultimately a model should be 
assessed on how constraints on theory are made by the model and determine if these are 
constraints seen in existing, empirical data. In the course of this thesis, specific 
constraints in the model are tested, such as the ratio in self-regulatory resource costs 
between felt-affect regulation and affect-expression regulation. This proposed 
imbalance between the costs of regulating affect is seen in the best fits of the diary data 
for both studies offering support for the model as plausible alternative costs of the two 
processes (see section 9.2.1) do not occur in the model best fits.  
The use of data fitting as a validation tool has been argued as a suitable starting point 
(Rodgers & Rowe, 2002) for theory development and as a diagnostic tool for examining 
relationships within models (Humphries & Gurney, 2007). Data which falls outside the 
ranges that the model can predict lead researchers to re-examine assumptions made in 
the model and can point towards areas which require development. For example in this 
thesis, tailoring parameter values to offer best fits of individuals’ data indicates that for 
participant 5 in study 2 affect goals may typically be lower than the affect home-base. 
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This points towards an inappropriately set goal home-base for the model to represent the 
diary contrary to the general assumption that the goal home-base state would be more 
positive than the home-base. 
Results in Chapters 6 and 7 are a product of fitting a general model to the complete data 
sets. A limitation of this is that individual differences are not explored and as a result, 
fitting of the individual diary data is not as close as it can be. Optimising parameter fits 
to each individual’s diary data enables better fit of the data sets and potentially 
improved predictive validity for extended modelling of individuals affect dynamics 
across longer periods of time. Differences between parameter values between 
individuals can be regarded as predictions of individual differences across key aspects 
of individuals’ affective profiles or affect regulation use.  
Fitting the model data to individual results may indicate that individuals differ in their 
depletion resulting from felt-affect regulation, which can be further explored and tested 
in experimental studies. Oravecz et al. (2009) use individual fitting of results to 
differential between individuals’ affective variability and their home-bases for affect; 
these individual profiles are indicated to correlate with personality measures of 
neuroticism and extraversion respectively. Fitting individual results through variation in 
actuator gains in simple models of control (Rogers, Mansell, Ihenacho, & Gruber, in 
press) can offer specific predictions of individuals’ behaviour in novel situations; 
interaction between two fitted control models of preferences for personal space predicts 
human behaviour in actual interactions. A data fitting procedure of this means applied 
to this thesis has implications for predictions of dyadic interaction; this is suggested in 
the ranges of affect in modelled interactions in Chapter 8, where individuals with high 
regulatory momentum (high actuator gain) are indicated to be comparatively immune to 
the observed effects of depression contagion. 
9.4 Future Research Directions and Wider Implications  
Taking the limitations described into consideration, this section examines some of the 
potential research avenues made available through the development of this simulation. 
These are organised by the themes of further research within the current model, further 
research expanding upon the current model, and further practical research. Wider 
implications are considered alongside the discussion of further practical research. 
Computer simulation offers a strong, alternative means of investigating observable 
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phenomena such as emotion regulation because it requires the explicit specification of 
assumptions, predictions, and hypotheses. Models used to describe emotion regulation 
have traditionally existed as simple box-diagram representations of processes involved 
(e.g., Gross, 1998a) and, in this form, do little to offer specified, measurable, and 
testable predictions. In contrast, the requirements for specific representation in a 
simulation of concepts and explanations of the interactions between these concepts 
present new avenues to be pursued and new predictions about these concepts to be made 
(e.g., Thompson & Derr, 2009).  
9.4.1 Further Parameter Testing 
The thesis offers an overview of the parameter variation process used to best fit the 
diary data. The large number of parameters shaping the behaviour of the model, as it 
currently stands, presents a logistical challenge for a comprehensive overview of each 
parameter’s influence with regards to variations in all of the remaining parameters. To 
best accommodate the process of parameter variation within the scope of the thesis, it 
was determined that six key parameters of interest would be varied in the process of 
data fitting (Table 9.1). The process used does offer a template for further means of 
testing and examining the model in the capacity of an extended study. This process of 
fitting further parameters could result in closer fits with diary data, given the additional 
degrees of freedom that further varied parameters afford, and could offer further 
insights into parameters already examined.  
The use of further parameter variation could be extended to that of dividing a general 
parameter, which was initially created through the grouping of four individual 
parameters for the purpose of parsimony in the model. The parameter regarding the 
influence of regulation efforts (regulatory momentum, k2, Table 9.1) is used at each 
point of regulation in the model: felt-affect regulation, affect-expression regulation, felt-
affect goal regulation and affect-expression goal regulation. However, with regards to 
the first two uses of this parameter, there is a distinction drawn in the literature between 
individuals who favour reappraisal (felt-affect regulation) and individuals who favour 
affect suppression (affect-expression regulation) as regulation strategies (reappraisers 
and suppressors, Gross & John 2003). Two distinct parameters at the lower tier of affect 
regulation, which determine the efficacy of regulation strategy, could be applied to 
examine this distinction.  
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Moreover, this distinction between those preferring felt-affect regulation and those 
preferring affect-expression regulation (Gross & John, 2003) could be applied at the 
higher tier as individuals could hypothetically prefer to limit goal conflict through 
adjusting either the felt-affect goal or the affect-expression goal. Further to this, a 
distinction could be made between individuals by the difference in their efficacy 
between enacting regulation at higher and lower levels. In this model both of these 
considerations would be represented by again dividing the overarching parameter k2 
into constituent parameters for each component of the model where k2 is currently used. 
This design decision would further allow for the investigation, understanding, and 
possible explanation of the interaction of regulatory processes over the current 
description level of data trends in affect goal adjustment offered by the existing model. 
It should be noted that the data patterns described in section 9.2.1 regarding the reported 
rate of affect goal adjustment would not be altered by this adaptation of the model 
because at that point, the model serves just to reflect trends existing in the data. 
The above examples, describing adaptations of the current model, both point towards 
the potential for the model to better capture changes in affect and affect regulation seen 
in data through the variation of parameters to represent individual differences. The 
examination of individual differences in the dynamics of affect has recently been 
described as an essential aspect of developing understanding of emotion in the future 
(Kuppens et al., 2010). In Chapters 6 and 7, considerations are made in the respective 
short discussions about the use of refining the data fitting process to individuals’ diaries 
through the differentiation between parameter values across multiple instances of the 
model. It remains to be seen if differences in aspects of affect regulation processes such 
as individual’s preference for one strategy over another or the perceived effort required 
to engage in such strategies can both be reflected in parameter variations of individual 
differences and result in closer representation of their affect dynamics. 
9.4.2 Further Developments of the Model 
In addition to the suggested developments within the model for further parameter 
testing, in Section 9.4.1, there are many further possibilities for expanding upon the 
current model and means to broaden its investigatory scope and its explanatory and 
predictive capacities. In this section, four general future directions for the model and 
specific aspects of these are suggested and considerations of the impact on the model 
are offered. 
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First, there are multiple alternative means of representing affective experience in the 
affect literature. Moreover, recent research in affective dynamics indicates that affect 
experience over time might vary from one form of affect to another (Verduyn et al., 
2009). Building on work by Sonnemans and Frijda (1994), Verdun et al. (2009) indicate 
that diverse affective experiences, such as anger, joy, and sadness, may differ not just in 
their typical duration but also that their intensity profiles (how the experience changes 
over time). Representation of individual affect experience profiles in an adaptation of 
the current model could be achieved through the development of parallel control loops 
and the modification of affective event intensities to determine their capacity to 
influence each affective state. Such a development could allow for investigation of the 
dynamics of different regulation processes for each affect experience, to answer 
questions such as whether certain types of affect are easier to regulate than others. 
Should it be considered more prudent to maintain a ‘core-affect’ representation (e.g., 
Russell, 2003), the model could be expanded through the representation of affect as 
independent processes of valence and arousal, such as that shown by Oravecz et al. 
(2009). Affect could further be represented across different periods of time, drawing a 
distinction between moods and emotions (e.g., Beedie et al., 2005), testing the 
scalability of the operations conducted in the model; for example, this could be used to 
determine whether the successful representation of affect change over an extended 
period of days is transferable to representations of affect across minutes. Section 9.2 
offers predictions of individuals’ affect and affect regulation dynamics for both longer 
term and more immediate timeframes; the further development of the model to focus on 
modelling shorter time-frames could aid in further refining the experiments offered to 
test predictions for short-term affect regulation dynamics. 
Second, the model could be developed through the inclusion of an appraisal system. A 
fundamental aspect of emotion regulation is the process of appraisal (e.g., Gross, 1998a; 
Scherer, 1999) and there are existing and proposed computational simulations aimed at 
representing how stimuli are appraised (Gratch & Marsella, 2004, 2005; Gratch, 
Marsella, & Petta, 2009; Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005). The dynamic process of 
reappraisal has not yet been investigated with computational models in terms of 
dynamics of self-regulatory capacity, expression regulation, or pursuit of dynamic affect 
goals. There remains much room for further investigation in these terms by extending 
this thesis’ current model. Gratch et al.’s (2009) model is designed with the intention of 
demonstrating a detailed representation of the multiple steps required to appraise an 
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event or occurrence in terms of interaction with and influence on beliefs and desires. In 
contrast, the current model described in this thesis has not been constructed with the 
intention to use this broad and complex approach in its representation of the influence 
of events or occurrences on affective states. As a result, the current model does not 
engage in a ‘true’ process of reappraisal when regulating felt-affect in the time an 
affective event acts on the model’s felt-affect state. In this existing representation, the 
model currently enacts a change to the felt-affect state but leaves the valence of the 
experienced event untouched.  
A ‘true’ representation of reappraisal would consist of the more complex process of 
directly changing the magnitude of the interpreted valence of the event influencing the 
felt-affect state at a point in the system before influence reaches the felt state (e.g., 
Gross, 1998a). This process creates additional complexity in that appraisal parameter(s) 
would need inclusion and the capacity to be modified by the model itself. Alongside 
this, the representation of affective events could need restructuring because, as the 
current model stands, there is a single pathway from the broadly defined ‘events’ input 
to influence the felt-affect of the model. The model does not have any representation of 
what these events are, just that they have an affective valence value that influences the 
felt-affect state. Each event or influence on felt-affect would require identification as a 
distinct representation so that the model does not universally reappraise all stimuli 
including novel ones that may bear no relation to prior events reappraised. This would 
be a development which could require extensive change to the model through the use of 
a symbolic (e.g., Gratch & Marsella, 2004) neural network (Sander et al., 2005), or 
other non-linear (e.g., Mueleman, 2012) representation of distinct, identifiable events. 
Development of representation of the context in which events occur and are appraised 
could offer substantial improvements in fitting model outputs to empirical data. 
Affective events may be represented in terms of their influence on individual’s held 
goals (e.g., Gratch & Marsella, 2004) better allowing the model to capture enduring 
impact of brief but emotionally significant events that have a lasting impact on the 
individual. 
A third means of developing the model consists of the provision for the choice of goal 
pursuit. Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) refer to a means of selecting between goals 
to pursue and so shape behaviour. At each level of the model’s hierarchy, goals are 
considered to be in competition with each other: individuals cannot simultaneously 
pursue two incompatible goals. It is suggested that the particular goal to pursue at the 
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time is chosen based on its motivational force, a value derived from the interaction of 
the perceived likelihood of reaching the goal (Vroom, 1964) and the contribution this 
goal makes in reaching other desired, higher goals (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). The 
goal with the highest motivational force is argued to be the one selected for pursuit, 
until a higher motivational force for another goal arises.  
Revising the means of goal pursuit selection affords a step towards a more general 
framework for a multi-level control system for affect regulation. At present, affect goal 
pursuit is not considered in terms of how likely it would be to assist in higher level goal 
pursuit (which itself is only represented at a most basic degree of affect goals tending 
towards a fixed point of valence determined by an otherwise unspecified ‘higher level 
of control’). Adaptation of the model at this point could present further opportunity to 
examine influences of dynamic parameter variation, such as learning or reorganisation 
of priorities as a means of reducing goal conflict. This design direction towards a more 
Perceptual Control Theory based approach (e.g., Powers, 1974) over the current self-
regulation system approach (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001) would offer opportunity to 
further examine dynamic shifts in affect regulatory strategy use over both a short term 
(in the case of goal selection) and long term (in the case of reorganisation of priorities 
and learning effective strategies). Reorganisation of goals and adjustment of 
motivations to pursue each offers a rich potential for improving the quality of fitting 
model results to existing data, particularly in terms of reflecting affect goal dynamics. 
Inclusion of a motivational force to pursue affect goals, either alongside, or in 
replacement of, the existing ‘resource model’ offers means to compare and contrast  
conflicting accounts (e.g., Alberts et al., 2011; Baumeister et al., 2007) of the pursuit of 
held goals Experimentally induced affect goal conflicts, such as those offered in section 
9.2 may further test model predictions of the capacity to pursue individual goals. 
The final offered development of the model relates to that of the third suggested 
extension because it proposes the broadening of affect regulation use to include 
interpersonal affect regulation (e.g., Niven et al., 2009). Deliberate interpersonal affect 
regulation strategies would develop and expand upon the predictions generated in 
Chapter 8 from the formation of a dyad of models because it would enable a wider 
degree of affect-expression change according to agents’ motivations. An individual 
agent may actively seek to improve their own affective state through regulating others’ 
felt-affect states and affect-expressions as an alternative means to intrapersonal 
regulation. Two agents with dynamic aims and motivations would further emphasise the 
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importance of regarding actors in a dyad as both active agents seeking to control their 
own affect, as outlined in Chapter 8.  
Leading on from this, models may be assembled as agents in complex networks of 
individuals, forming a hybrid simulation of parameter driven and agent based model 
(e.g., Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Smith & Conrey, 2007). Activity of agents, governed by 
rules at a complete system level, such as the structure of organisational networks 
(Totterdell et al., 2004), degrees of susceptibility to affect contagion (Ilies, Wagner, & 
Morgeson, 2007), and influence of network changes or mergers (Franz & Carley, 2009), 
would develop the investigation of affect regulation processes and strategy selection for 
affect regulation at broader levels than just the individual. Such approaches would 
further enable the examination for network effects on individuals as part of the growing 
argument for the benefit of examining affect as a social process, embedded within social 
networks. It is possible that using multiple, connected agents to explore affect 
regulation within a network as a unit may offer closer fits to individual data than 
examining individuals alone. Networks with dynamic connections between individuals 
may then offer predictions of network formation’s relationships with individuals’ affect 
regulation styles; individual agents that tend to use more effective regulation strategies 
may be more influential in the network and so more likely to make and maintain 
connections.  
9.4.3 Wider Implications and Research Directions 
Expanding beyond developments for the model, this section considers the wider 
implications of the research in this thesis across five main areas. The first area that the 
thesis has implications for is the understanding of affect regulation. Within the context 
of affect research, it is still only relatively recently that affect has been really considered 
in terms of being a dynamic (Boker, 2002; Scherer, 2000a) and controllable process 
(Gross, 1998a; Gross & Thompson, 2007). Given the short history of affect being 
examined from these approaches, the development of explorative models can offer 
unique perspectives and novel implications, particularly at their intersection of affect 
regulation dynamics. 
The model points towards two aspects of affect regulation that together have 
implications for the way affect regulation is commonly conceptualised. Firstly, 
representation of two agents interacting in a dyad highlights that an individual engaging 
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in expression regulation can shape the emotional experiences and expressions of the 
other individual. Issues arise when examining this interaction through the lens of the 
process model (Gross, 1998a); the first agent’s response modulation (expression 
regulation) modifies the affective situation it perceives (the second agents expression). 
This coinciding of processes contrasts the linear depiction of affect regulation in the 
process model. Secondly, the thesis suggests that both felt-affect regulation and affect-
expression regulation can co-occur, particularly in the pursuit of two contrasting held 
affect goals. Individuals in the second diary study report distinctions both between their 
felt-affect and affect-expression states and between the felt and expression affect goal 
states. Representations of these differences are met by the model through specifying 
contrasting goal states and independent regulation of affect states. Again, this contrasts 
the representation of affect regulation in the process model.  
Alongside the alternative representations of regulation dynamics, the occurrence of 
switching between dominant regulation strategy use in the model has implications for 
the representation of individuals as reappraisers or suppressors (e.g., Gross & John, 
2003). Regulation strategy use is context dependent in the model, relying on the relative 
disparity or coherency between the two affect goals and current self-regulatory capacity. 
A change in circumstances the model faces, such as affective events, a change in affect 
goals, or depletion of resource can, for example, see the model switch from exerting 
control primarily through felt-affect regulation, to both strategies being used 
concurrently, to primarily affect-expression regulation. While there may be trait 
dependent influences on regulation strategy selection, the model indicates that 
situational context can play an important role. Experiments in which the context of 
regulation is altered could offer further insights into the dynamics of individuals’ 
regulation strategy use. 
The second area that the thesis has implications for is the understanding of self-control. 
In the literature on the strength-model of self-control, suggestions are made that self-
regulatory capacity is depleted across a day (Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister et al., 
1999; Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996) and restoration across the long term is 
associated with sleep (Barber et al., 2010; Gailliot, 2008; Hagger, 2010). However, 
there is a dearth of studies examining this proposition further and studies dedicated to 
exploring the strength-model over time focus primarily on building self-control (e.g., 
Muraven, 2010) or record too infrequently to examine changes within a day (Muraven, 
Collins, Shiffman, & Paty, 2005). This thesis develops the concept of resource depletion 
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and restoration occurring across regular cycles and offers new insight into variation in 
resource capacity. Further exploration of self-regulatory capacity, such as controlled 
sleep-deprivation studies, could be conducted to better uncover any underlying rhythms 
and examine resource depletion’s association with subjective fatigue (e.g., Hagger et al., 
2010). 
Given the strength-model’s emphasis on the conservation of self-regulatory resource as 
a mechanism for abandoning self-regulation efforts, the indication that self-regulatory 
capacity varies within individuals across time has implications for testing protocols. 
Time-of-day effects may be seen between experimental studies as individuals might be 
more prepared to conserve resource in studies later on in the day after already 
experiencing everyday demands on self-regulation. So-called ‘glucose-hypothesis’ 
studies have been careful to monitor times in which self-regulation experiments are 
undertaken, particularly in repeated measures designs (Niven, Totterdell, Miles, Webb, 
& Sheeran, in press). However, there is no current indication that potential time-of-day 
effects have been considered in self-control experiments in general. 
The third area that the thesis has implications for is the use of computational models for 
investigating affect. To the author’s knowledge, there have not been previous attempts 
for integration of research across the diverse areas of: felt-affect regulation, affect-
expression regulation, self-regulatory capacity and goal adjustment, to develop an 
overarching model of affect regulation dynamics. Previous attempts at modelling affect 
and affect regulation dynamics have been limited to changing felt states only (e.g., 
Bosse et al., 2010; Oravecz et al., 2009) and point towards developing models for 
expression regulation as a future direction for the field (Bosse et al., 2010). The current 
model draws together these multiple aspects of affect regulation to a single model in 
which these are presented as being interrelated processes. As a result, complex 
dynamics of affect can be explored and changes of affect considered in broader terms, 
including the influence on affect goals and self-regulatory capacity.  
The use of computational models to represent dynamic processes offers alternative 
perspectives on affective processes and allows for exploration of plausible mechanisms 
underlying complex affect dynamics. Computational models, such as the one presented 
in this thesis, highlight current gaps in the literature that arise due to examining affect as 
a dynamic process trough using static models, such as that developed by Diefendorff 
and Gosserand, (2003). Propositions about the course of affect over time made using 
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informal models offer limited scope for investigation because representations of 
dynamics cannot be specified. In contrast, the development of computational models 
requires the specification of propositions (e.g., Epstein, 2008) enabling these to be 
formally tested and hypotheses examined.  
Practical implications arising from the development of predictive models of affect 
dynamics extend to the use of such models as ‘virtual participants’ for study. In 
experimental investigations where it becomes impractical or unethical to test 
propositions, such as the effects of extended sleep deprivation, a representation of 
plausible results derived from computational models offers possible alternatives to the 
use of human participants. This approach however, necessarily depends on accurate 
projections from simulations. Accurate and extended representation of an individual’s 
affect states offers further direction for research; clinical interventions for mood 
disorders could be explored and contrasted against projections made by the model for an 
individual’s affect states without intervention. Alternatively parameter change within a 
model representing an individual’s affect history could offer estimates of the projected 
influence interventions may have; such work is preliminarily explored in the context of 
anger management therapy in Bosse et al. (2010) and could be explored in further 
models. 
The fourth implication for research concerns hedonistic theories of affect. Traditionally 
the management of affect has been viewed with the assumption that individuals aim to 
maximise positive feelings (e.g., Khrone et al., 2002; Larsen, 2000; Tice & Bratslavsky, 
2000). However, there has been a recent growth in the exploration of affect goals from 
an alternative, instrumental perspective (e.g., Tamir, 2009a). Exploring the utility of 
affect as a tool to facilitate goal pursuit has placed emphasis on the benefits of negative 
valence affective states, and critically, contested the perspective that individuals solely 
aim to feel good. 
Even though the current model is built incorporating what is ultimately a hedonistic 
standpoint of affect regulation (i.e., the felt-affect goal home-base is more positive than 
the felt-affect home-base), the parameter set developed results in affect goals being as 
variable as felt-affect itself. Overall the model offers a representation of affect goals not 
just as single track as Larsen’s (2000) representation of assuming individuals want to 
feel good, but rather the more diverse view that individuals typically want to feel better 
(i.e., more positive or less negative). This indication that positive affect goals can vary 
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broadens the hedonistic perspective and implies that a ‘weak hedonistic approach’ of 
flexible goals, in contrast to the ‘strong hedonistic approach’ (e.g., Larsen, 2000), 
remains relevant alongside the development of instrumental theories of affect. 
The final area that the thesis has implications for is the control theory perspective of 
self-regulation. Carver and Scheier’s (2001) model of self-regulation offers an account 
of goal-directed behaviour, organised in a hierarchy of tiers of competing control loops. 
While their theory draws heavily from control in engineering (Clark, 1996) and 
perceptual control theory (Powers, 1974), one notable distinction is in their 
representation of affect. Positive and negative affect are considered as perceptions of the 
rate of progress towards or away from a goal and themselves argued to exist as states 
within their own control loops. These loops hold a fixed representation of how 
individuals would want to feel and in representations of their control model, are situated 
outside the main goal hierarchy. 
As discussed in terms of implications for hedonistic theories of affect, this thesis 
indicates that affect goals (i.e. what individuals want to feel) are not static. 
Representation of variation within individuals of affect goals over time indicates that 
these changes can even occur at rates comparable to affect change. This is a substantial 
contrast to the model put forwards by Carver and Scheier (2001), which does not 
consider the implications of adjustment of affect goals. Variation in affect goals offers a 
wider role for affect within the control framework, pointing towards behaviour being 
shaped to achieve goal affect states, as argued by Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, and Zang, 
(2007). Further to this, as affect goals can exist as something individuals specifically 
seek, this implies that an integration of affect regulation within the main hierarchy of 
goal driven self-regulation (Carver & Scheier; Powers, 1974) is appropriate. Again, this 
points towards the importance of examining self-regulation processes as being 
interrelated and the value of integrating related areas of research within overarching 
frameworks. 
In terms of practical implications, the model offers new directions for tools in the 
growing field of affect tracking and affect management. Currently, individuals can self-
monitor affect changes through a variety of smartphone applications or websites (e.g., 
T2 MoodTrackerTM, t2health.org/apps/t2-mood-tracker; MoodscopeTM, moodscope.com), 
which have potential use in terms of affect management and self-help. Development of 
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a MARDy affect tracking tool could extend affect tracking to that of goal affect states, 
which, to the author’s knowledge, no other tracking tool provides. Moreover, 
individuals can find it difficult to accurately forecast their affect (e.g., Ayton, Pott, & 
Elwakili, 2007) and yet current affect management tools do not explore individuals’ 
prospective affect in aid of better forecasting feelings. MARDy simulation offers 
representation of affect dynamics based on affective events and model development as 
an affect management tool could offer forecasting of individuals’ affect states based on 
individuals’ anticipated affective events.  
9.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter brings together findings from three means of testing the current model of 
affect regulation dynamics to explore propositions across three themes: self-regulatory 
capacity, affect regulation dynamics, and affect regulation in a dyad. The model 
discussed in this chapter represents the integration of five interrelated areas of self-
regulation: felt-affect regulation, affect-expression regulation, self-regulatory capacity, 
felt-affect goal regulation and affect-expression goal regulation. Its implementation as a 
computational model offers the exploration of dynamics across each of these areas and 
mechanisms underlying these. Implications of the models propositions for research are 
considered, and limitations and future directions discussed. 
Findings from model development and simulation indicate affect regulation dynamics 
can successfully be represented within a control theory framework of two levels of 
control. Moreover, within this framework, the higher tier, representing adjustments 
made to affect goals, shows comparable rates of change to that of the lower tier, 
representing affect states; this contrasts anticipated results and suggests flexibility in 
what individuals want to feel or express. Model representation of regulatory dynamics 
gathered from diary data is most successfully achieved with model parameter sets 
specified to reflect findings from emotional labour literature and a hedonistic 
conceptualisation of affect: specifically, affect-expression regulation is considered more 
effortful than felt-affect regulation and individuals typically regulate towards positive 
affect goals. Understanding both how affect changes across time and the mechanisms 
involved are current challenges for affect research; this thesis has offered a novel and 
viable way of moving that endeavour forward. 
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Appendix 1: Resource Model Formulae 
 
Resource (Rc) at time (t) is determined by the following formulae: 
 
Awake function: 
 
S(t) = ( Sa – L ) e-0.0353t + L 
 
Where S is the current level of alertness, Sa is alertness at time of waking and L is the 
lower asymptote for alertness in this function. L is specified as being 2.4. As time 
passes in the simulation alertness levels deplete from the level at Sa to that of L due to 
the wake function. 
 
Sleep function: 
 
S(t) = M – ( M – Ss ) e-0.0381t 
 
Unless S(t) < 12.5 then S(t) = S(t-1) + ( M – ( M – Ss ) e-0.0381t ) – 12.5 
 
Where R is the current level of alertness, Ss is alertness at time of sleeping and M is the 
max asymptote for alertness in this function. M is specified as being 14.3. As time 
passes in the simulation alertness levels restore from the level at Ss to that of M due to 
the sleep function. 
 
The use of either the sleep or awake function to determine S(t) is governed by an 
external signal determining the model’s sleeping or waking status. 
 
Circadian function: 
 
C(t) = cos ( pi / 12 / τ * t - pc ) 
 
Where τ represents the temporal resolution of the simulation (specified at 1000) and pc 
represents the point of achrophase for the circadian cycle (adjusted for each individual, 
default value 4.3966) 
 
An Ultradian function is set with a peak of 0.5 the circadian function, a period of 12 
hours and an acrophase 3 hours ahead of the circadian acrophase. pu = pc - 3 
 
U(t) = 0.5 cos ( pi / 6 / τ * t – pu * pi / 6 ) 
 
Resource (Rc) in the resource block is determined by the collective output of the 
functions: 
 
Rc(t) = S(t) + 0.1748 * ( C(t) - U(t) ) 
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Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms Used in Chapter 5 
Coherence Current Perceived Felt-Affect state acting as a home-base 
for Perceived Affect-Expression 
Discrep. Detected discrepancy between perceived affect or affect 
goal state and reference state 
Eval. Evaluation of stimulus intensity. 
FFh Expressive feedback from Perceived Affect-Expression to 
Perceived Felt-Affect 
PAE Perceived Affect-Expression – the model’s current affect-
expression state 
PEG Perceived Affect-Expression Goal – the model’s current 
affect-expression goal state 
PFA Perceived Felt-Affect – the model’s current felt-affect 
state 
PFG Perceived Felt-Affect Goal – the model’s current felt-
affect goal state 
Reg. Intensity of regulation output 
Reg On. Instruction determining if regulation is in use – signals the 
model to stop regulation when the model is in a ‘sleep’ 
state 
Res. Perceived self-regulatory resource capacity 
Stim. Stimulus’s affective intensity 
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Appendix 3: Parameter Ranges used in Sleep Deprivation Simulation 
Fixed Values  
 
k = 0.02 
k3 = 0.08 
feedback = 0.2 
int_goal = 0.6  
exp_goal = 0.6 
 
id_noise_fuzz = 0.02 % SD of Gaussian noise shaping affect trajectory 
id_noise_seed_range = round(1000*rand(100,1)) % Random seed for noise  
 
Parameter values drawn randomly from these ranges: 
home_base = 0 
k2_base = 0.02 
int_cost_base = 3 
exp_cost_base = 6 
 
home_base_range: Min = home_base -0.15,  Max = home_base +0.15 
k2_range:       Min = k2_base -0.005,   Max = k2_base + 0.015 
int_cost_range:  Min int_cost_base -0.5, Max = int_cost_base + 0.5  
exp_cost_range:  Min exp_cost_base -0.5, Max = exp_cost_base + 0.5 
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Appendix 4: Example of Research Materials for Study 1 
Preliminary Screening: 
 
Do you experience any irregular sleep patterns (e.g. due to shift work): 
 
Do you experience, or have previously been diagnosed with a mood disorder: 
 
Sample Diary Questions 
 
Please take time to familiarise yourself with the questions below. These will make up the 
majority of the diary study. If you have any queries about these or if you have any issues 
you wish to raise about these questions please inform the researcher. 
 
Current Feelings 
 
Please rate the extent to which you currently feel each of the following by ringing the 
appropriate ratings. 
A mark of 5 indicates that you currently feel that emotion a great deal, 3 indicates 
feeling that to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state. 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic 
The body consumes energy for activities such as physical exertion or extended 
concentration: this can be viewed as draining of a resource stored in a tank that has to 
be replenished from time to time. Please rate the extent to which you currently feel the 
following by ringing the appropriate ratings. 
 Not At 
All 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Emotionally Drained 
Target Feelings 
Please rate the extent to which you currently would want to feel each of the following 
by ringing a continuous range of appropriate ratings. 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic 
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Events That Have Happened To You In The Past 3 Hours   
 
This includes any events that were of any significance to you. 
 
Time – time event happened (approximate if necessary)  
 
Duration – how long event lasted (in minutes). 
 
Emotional strength – rate each event for its emotional strength on each scale, again from 
-5 to 5. E.g. a mark of 5 in the gloomy – happy box indicates that you felt happy to a 
great extent in response to the event. A mark of -3 on the sluggish – energetic scale 
indicates feeling sluggish to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state in 
response to the event. This is to measure how you as an individual feel in response to 
each event.  
 
Time Duration Gloomy- Happy Sluggish- Energetic 
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Your Emotional Expressions In The Past 3 Hours   
 
This includes any significant verbal or nonverbal expressions of feelings to others. 
 
Time – time it happened (approximate if necessary).  
 
Duration – how long it lasted (in minutes). 
 
Emotional strength – rate each of your expressions for its emotional strength on each 
scale, again from -5 to 5 E.g. a mark of 5 in the gloomy – happy box indicates that you 
expressed happiness to a great extent. A mark of -3 on the sluggish – energetic scale 
indicates a sluggish expression to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not expressing 
either state. This is a measure of how you as an individual express emotion 
 
Time Duration Gloomy- Happy Sluggish- Energetic 
    
    
    
    
 
Target Expressions 
 
Sometimes we are required to express certain emotions, even if we do not actually feel 
those emotions, e.g.as a requirement of a job. Please rate the extent to which you are 
expected to express each of the following by ringing a continuous range of appropriate 
ratings. 
 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic 
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Example Consent Form: 
 
Introduction 
 
 
What is this diary about? 
 
This is designed to track changes of mood across a week. In addition to this we will also 
ask you to record desired mood states, sleeping patterns, emotional events and 
emotional expression. The aim of this study is to better understand how these factors are 
related across time. 
 
The diary is part of a wider project looking at how we regulate, or attempt to change, 
our own and others emotional states. The data collected here is designed to test a 
computer model’s predictions of mood change across time. Your data will be used to 
help validate the model. 
 
What will happen with my data? 
 
The information that you provide in this diary will be kept completely confidential. 
 
To protect anonymity you do not need to put your name on the diary, each book has a 
unique identification number so only the research team know whose answers are whose. 
No personal information of yours will be stored with the data, events or personal 
interactions described will be numerically coded in the final data. 
 
We remind you that participation in this study is voluntary and you may stop at any 
time 
 
How do I fill out the diary? 
 
The diary has two sections for completion on waking and three sections for most other 
entries later in the day. For the ‘waking’ entries, the first questions are about the 
duration of sleep, followed by questions on your current mood state and your energy 
levels. You are requested to ring the values that most closely match your current state. 
 
For the other entries later in the day the first set of questions concern your current mood 
state, your energy levels and your desired moods states. You are requested to ring the 
values that most closely match your current state.  The second set of questions concern 
emotive events that have occurred since the last diary entry and how these made you 
feel. You are requested to write the time, duration, and the degree to which you felt each 
emotion in response to the events.  The final set of questions concern your emotional 
expression since the last diary entry. You are requested to write the time, duration, and 
the degree to which you expressed each emotion. 
 
There are examples of both a completed waking and regular diary entry at the end of 
this introduction. 
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How often do I complete the diary? 
 
For most days you will complete the diary on waking and then at three hourly intervals 
until the end of the day – e.g. 9am, 12noon, 3pm, 6pm, 9pm, and 12midnight. However, 
for two of the days (one weekday and one day from the weekend) you will fill out the 
diary on waking and then on the hour until the end of the day. 
  
You will be asked to start completing the diary on Thursday.  
 
What happens if I miss a time? 
 
If you miss a time, be that through waking up after the time for a diary entry has passed, 
going to sleep before the next diary entry is due, or simply forgetting; please do not fill 
in the missing time. Instead, please continue on with the diary as normal. 
 
Contact Information 
 
If you are unsure about how to complete this booklet, or have any other questions, 
please contact the researcher by email: 
 
d.s.cameron@shef.ac.uk 
 
or by phone: 
 
 +44 (0) 114 222 3257 
 
If you experience any distress over the course of this study please end participation in 
the study and contact your GP or another trusted health professional. 
 
 
 
I have read and understood the above introduction  
 
 
 
 
Signed.................................Date.............. 
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Example Morning Diary Entry: 
 
Affect Diary, Day …. 
 
 
TO BE COMPLETED ON WAKING UP  
 
Sleep 
 
What time did you go to sleep last night: 
 
What time did you wake up this morning:   
 
Minutes of sleep lost between those times (if any): 
 
 
Current Feelings 
 
Please rate the extent to which you currently feel each of the following by ringing the 
appropriate ratings. 
A mark of 5 indicates that you currently feel that emotion a great deal, 3 indicates 
feeling that to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state. 
 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic 
 
The body consumes energy for activities such as physical exertion or extended 
concentration: this can be viewed as draining of a resource stored in a tank that has to 
be replenished from time to time. Please rate the extent to which you currently feel the 
following by ringing the appropriate ratings. 
 
 Not At 
All 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Emotionally Drained 
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Example Regular Diary Entry: 
 
TO BE COMPLETED AT ….. AM (continued) 
 
Current Feelings 
 
Please rate the extent to which you currently feel each of the following by ringing the 
appropriate ratings. 
A mark of 5 indicates that you currently feel that emotion a great deal, 3 indicates 
feeling that to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state. 
 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent 
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic 
 
The body consumes energy for activities such as physical exertion or extended 
concentration: this can be viewed as draining of a resource stored in a tank that has to 
be replenished from time to time. Please rate the extent to which you currently feel each 
of the following by ringing the appropriate ratings. 
 
 Not At 
All 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Emotionally Drained 
 
Target Feelings 
 
Please rate the extent to which you currently would want to feel each of the following 
by ringing a continuous range of appropriate ratings. 
 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic 
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TO BE COMPLETED AT ..… AM (continued) 
 
Events That Have Happened To You In The Past 3 Hours   
 
This includes any events that were of any significance to you. 
 
Time – time event happened (approximate if necessary)  
 
Duration – how long event lasted (in minutes). 
 
Emotional strength – rate each event for its emotional strength on each scale, again from 
-5 to 5. E.g. a mark of 5 in the gloomy – happy box indicates that you felt happy to a 
great extent in response to the event. A mark of -3 on the sluggish – energetic scale 
indicates feeling sluggish to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state in 
response to the event. This is to measure how you as an individual feel in response to 
each event.  
 
Time Duration Gloomy- Happy Sluggish- Energetic 
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TO BE COMPLETED AT ….. AM (continued) 
 
Your Emotional Expressions In The Past 3 Hours   
 
This includes any significant verbal or nonverbal expressions of feelings to others. 
 
Time – time it happened (approximate if necessary).  
 
Duration – how long it lasted (in minutes). 
 
Emotional strength – rate each of your expressions for its emotional strength on each 
scale, again from -5 to 5 E.g. a mark of 5 in the gloomy – happy box indicates that you 
expressed happiness to a great extent. A mark of -3 on the sluggish – energetic scale 
indicates a sluggish expression to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not expressing 
either state. This is a measure of how you as an individual express emotion 
 
Time Duration Gloomy- Happy Sluggish- Energetic 
    
    
    
    
 
Target Expressions 
 
Sometimes we are required to express certain emotions, even if we do not actually feel 
those emotions, e.g.as a requirement of a job. Please rate the extent to which you are 
expected to express each of the following by ringing a continuous range of appropriate 
ratings. 
 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic 
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Appendix 5: Example of Research Materials for Study 2 
Preliminary Screening: 
 
Do you experience any irregular sleep patterns (e.g. due to shift work): 
 
Do you experience, or have previously been diagnosed with a mood disorder: 
 
Sample Diary Questions: 
 
Expressed Emotions 
Please rate the extent to which you have over the past two hours generally expressed 
your feelings. This can include expression through facial expressions, posture, gestures, 
tone of voice, as well as saying how you feel, both in person or through written means 
such as emails or texts.  
E.g. A mark of 5 on the scale indicates a great extent of positive expressions (such as 
enthusiasm, happiness or calmness), a mark of -3 indicates a moderate degree of 
negative expressions (such as annoyance, sadness or anxiety). If you cannot think of a 
time you have expressed your feelings please circle the X on the left of the scale and 
then rate what you would have expected to express to others, had you needed to. 
N/A  A Great Extent 
  Neutral   A Great Extent 
 
X Negative Expressions -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Positive 
Expressions
Current Feelings 
Please rate the extent to which you currently feel each of the following by ringing the 
appropriate ratings. 
E.g. a mark of 5 on the gloomy – happy scale indicates that you are currently feeling 
happy to a great extent. A mark of -3 on the sluggish – energetic scale indicates feeling 
sluggish to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state. 
 A Great 
Extent 
  Neutral   A Great Extent 
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic
The body consumes energy for activities such as physical exertion or extended 
concentration: this can be viewed as draining of a resource stored in a tank that has to 
be replenished from time to time. Please rate the extent to which you currently feel the 
following by ringing the appropriate rating. 
 Not At  
All 
  Somewhat   A Great Extent 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Emotionally Drained
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Target Emotions 
Taking in mind any external or situational factors you may be experiencing, please rate 
the extent to which you currently would want to express the following by ringing the 
appropriate rating. For example, at times it may be necessary to express emotions other 
than what you currently feel, such as appearing calm while feeling anxious or 
appearing positive when feeling sad or annoyed. 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent 
 
Negative 
Expressions 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Positive 
Expressions
Please rate the extent to which you currently would want to feel each of the following 
by ringing the appropriate ratings. 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent 
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic
Events That Have Happened To You In The Past 2 Hours   
This includes any events that were of any significance to you. Please record the 
approximate time and duration of the events  
Please also rate how you felt in response to each event on each scale, again from -5 to 
5. E.g. a mark of +5 in the Gloomy – Happy box indicates that you felt happy to a great 
extent in response to the event. A mark of -3 in the sluggish – energetic box indicates 
feeling sluggish to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state in 
response to the event.  
Time Duration 
(-5) Gloomy – 
Happy (+5) 
(-5) Sluggish – 
Energetic (+5) 
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Example Consent Form: 
Introduction 
What is this diary about? 
This is designed to track changes of emotional expressions and mood across a week. In 
addition to this we will also ask you to record what you want to express and feel, 
sleeping patterns, and any significant emotional events. The aim of this study is to better 
understand how these factors are related across time. 
Emotional expressions can often vary with how we are feeling, for example feeling 
happy would often be associated with more positive expressions. However, there are 
also circumstances in which we do not express what they feel. For example, you may 
feel anxious about a situation but need to appear calm, or you may feel annoyed with 
another person but are required to appear positive and pleasant towards them. In this 
study, we are interested in both your expressions towards others and also your general 
expressions. Your general expressions includes facial expressions, posture, gestures, 
tone of voice, as well as saying how you feel, both in person or through written means 
such as emails or texts and can occur in private as well as being directed towards others. 
The diary is part of a wider project looking at how we regulate, or attempt to change, 
our own and others’ emotional states. The data collected here is designed to test a 
computer model’s predictions of mood change across time. Your data will be used to 
help validate the model. 
Who will see my answers? 
The information that you provide in this diary will be kept completely confidential. 
None of your responses will be released to anyone outside the research team. To protect 
anonymity you do not need to put your name on the diary, each book has a unique 
identification number so only the research team know whose answers are whose. 
We remind you that participation in this study is voluntary and you may stop at any time 
How do I fill out the diary? 
The diary is divided into two main parts: entries made on waking and entries made 
throughout the day. 
For the ‘waking’ entries, the first questions are about the duration of sleep, followed by 
questions on your current mood state and your energy levels. You are requested to ring 
the values that most closely match your current state. 
For the other entries throughout the day, the first set of questions concern your 
expressions of emotions, your current feelings, and your energy levels. You are 
requested to ring the values that most closely match your expressions and feelings.  The 
second set of questions concern what you want to express and want to feel. You are 
requested to ring the values that most closely match your target expressions and 
feelings. 
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Finally, the third set of questions (on the same page as the second set) concern emotive 
events that have occurred since the last diary entry and how these made you feel. You 
are requested to write the time, duration, source of emotion, and the degree to which 
you felt each emotion in response to the events.  There are examples of both a 
completed waking and regular diary entry at the end of this introduction. 
How often do I complete the diary? 
For the six days of the study you are asked to complete the diary on waking and then at 
two hourly intervals until the end of the day – e.g. 8am, 10am, 12noon, 2pm, 4pm, 6pm, 
8pm, 10pm, and 12midnight. 
You will be asked to start completing the diary on Thursday.  
What happens if I miss a time? 
If you miss a time, be that through waking up after the time for a diary entry has passed, 
going to sleep before the next diary entry is due, or simply forgetting; please do not fill 
in the missing time. Instead, please continue on with the diary as normal. 
Contact Information 
If you are unsure about how to complete this booklet, or have any other questions, 
please contact the researcher by email: 
 
d.s.cameron@shef.ac.uk 
 
or by  phone: 
 
+44 (0) 114 222 3225 
 
 
 
 
I have read and understood the above introduction  
 
 
 
Signed………..........…………………………..........Date........……..................... 
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Example Morning Diary Entry: 
 
Affect Diary, Day …. 
 
 
TO BE COMPLETED ON WAKING UP  
 
Sleep 
 
What time did you go to sleep last night: 
 
What time did you wake up this morning:   
 
Minutes of sleep lost between those times (if any): 
 
 
Current Feelings 
 
Please rate the extent to which you currently feel each of the following by ringing the 
appropriate ratings. 
A mark of 5 indicates that you currently feel that emotion a great deal, 3 indicates 
feeling that to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state. 
 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic 
 
The body consumes energy for activities such as physical exertion or extended 
concentration: this can be viewed as draining of a resource stored in a tank that has to 
be replenished from time to time. Please rate the extent to which you currently feel the 
following by ringing the appropriate ratings. 
 
 Not At 
All 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent  
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Emotionally Drained 
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Example Regular Diary Entry: 
 
TO COMPLETED AT ..… AM 
  
Expressed Emotions 
 
Please rate the extent to which you have over the past two hours generally expressed 
your feelings. This can include expression through facial expressions, posture, gestures, 
tone of voice, as well as saying how you feel, both in person or through written means 
such as emails or texts.  
E.g. A mark of 5 on the scale indicates a great extent of positive expressions (such as 
enthusiasm, happiness or calmness), a mark of -3 indicates a moderate degree of 
negative expressions (such as annoyance, sadness or anxiety). If you cannot think of a 
time you have expressed your feelings please circle the X on the left of the scale and 
then rate what you would have expected to express to others, had you needed to. 
N/A  A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral   A Great 
Extent 
 
X Negative 
Expressions 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Positive 
Expressions
Current Feelings 
Please rate the extent to which you currently feel each of the following by ringing the 
appropriate ratings. 
E.g. a mark of 5 on the gloomy – happy scale indicates that you are currently feeling 
happy to a great extent. A mark of -3 on the sluggish – energetic scale indicates feeling 
sluggish to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state. 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral 
  A Great 
Extent 
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic
The body consumes energy for activities such as physical exertion or extended 
concentration: this can be viewed as draining of a resource stored in a tank that has to 
be replenished from time to time. Please rate the extent to which you currently feel the 
following by ringing the appropriate rating. 
 Not At  
All 
  Somewhat   A Great 
Extent 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Emotionally 
Drained
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TO BE COMPLETED AT ….. AM (continued) 
 
Target Emotions 
Taking in mind any external or situational factors you may be experiencing, please rate 
the extent to which you currently would want to express the following by ringing the 
appropriate rating. For example, at times it may be necessary to express emotions other 
than what you currently feel, such as appearing calm while feeling anxious or 
appearing positive when feeling sad or annoyed. 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral   A Great 
Extent 
 
Negative 
Expressions 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Positive 
Expressions
Please rate the extent to which you currently would want to feel each of the following 
by ringing the appropriate ratings. 
 A Great 
Extent 
  
Neutral   A Great 
Extent 
 
Gloomy -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy
Sluggish -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Energetic
Events That Have Happened To You In The Past 2 Hours   
This includes any events that were of any significance to you. Please record the 
approximate time and duration of the events  
Please also rate how you felt in response to each event on each scale, again from -5 to 
5. E.g. a mark of +5 in the Gloomy – Happy box indicates that you felt happy to a great 
extent in response to the event. A mark of -3 in the sluggish – energetic box indicates 
feeling sluggish to a moderate degree and 0 indicates not feeling either state in 
response to the event.  
Time Duration 
(-5) Gloomy – 
Happy (+5) 
(-5) Sluggish – 
Energetic (+5) 
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Appendix 6: Parameter Ranges used in Dyad Simulation 
Fixed values: 
 
k = 0.02 
k3 = 0.08 
feedback = 0.2 
exp_cost = 6 
 
id_noise_fuzz = 0.02 % SD of Gaussian noise shaping affect trajectory 
id_noise_seed_range = round(1000*rand(100,1)) % Random seed for noise  
 
Variable parameters in simulations: 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3a Scenario 3b 
home_base_1 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
home_base_2 0.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.4 
int_goal_home_1 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 
int_goal_home_2 1.0 1.0 1.0 -0.2 
exp_goal_home_1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
exp_goal_home_2 1.0 1.0 1.0 -0.2 
 
k2_base = 0.02 
k4_base = 0.02 
int_cost_base = 5 
 
Parameter values drawn randomly from these ranges: 
 
home_base_1_range: Min = home_base_1 -0.15, Max = home_base_1 +0.15 
home_base_2_range: Min = home_base_2 -0.15, Max = home_base_2 +0.15 
  
k2_1_range: Min = k2_base -0.005, Max = k2_base + 0.015 
k2_3_range: Min = k2_base -0.005, Max = k2_base + 0.015 
 
k4_1_range: Min = k4_base -0.0025, Max = k4_base + 0.0125 
k4_2_range: Min = k4_base -0.0025, Max = k4_base + 0.0125 
 
int_cost_1_range: Min int_cost_base -0.5, Max = int_cost_base + 0.5  
int_cost_2_range: Min int_cost_base -0.5, Max = int_cost_base + 0.5 
 
